CAMPAIGNING FOR NAPOLEON: The Diary of a Napoleonic Cavalry Officer (1806 -1813)

Book Description

In 1806 an enthusiastic young Frenchman Maurice de Tascher embarked on a career as a soldier in Napoleon's Grand Arme'e. He was inspired by the emperor's triumphs and determined to win glory and serve his country. In 1813, disillusioned by war and doubtful about the honor of the French cause, de Tascher died in Berlin, a victim of Napoleon's disastrous war against Russia. This is his story.

NAPOLEON'S GRANDE ARME'E OF 1813 (Armies of the Napoleonic Wars Research Series)

Average customer rating:

Re: Detail and Typos
Invaluable insight into Napoleon's 1813 campaign
Good book
An impressive, remarkable piece of original scholarship
A book with a wealth of detail and numerous typo errors

NAPOLEON'S GRANDE ARME'E OF 1813 (Armies of the Napoleonic Wars Research Series)
Scott Bowden
Manufacturer: Emperor's Press
ProductGroup: Book
Binding: Hardcover

General | Europe | History | Subjects | Books

General | Military | History | Subjects | Books

19th Century | World | History | Subjects | Books

General | World | History | Subjects | Books

Military Science | History | Subjects | Books
ASIN: 0962665517

Book Description

France was down to its last reserves when Napoleon faced the task of raising a massive army to confront an alliance of all the powers of Europe. Drawing on French Army archives, the author presents a definitive account of Napoleon's 1813 army, its composition and organization previously unavailable in English.

Customer Reviews:

Re: Detail and Typos.......2004-04-03

I have to follow-up with the previous review. Having been given this book for my birthday by my kids, I was instantly drawn in by Bowden's immense research. However, I also was appalled by the large number of typographic errors, grammatical errors, and use of slang in referring to the sergeants and corporals as "noncomms" instead of as non-commissioned officers. I served in the U.S. Army for 20 years and always called them by either their rank or by the term non-commissioned officers (or its abbreviation - NCOs). I also wonder how much error has crept into the amazing appendices. But I guess we'll never know until someone goes and checks out the French archives originals. Otherwise a useful book on this oft neglected campaign.

Invaluable insight into Napoleon's 1813 campaign.......2003-05-03

After finishing this book, I realized that for the first time, I feel as though I understand WHY the 1813 campaign unfolded in the manner that it did...what forces were in play that affected Napoleon and his army...reasons that have never before been explained.

Everything about the French army and its unbelievable weaknesses are revealed in detail, along with Napoleon's momentous mistakes that kept feeding immature youths that were improperly officered into an already failing organizational structure because the recruits could not be properly trained OR properly fed.

If you are interested in the 1813 campaigns, don't miss this one.

Good book.......2000-03-06

I recommend this book, although I am a little bit dissapointed after Bowden's master piece "Napoleon and Austerlitz"

An impressive, remarkable piece of original scholarship.......1999-09-08

After having read the author's NAPOLEON AND AUSTERLITZ, which was the best Napoleonic combat narrative I've ever seen, I ordered a copy of NAPOLEON'S GRANDE ARMEE OF 1813. This is the first time that I have ever read a work that can only be described as a "biography of an army," and it is impressive. The campaign for Germany in 1813 now makes complete sense in light of understanding the central characters of the struggle, that being Napoleon and his army. Like the author's other works, this book shows what remarkable evidence can be presented when original source documents are consulted. Highest recommendation.

A book with a wealth of detail and numerous typo errors.......1998-07-01

This book is really quite attractive, with a stunning dustcover and a highly promising topic. The Grande Armee of 1813 as Scott Bowden clearly shows, was a makeshift army and Grande was a semantic concept. There is a very detailed breakdown of the units of the 1813 Grande Armee in an extended appendix and the text reads quite well. What throws me off is the numerous typo errors in the text (there are a lot of them!) and although I am not in a position to comment on the accuracy of the breakdown of the units, I am uncertain as to whether careless editing may have also crept into the appendix, hence the ambivalent rating.

