Book Description
A master spy's memoir of playing the game in the most strategically influential country in 1960s Africa.
Larry Devlin arrived as the new chief of station for the CIA in the Congo five days after the country had declared its independence, the army had mutinied, and governmental authority had collapsed. As he crossed the Congo River in an almost empty ferry boat, all he could see were lines of people trying to travel the other way--out of the Congo. Within his first two weeks he found himself on the wrong end of a revolver as militiamen played Russian-roulette, Congo style, with him.
During his first year, the charismatic and reckless political leader, Patrice Lumumba, was murdered and Devlin was widely thought to have been entrusted with (he was) and to have carried out (he didn't) the assassination. Then he saved the life of Joseph Desire Mobutu, who carried out the military coup that presaged his own rise to political power. Devlin found himself at the heart of Africa, fighting for the future of perhaps the most strategically influential country on the continent, its borders shared with eight other nations. He met every significant political figure, from presidents to mercenaries, as he took the Cold War to one of the world's hottest zones. This is a classic political memoir from a master spy who lived in wildly dramatic times.
Customer Reviews:
CoS Congo.......2007-08-09
An excellent biography, discusses what happened during the Cold War in the Congo from his point of view. I found it an enjoyable read.
Exciting times.......2007-07-05
A good book giving an overall flavor of the Congo in the early 60's. It would be nice if Devlin had filled in more details however perhaps this is proscribed in his publishing agreement (I presume that he had to run this through the CIA before publishing it). You do get an idea of just what a CIA COS does to try to guide events to follow US policy. He's rather blase about the physical risks of operating in an unstable environment although maybe this is because he survived to tell the tale. I don't think that I would have my family at my side in such an environment.
Charts his many encounters and is a top pick.......2007-06-17
Author Larry Devlin arrived as the new chief of station for the CIA in the Congo five days after the country declared its independence, the army mutinied, and the government had collapsed: as he entered the country, streams of residents were fleeing. During his first year he was accused of murdering a charismatic political leader, saved the life of the man who carried out the military coup, and found himself confronting unheard-of challenges in Africa. CHIEF OF STATION, CONGO charts his many encounters and is a top pick especially recommended for college-level and military holdings strong in African culture and history.
Diane C. Donovan
California Bookwatch
-.......2007-06-12
A little too general, very maddening that he left out so many details. But a necessary read for those interested in the Congo in the 60's
History Lessons.......2007-06-07
This book rewards its readers with good deal of information on a variety of subjects. It undoubtedly provides a very accurate account of the struggle of the former Belgium Congo to become a variable nation state. In the course of doing this, its author provides a plausible description of the chaotic condition of an imploding nation state and its leading political players of the period, including the controversial Patrice Lumumba and the man who turned out to be his chief rival Sese Seko Mobutu. Finally the book opens a window on how the U.S -Soviet Union Clod War rivalry played out in an newly independent African state like the Congo.
On a rather different level, Larry Devlin provides a good explanation of what a pro-active CIA Station Chief (COS) of 1960 did to earn his keep. One can carry away a good deal of information about good `tradecraft', the use of non-official cover (NOC) agents, and the vital need for a close relationship between the COS and the U.S. Ambassador. For a long period Devlin was not only COS Kinshasa (Leopoldville), but also the only CIA representative in the Congo. As a result, he discloses quite a bit about the art and craft of recruiting and maintaining `agents' in the field. Although virtually all memoirs written by former intelligence folks tend to be somewhat self-serving, from this book it is clear that Devlin really was good at his job and did his best to protect the national security interests of U.S. and equally important to help the Congolese build a viable and independent nation state. That in the end the Congo continues to be a near failed state was due to factors well beyond Devlin's control.
The problem then as now of course is that a really good CIA operative like Devlin and a really poor operatives are treated pretty much the same way by CIA. The system is really designed to homogenize everyone into the same bland blend. Also it is clear that CIA of 2007 would never allow a COS the kind of freedom of action that Devlin had in 1960.
Anyone with an interest in Africa or the CIA or both ought to find this well written and informative book fascinating.
Book Description
A man who had won the Nobel Peace Prize, who was widely counted one of the greatest UN Secretary Generals, was nearly hounded from office by scandal. Indeed, both Annan and the institution he incarnates were so deeply shaken after the Bush Administration went to war in Iraq in the face of opposition from the Security Council that critics, and even some friends, began asking whether this sixty-year-old experiment in global policing has outlived its usefulness. Do its failures arise from its own structure and culture, or from a clash with an American administration determined to go its own way in defiance of world opinion?