Napoleon at Dresden: The Battles of August 1813

Average customer rating:

Napoleon at Dresden: The Battles of August 1813
George Nafziger
Manufacturer: Emperor's Press
ProductGroup: Book
Binding: Hardcover

Rome | Ancient | History | Subjects | Books

General | Europe | History | Subjects | Books

General | Military | History | Subjects | Books

Strategy | Military | History | Subjects | Books

General | World | History | Subjects | Books
Similar Items:

Napoleon at Leipzig: The Battle of Nations 1813

ASIN: 0962665541

Average customer rating:

A biased account
3.4 stars; not entirely convincing

Fighting Napoleon
Charles J. Esdaile
Manufacturer: Yale University Press
ProductGroup: Book
Binding: Hardcover

General | Asia | History | Subjects | Books

General | Europe | History | Subjects | Books

Spain | Europe | History | Subjects | Books

Strategy | Military | History | Subjects | Books

General | World | History | Subjects | Books

All Titles | Qualifying Textbooks - Fall 2007 | Stores | Books
Similar Items:

The Fatal Knot: The Guerrilla War in Navarre and the Defeat of Napoleon in Spain

ASIN: 0300101120

Book Description

Alongside the Spanish army in the campaign against Napoleon (1808-1814) was an assortment of freebooters, local peasants, and bandits who were organized into ad hoc regional private armies. These "guerrillas"-a term introduced to the English language during the Peninsular War-ambushed French convoys, attacked French encampments, and pounced upon, dodged, and fought French columns, often with extreme brutality. This book investigates for the first time the irregular Spanish forces and their role in resisting Napoleon. Delving deeply into previously untapped archival resources, Charles Esdaile arrives at an entirely new view of the Spanish guerrillas. He shows that the Spanish war against Napoleon was something other than the great popular crusade of legend, that many guerrillas were not armed civilians acting spontaneously, and that guerrillas were more often driven by personal motives than high-minded ideology. Tracking down the bandit armies and assessing their contributions, Esdaile offers important insights into the famous "little war" and the motives of those who fought it.

Customer Reviews:

A biased account.......2005-08-30

Charles Esdaile has worked a strongly biased narrative about guerrilla warfare in Spain in the Napoleonic Wars. He has an axe to grind and went berserker... missing his target by a mile. For example, he states there were a direct relationship between the guerrillas and the grow of rural delicuency in Galicia from 1810 onwards. However Galicia was occupied by the French for only five months -from January to June, 1809- and albeit there were a popular uprising, there were not guerrilla bands organised.
He makes another gross mistakes as when he atributes the rank of officer of the marines to Diaz Porlier... when he was a captain in the Mallorca Line Infantry Regiment since 1806 when he applied from a transfer from the Navy -where he was Second Lieutenant- to the Army. This can look irrelevant but as he takes so many pains to prove that Porlier was a greedy guerrilla fighter instead a regular officer, that to state what exactly was the status of Porlier when he raised his Division in 1808 acquires relevance.
Not a good book at all except you are really knowledge in guerrilla warfare in Spain... only to allow you to steer your path between his many prejudices, mistakes and outright lies.

3.4 stars; not entirely convincing.......2004-07-07

For some time now historians have been critical of the democratic claims of the French Revolution. Where once people saw the birth of liberty, many scholars see mass indifference, active opposition and widespread fear. So I suppose it was only a matter of time that historians would start seeing the same things about the counter-revolution as well. And surely there is no place where the counter-revolution was as popular as Spain during the Peninsular wars? For not only did Spain provide a guerilla warfare unmatched in the rest of Napoleonic Europe, it even provided the term "guerrilla." But not so fast, argues Charles Esdaile. He relies on archives from Madrid, Barcelona, Tudela, Zaragoza and London, thirty-three contemporary newspapers, several dozen memoirs and contemporary accounts as well as a wide secondary literature. The result is a stimulating, provocative work, that is not entirely convincing.