James Traub, a New York Times Magazine contributor who has spent years writing about the UN and about foreign affairs, delves into these questions as no one else has done before. Traub enjoyed unprecedented access to Annan and his top aides throughout much of this traumatic period. He describes the despair over the Oil-for-Food scandal, the deep divide between those who wished to accommodate American critics and those who wished to confront them, the failed attempt to goad the Security Council to act decisively against state-sponsored ethnic cleansing in Sudan. And he recounts Annan’s effort to respond to criticism with sweeping reform—an effort which ultimately shattered on the resistance of U.S. Ambassador John Bolton.
In The Best Intentions, Traub recounts the dramatically entwined history of Kofi Annan and the UN from 1992 to the present. In Annan he sees a conscientious idealist given too little credit for advancing causes like humanitarian intervention and an honest broker crushed between American conservatives and Third World opponents—but also a UN careerist who has absorbed that culture and can not, in the end, escape its limitations.
Customer Reviews:
Timely study of the UN and the challenges of global leadership.......2007-06-01
The strengths of this excellent book far outweigh its weaknesses. It is especially compelling as a case study of leadership in a deeply flawed but essential institution. Traub's had access to Kofi Annan, as well as Annan's chief lieutenants at the UN, over an extended period of time that included his early successes, the events prior to the Iraq war and the Iraq "Oil for Food" scandal. Through the text we gain an understanding of the inner workings of the infamously cumbersome UN bureaucracy as well as the impossible constraints placed upon it by the United States government and the 191 other member states. Annan's early successes as Secretary General were substantial; yet his passive style of leadership made him very vulnerable. He ultimately paid a severe price. Traub documents Annan's physical and mental breakdowns and the blow to his reputation caused by his failure to properly monitor the Oil for Food program.
The book would have benefited from a section with further details on the overwhelming complexity of the UN organization and the lack of power of the Secretary General to control it. Traub also occasionally feels compelled to engage in weak, superficial "fair and balanced" analysis that is not helpful to the overall narrative. Overall, however, this is a fine book that is a useful way to learn about the challenges of running the UN.
An Impossible Role.......2007-03-13
FDR was a leading proponent of the U.N. after WWII had proven the League of Nations (formed in response ti WWI) ineffectual. His vision was that the "four policemen" (U.S., Nationalist China, Russia, and Britain) would be able to prevent WWIII.
Unfortunately, it is hard to think good thoughts about the U.N. as it currently operates, given its consistent failures in Darfur, Iraq, Serbia, Congo, Zimbabwe, and the Mid-East, as well as in the areas of nuclear non-proliferation, global warming, and HIV/AIDS. However, it is much harder to think of a realistic and better alternative, given the high-level and intense jockeying for power by the U.S., Russia, and China, and Iran, Venezuela, Iraq, India, and others taking advantage of every opportunity to increase their own agendas.
In the midst of this never-ending squabbling, Kofi Annan, with little personal power within the U.N. and tarred by his son's role in the "Oil for Food" scandal, tries to convert his best intentions into constructive action. Predictably, he fails.
Hopefully "The Best Intentions" will lead the way to effective reform of the U.N., and we won't need a WWIII to come up with a better alternative.
Kofi Annan's record.......2007-01-20
This is an excellent book, which reviews Annan's work from the inside of the UN secretariat. Traub was given generous access to internal debates and Annan's close associates, and gives a detailed account of the UN responses to
difficult or impossible dilemmas and crises during his term, and to the attitudes of member states. Annan's own personality is itself described, with its strengths and foibles in a candid way.
Recommended to all those interested in the UN and in the role of the UN Secretaries General.
Yves Beigbeder (former UN and UNITAR official, Retired)
January 2007
A huge scam.......2006-12-11
This book would have us beleive that were it not for 'bad' America the UN would have magically solved all the world's problems. But let us take one test case for this. Where has Kofi Annan been on Darfur and the genocide in the Sudan? Has he done anything? Dag Hamarskojld, the first Secretary General bullied western nations to intervene in the Congolese crises in Katanga in 1960. It is strange that he was able to acheive results in a place that was not a genocide, but Kofi wasn't able to do anything and not only that he won't even call the complete ethnic cleansing and murde rof 200,000 Blacks by White Arab miltiias 'genocide'. Kofi Anna is not the 'best' Secretary General, he is in fact the weakest and worst, the only thing he had going for him was that he was not a former Nazi the way Kurt Waldheim was. When Kofi goes the UN and the world will be a better place. This book doesnt bother to ask any important questions such as: Why did Kofi Annan's family become millionares through UN handouts and jobs while he was in charge, why is Kofi Annans house getting a 4 million dollar renovation? Why did the UN Human rights commission critisize Israel 50 times more than any other country in the entire world, thus attributing the problems of 6 billion people to a nation of 5 million? Why did the UN do nothing on the Sudanese genocide, the war in Congo and wars in Sri Lanka or anywhere else? Why did the UN ethnically cleanse all of the Serbs from Kosovo and why did it also colonize Kosovo?