After discussing the basic pro-Guerrilla historiography, and then giving a brief survey of the guerrilla war which seems to vindicate them (even Joseph Bonaparte, Napoleon's brother and king of Spain, said the guerrillas undermined the Spanish position) Esdaile starts to attack. He starts off slowly, arguing that what some people describe as guerrillas were actually local home guards. The regular Spanish army still existed and they often provided vital assistance. Many "guerrillas" were actually members of the regular army. Now moving in to the kill, Esdaile discusses the pro-Patriot response. The Bourbon elites still remained in power, and often had to repress angry Spaniards outraged over their corruption, brutality and use of conscription. Indeed, in parts of Spain they were serious jacqueries, which should be distinguished from social banditry. The guerrillas had little interest in larger social change, while the many bandits were decidedly anti-social. Not only was there resistance to conscription, but there was also mass desertion. Nor were the "guerrillas" particularly popular. Only in Navarre, where feudalism was extremely weak and the Church atypically mild, was there real enthusiasm for partisan warfare. Looking at the biographies of many guerrillas, Esdaile finds many lies and deceptions, and a strong streak of opportunism. Elsewhere, there was little enthusiasm for the struggle. People joined the guerrillas because they had to flee the consequences of their own actions, or because they were forced to by the often brutal guerrillas themselves, or because they were basically bandits. Economic disaster made joining the guerrillas an economically rational move. What achievements were made was the result of Napoleon's withdrawal of troops. Elsewhere guerrillas squabbled among themselves for the most petty and selfish of reasons, while they often looted and burdened themselves on the public at large. After the defeat of Napoleon the guerrillas' violence only intensified before they were suppressed by the state. Many romantic liberals thought this was unfair, but gradually realized that this was right. Finally, contrary to what people might think, few guerrillas became principled liberals; the most famous examples can really be explained by opportunism.

Such is Esdaile's argument. On a first glance it looks convincing, and it is backed by many examples. But a second glance reveals some problems. Commenting on the roots of the guerrillas, Esdaile writes that they "lay not in heroism but hunger, not daring but despair." But surely this is too sharp a distinction. After all one reason why many people would find the French intolerable was because of the economic crisis they encouraged. Another problem with the emphasis on opportunism is that opportunists and ne'er do wells could join the French occupying authorities. But they did not, or at least not enough to help them. A larger problem is a complete lack of comparative analysis. There is certainly no doubt that Spain caused more trouble for Napoleon than most of the rest of Europe together. Surely there must be some explanation for this ability. It certainly can't be the efficiency of the state or the effectiveness of the army that made Spain deadlier than the Netherlands, Switzerland or the domains of the Habsburgs. Likewise a comparison with Vietnam would undercut Esdaile's suggestion that guerrillas have only limited tactical abilities. And whether it is discussing wartime Greece, the French resistance or the Vietnam war, recent histories by Mark Mazower, Julian Jackson, Eric Bergerud and David Elliott have made clear that while partisans can be brutal, greedy and viewed with some skepticism by the local population, they can also receive genuine support and carry out real damage on the occupying countries. But Esdaile has nothing to say about the rest of occupied Europe and other guerrilla wars. Similarly if most of the guerrilla leaders were selfish, opportunistic and rapacious, were their betters in the regular army, the Absolutist state or Wellington's forces any better? We got no clear discussion of this point, and we get even less about the guerrilla rank and file. And Esdaile does not distinguish as well as he could between opportunism and a lack of political sophistication that would be inevitable in a country as autocratically run as Spain. Esdaile tells us much about politics in a country whose historiography often remains shadowy even among well educated readers. But there is an all or nothing tendency in his book that undercuts his points.

Average customer rating:

Bitter anonymous critics

More bad history by a Brit

Leipzig Made Simple!

Grievous errors abound amidst many eye-witness accounts

Decent Account of the "Battle of the Nations"

1813 Leipzig: Napoleon and the Battle of the Nations
Digby Smith
Manufacturer: Greenhill Books
ProductGroup: Book
Binding: Hardcover

General | Europe | History | Subjects | Books
General | Germany | Europe | History | Subjects | Books
General | Military | History | Subjects | Books
General | Napoleonic Wars | Military | History | Subjects | Books
Napoleon | Napoleonic Wars | Military | History | Subjects | Books
General | World | History | Subjects | Books
Similar Items:

1814, THE CAMPAIGN OF FRANCE (Great Battles of the First Empire)