Seth J. Frantzman
Timely, Relevant, Useful, Incomplete, Well-Presented, Lacking Notes & Larger Context.......2006-11-29
I give this book five stars instead of four, which I would normally assign, because the shortfalls in the book, most especially a lack of context, notes, and additional detail, are out-weighed by the timeliness, relevance, utility, and able original presentation.
This is an important book for our time. Indeed, I put it down thinking that the author has presented us with a meal of worms--and only those visible at the top of the planter box--but when you are starving--when there is no other viable alternative for peacekeeping--worms can be appetizing.
Before I present some details that made it to my fly-leaf notes, a few "big points" that stayed with me:
1) UN is a grotesque failure in many many ways, but also the closest thing we have to a viable global enterprise, hence, a good starting point for all its flaws.
2) Not addressed at all in the book, spoken of only in passing, the rather important point that most UN agencies are not at all subordinate to nor responsive to the Secretary General and his Secretariat.
3) The UN suffers from two major impediments: first, that the contributing or Member nations do not really want it to be effective, and ham-string it, particularly the Security Council members, although the author is vitriolic on China and Russia vetoing votes, while strangely silent on the US and its constant veto; and second, that personal relations built over decades far out-weight actual job titles and responsibilities, and can be blamed for many things including the Oil for Food corruption nightmare.
4) The author gently explores three major alternatives to the current situation:
4a) the division of the UN into a global body for mobilizing resources and consensus; and a separate global police or gendarme force. I would note, with a genuflection toward Oakley et all in "Policing the New World Disorder," that this needs to be standing force or at least an earmarked force, ideally led by the Dutch, which trains together and has inter-operable concepts, doctrines, and equipment. See also the edited work, "Peacekeeping Intelligence: Emerging Concepts for the Future."
4b) a Democracies body, one that purportedly brings together democracies and ends the domination of the UN by third-rate third-world countries, many managed by dictators and corrupt leaders who loot their commonwealths far more aggressively than Wall Street loots America and the rest of the world. This fails when one realizes that most democracies really are not...
4c) Regional networks that bring to bear regional concerns and resources in the context of the varied global agencies. This has some real possibilities, especially if information is shared broadly to provide a "ground truth" that is undeniable. I am reminded of J. F. Rischard's excellent recommendations in High Noon 20 Global Problems, 20 Years to Solve Them
There is a useful history of key Secretary Generals, one that makes the point that Dag Hammarskjöld was an anomaly, and Annan, for all his flaws, may be one of the few to rise to the Hammarskjöld level of effectiveness..
The author provides a useful history of UN ineffectiveness and UN successes. I certainly recommend that this book be read in tandem with William Shawcross's Deliver Us from Evil: Peacekeepers, Warlords and a World of Endless Conflict Interestingly, Shawcross and US diplomat Holbrooke were the only two personal guests at the Nobel Peace Prize award ceremony.
This book is severely lacking in two ways:
1) It really does not communicate the complexity of the over-all UN archipelago of fiefdoms, most of which are not responsive to the Secretary General, nor does it adequately describe the many problems for the UN created by Third World and other blocs. In this book, China, Russia, and to a much lesser extent than it merits, the US, are the evil doers.
2) It completely misses the role that multinational, multiagency, multidisciplinary, multidomain information sharing, what the Swedes call M4IS, can play in bringing disparate groups to the table. The word "intelligence" does not appear in the index nor as far as I can tell, in the book itself. Overall the book focuses excessively on the Oil for Food scandal, and on Darfur, correctly making the point that Darfur was anticipated, that the Member nations chose to pay lip service to the problem through UN "deliberations," but the book fails to point out that Darfur is one of 17 genocides on-going, and it fails to put the Secretary General's mission in the larger context of what I call the [ten threats, twelve policies, and eight challengers]. See The New Craft of Intelligence: Personal, Public, & Political--Citizen's Action Handbook for Fighting Terrorism, Genocide, Disease, Toxic Bombs, & Corruption for large context.