EMPEROR'S LAST VICTORY: Napoleon and the Battle of Wagram

ASIN: 1853674354

Book Description

The crucial three-day battle of Leipzig, known to posterity as the Battle of the Nations, was the biggest battle of the Napoleonic Wars. It was also one of Napoleon's worst defeats - Leipzig sealed the fate of Napoleon's empire. Now, in this superbly narrated account of the battle, Digby Smith describes the events of 16, 17, 18 and 19 October 1813, and stresses both the significance of the battle and the brutality of the fighting. At the height of the battle Napoleon fielded more than 200,000 men against an Allied force - which included contingents from Russia, Austria, Prussia and Sweden - of some 360,000 soldiers. Cornered against the River Estler, Napoleon, outnumbered and suffering heavily from the fire of 1,400 Allied guns, was soundly defeated, had to relinquish control of Germany and was forced back into France. Digby Smith's evocative account of Leipzig concentrates on the ferocious fighting, charts the fortunes of the three day struggle and underlines the incredible human cost of the battle. Using a wealth of first-hand accounts, many of them previously unpublished in English, he brings the dramatic struggle to life and demonstrates just what it was like for the average French, German, Russian, Prussian, Austrian or Swedish soldier to take part in the Battle of the Nations.

Customer Reviews:

Bitter anonymous critics.......2002-01-16

Two bitingly sour reviews of my book have been posted by `A Reader`, wishing to remain anonymous. From the similarity of style I would assume that both stem from the same pen. Obviously, I have got severely up someone`s nose; can it be because of my coolness towards Napoleon? Perhaps `A Reader` would have the courage to add his name to his work, as authors do.

More bad history by a Brit.......2001-12-18

This is one of the worst Napoleonic books I have ever read, chock full of meandering eye-witness accounts strung together with poor phrasing and writing. But what is the worst part of this book, and what is inexcusable, are the numerous mistakes of fact...so many of them that it is not worth the while of recounting all of them here. Simply put, if you want bad history, buy this book. If you want a decent treatment of the Battle of Nations, look elsewhere.

Leipzig Made Simple!.......2001-12-08

I have been struggling to find a manageable book about the Leipzig campaign for some time. It's a big battle and hard to find a good balance between extremely detailed (long-winded?) accounts, or accounts which are simply too basic and superficial. After all, it is THE battle of Napoleonic wars in terms of size and duration!

I found this Digby Smith book very accessible. He writes well, and the book is beter laid out than, say, the Bowden triology, which to my mind dont engage the reader as well, and focus unduly on the French perspective of the campaign - at the expense of the rest. Importantly for me, (and where he scores over the excellent Osprey title on Leipzig) he has a good set of orders of battle in the appendix. Digby Smith is always hot on providing lots of data in his books, and this book is no exception. Its not the extreme detail of a Nafziger orbat, but it tells you all you need to know. An excellent overall text, and, for me, just the right balance between content and detail - and in just one volume!

Grievous errors abound amidst many eye-witness accounts.......2001-10-06

Digby Smith, a.k.a. Otto von Pivka, makes a mess out of this effort to tackle the massive four-day struggle between the Emperor Napoleon I and his enemies. And after reading one certain "Five-Star" review in this column, this reviewer is left with the impression that such a high rating must be due to the fact that the "Five-Star" reviewer MUST be somehow in debt to Mr. Smith.

Factual errors---grievous ones at that---plague the book from the start. In fact, Chapter One is so riddled with mistakes, that one HAS to question the editorial capabilities of the publisher's staff. Only a few of these mistakes will be pointed out here. The author maintains on page 11 that by April, 1813, "Britain was pouring money and equipment into the coffers and depots of Napoleon's enemies via the Baltic." Such was not the case. The Allied powers were hard pressed to fund and supply their own efforts prior to the subsidy treaties between Britain/Prussia/Russia were concluded and signed in the middle of June (treaty with Prussia on 14 June; treaty with Russia on 15 June). Similar trouble crops up with Mr. Smith's handling of the Austrians, when he states on page 12 that "Austria joined the Allies...on 27 June 1813." The 27 June agreement DID NOT have the Austrians join the alliance, but rather authorized ultimatums to be delivered to Napoleon as the Allied price of peace. Austria later officially declared war on France in August.

Once the campaign begins, Smith's work seems to get worse. Smith claims on page 17 that Napoleon gave Marshal Ney command of the Army of the Bober on 15 August "with the aim of thrusting towards Berlin. This was, instead, Marshal Oudinot's Army of Berlin...Napoleon did not form the Army of the Bober until more than a week later, and it was under Marshal Macdonald. Smith then continues on a disastrous serious of mistaken identities. On August 22, Smith states that Oudinot, now as commander of the Army of the Bober, faced the Allies in Silesia. Then Smith claims on page 19 that on the following day, Oudinot, clashed with the Allied Army of the North "only 17 kilometers south of Berlin."

The mistakes go on and on and on and on. Example: In Chapter Two,on page 35, Mr. Smith claims that "under the terms of the Treaty of Tilst of 8 September 1808, Prussia's army had been limited to 42,000." It was the Treaty of Paris of 8 Septmber 1808 that limited the size of the Prussian army. Factual mistakes also show up often under the narrative of the Battle of Leipzig, such as Mr. Smith's claims on page 208 that Bulow's 3rd Prussian Corps was part of Blucher's Army of Silesia; rather, Bulow was with the Army of the North.

Sources are scant and without ANY French archival sources (these are easily accessed at the Chateau de Vincennes) and anaylsis is lacking in any detail or depth.

In the end, this is a treatment which seems to be aimed at an audience that enjoys lengthy eywitness accounts...and this is where the book's value may be found.

Decent Account of the "Battle of the Nations".......2001-03-29

I had great expectations when I started reading this book. As soon as I saw the cover I knew that I had to read it, since there have been so few decent accounts of this pivotal battle. At long last a new book on the 1813 battle of Leipzig, the `Battle of Nations'.

Alas it was not as good as I hoped. Although I found the research excellent and the first hand accounts very interesting the book was missing something. What it lacked, for me anyhow, was a story. The narrative was dry with lots of detail but it didn't seem to flow, to get you involved, as a good story should. I know the author is not writing a novel but a book that is just full of facts and details will lose its audience if its too dry to keep the reader awake.

Book Description

Napoleon's years of failure, beginning with Russia's incursion into France and ending with his first exile to Elba, are the focus of this political and military history by Napoleonic scholar Delderfield.

The Fatal Knot: The Guerrilla War in Navarre and the Defeat of Napoleon in Spain

Average customer rating:

No stone unturned
A "little" war
Sophisticated analysis, excellent read.

The Fatal Knot: The Guerrilla War in Navarre and the Defeat of Napoleon in Spain
John Lawrence Tone
Manufacturer: University of North Carolina Press
ProductGroup: Book
Binding: Hardcover

General | Europe | History | Subjects | Books

Spain | Europe | History | Subjects | Books

General | World | History | Subjects | Books

Military Science | History | Subjects | Books

ASIN: 0807821691

Customer Reviews:

No stone unturned.......2007-02-08

In "The Fatal Knot", John Tone does an excellent job in covering virtually every aspect in what was the world's first professional guerilla war. His opening chapters explain the cultural and social factors which laid beneath Navarre and gave cause to a guerrilla movement there, as opposed to other regions of Spain.

Tone does rare justice to historical objectivity, taking no sides and exposing the atrocities of both Napoleon's armies and the guerrillas (who more often than not were little more than bandits). The military lesson (which Napoleon failed to learn, incidentally) was that a guerrilla war can only possibly be defeated by a huge influx of troops (which Napoleon, with his upcoming Russian campaign in mind, was unwilling to provide).

This book is absolutely essential for understanding the modern guerrilla war. It's a shame that our current decision makers have obviously not read it. Napoleon could not control Spain (with a single rebellious province) with 400,000 troops. No matter how well trained the troops are, our own nation cannot pacify a nation larger than Spain with a force one-fourth the size of Napoleon's. It is simply impossible.

A "little" war.......2002-05-07

The Fatal Knot is the only book that I could find that focused on the "guerillas" in the first guerilla war. This is particularly strange considering the importance of "guerilla" wars in South America and Africa, not to mention Vietnam. There were of course wars that contained non-regular soldiers, such as the wars against the Indians in North America, but this was the first war (or "little war," "guer-illa") that pitted regular, conscripted soldiers against irregular combatants. According to Carl Schmitt, it was one of the first cracks in the established rules of international law. The author does a good job of bringing out the most important points, and demonstrating the social basis of the support for the guerillas. He also shows why the virulence of guerilla wars is a function of the force of the regular army and not just of the "banditry" of the irregular combatants. (Interestingly, even during this war there were POWs). In many ways, this war was the first modern war, and it deserves more study than it has attracted so far. The author makes a good first step.

Sophisticated analysis, excellent read........2000-05-17

Disregarding the historiographic tradition associated with the guerillas of Navarre, John Lawrence Tone provides a much-needed social and economic analysis of the Spanish province in The Fatal Knot: The Guerilla War in Navarre and the Defeat of Napoleon in Spain. Tone's sophisticated approach and copious evidence give a clear picture of the motivations and influences of the Navarrese guerillas and the failures of the French from 1808-1813.

The first two chapters, what tone calls his "portrait of Navarre", provide the background necessary to understand the vigilance and success of the guerilla movement and its leaders. Contrasting the upper and lower regions of Navarre, Montana and Ribera, Tone is able to evaluate and pinpoint sources of rebel instigation. More explanatory passages are sprinkled throughout the narrative portion of the book, so the separation of social and narrative history is neither harsh to the reader nor boring. The final chapter, clearly defined as "Why Navarre Fought" sums up Tone's arguments for the success of the movement in Montana. The prevalence of private land ownership, a large percentage of nobility, and clerical poverty all contributed to the movement's social and economic background but the political autonomy the region enjoyed under the Spanish Monarchy was possibly the most important factor in instigating the guerilla wars.

Tone's arguments would have benefited from a comparison of the situation in Spain with that in the Kingdom of Naples. General Reynier, for example, was successful in defeating guerrillas in the similarly harsh territory of Calabria, yet he was unable to resist them in Navarre, further evidence of the importance of political sovereignty in Navarre. For now the Calabrian guerillas remain subject to the stereotypes once associated with the Navarese. (see Milton Finley, "The Most Monstrous of Wars")

Average customer rating:
Europe Against Napoleon : The Leipzig Campaign, 1813 from Eye-Witness Accounts
Antony Brett-James
Manufacturer: St. Martin's Press
ProductGroup: Book
Binding: Hardcover
ASIN: 0312268807

Average customer rating:
The conscript;: A story of the French war of 1813; (Erckmann-Chatrian national novels)
Erckmann-Chatrian
Manufacturer: C. Scribner's sons
ProductGroup: Book
Binding: Unknown Binding
ASIN: B000887Y08

Book Description

Thelma Blumberg has seen it all: children with elective mutism, children physically abused, children on drugs, children who create fear in others and children who live their lives in fear. The Baltimore City School system is a good place to find a cross-section of such children. The Jewish Day Schools also present experiences which keep a school psychologist on her toes. Working in Israel, in Kiryat Arba, among other places, Thelma sees what happens when shock and trauma become everyday occurrences. While in Israel, Thelma finds herself counseling children sent by their parents to "find themselves" - to kick their drug habits and/or their non-responsiveness to Judaism, and come back home "cured". Through it all, Thelma has to care for her emotionally troubled son, making sure he has what he needs to confront his obstacles. How does she do it? That's the secret of Thelma Blumberg.

Customer Reviews:

No Time.......2006-07-28

Blumberg is a psychologist in the city of Baltimore, Maryland helping students and working in conjunction with teachers, social workers, and other school professionals. This book is her story- both inside school and in general. As the mother of an intellectually limited child herself, one of Blumberg's focuses is on increasing the interaction and understanding between health workers and the parents of the children she works with. Additionally, Blumberg is a staunch proponent of behavior management to help students, both inside and outside the classroom.

Quote: "Prevalent here are the success stories of children whose lives I helped transform, and included to are the tales of the naysayers who said `It can't be done.'"

I chose this book because I am about to begin teaching in a city school and am looking for tips and inspiration anywhere I can find them. Unfortunately, this book had very little of either. This book, short as it was, contained too much of Blumberg's life story outside of schools, and not enough just about working with the students. Ultimately, I'm sure she has helped many students during her career, it was just a bit too self-congratulatory a work for me.

Books:

Books Index

Books Home

Recommended Books