The author concludes that the US invasion and occupation of Iraq have weakened the UN; and that most of the world does not see terrorism as a threat. Indeed, since this was written, the High-Level Threat Panel places terrorism as ninth on a list of ten high-level threats.
Throughout the book the role of the US as the 900 lb bully is the subtle and sometimes not so subtle sub-text. My own view, formed by my actual experience as well as my broad reading in non-fiction, is that the US, for all its good, is also the single most negative force on the planet, simply because it persists in virtual colonialism, unilateral militarism inclusive of 750 secret and not secret bases world-wide, and its tolerance for predatory immoral capitalism that has created a class war in which US financial and corporate elites bribe foreign elites, and they both destroy their own middle classes while looting all relatively defenseless economies. See the books Confessions of an Economic Hit Man; The Soul of Capitalism: Opening Paths to a Moral Economy; and Rogue Nation: American Unilateralism and the Failure of Good Intentions.
There is PLENTY of money to address the ten high-level threats with twelve intelligent inter-related policies that help the eight challengers avoid American mistakes that today produce a third of the waste on the planet while consuming a third of the energy. What we need now, in support of our new Secretary General, is a commitment to implement ALL of the Brahimi Report recommendations, inclusive of a Director of Global Intelligence (Decision-Support), perhaps sponsored by the UN Foundation, so that every Member nation, and every non-governmental organization, might operate in a transparent, accountable, sensible context. See Peacekeeping Intelligence: Emerging Concepts for the Future and my essays on "Virtual Intelligence" and on "Information Peacekeeping: The Purest Form of War."
Average customer rating:
- Two enthusiastic thumbs up!
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Conflict over Convoys: Anglo-American Logistics Diplomacy in the Second World War
Kevin Smith
Manufacturer: Cambridge University Press
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ASIN: 0521497256 |
Book Description
Conflict Over Convoys examines the Battle of the Atlantic from the perspective of Anglo-American diplomacy, deepening our understanding of Allied strategy, British industrial decline, and operations TORCH and OVERLORD. Britain's dependence on American ships and logistical support created controversy over the control of military strategy; victory in the Atlantic eventually allowed America to dominate Allied logistics diplomacy. Conflict Over Convoys shows how these tensions reflect the decline of British hegemony and America's rise to global influence.
Download Description
Conflict Over Convoys examines the Battle of the Atlantic from the perspective of Anglo-American diplomacy, deepening our understanding of Allied strategy, British industrial decline, and operations TORCH and OVERLORD. Britain's dependence on American ships and logistical support created controversy over the control of military strategy; victory in the Atlantic eventually allowed America to dominate Allied logistics diplomacy. Conflict Over Convoys shows how these tensions reflect the decline of British hegemony and America's rise to global influence.
Customer Reviews:
Two enthusiastic thumbs up!.......2007-02-25
Ecclesiastes 12:12 does not apply here. Only $39.99? A great stocking-stuffer.
Book Description
As America confronts an unpredictable war in Iraq, Stephen Randolph returns to an earlier conflict that severely tested our civilian and military leaders. In 1972, America sought to withdraw from Vietnam with its credibility intact. As diplomatic negotiations were pursued in Paris, President Richard Nixon and National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger hoped that gains on the battlefield would strengthen their position at the negotiating table--working against the relentless deadline of a presidential election year.
In retaliation for a major North Vietnamese offensive breaking over the Easter holidays, the President launched the all-out air campaign known as Linebacker--overriding his Secretary of Defense and clashing with the theater commander in whom he had lost all confidence. He intended to destroy the enemy with the full force of America's "powerful and brutal weapons" and thus shape the endgame of the war. Randolph's narrative, based not only on the Nixon White House tapes and newly declassified materials from the National Security Council, the Pentagon, and the White House but also on never before used North Vietnamese sources, re-creates how North Vietnam planned and fought this battle from Hanoi and how the U.S. planned and fought it from Washington.
Randolph's intimate chronicle of Nixon's performance as commander-in-chief gains us unprecedented access to how strategic assessments were made, transmitted through the field of command, and played out in combat and at the negotiating table. It is a compelling story about America's military decision-making in conflicts with nontraditional belligerents that speaks provocatively to our own time.
Book Description
Finalist for the 2006 Gelber Prize: "A brilliant contribution to the American foreign policy debate."—Anatol Lieven, New York Times Book Review
At a time when America's dominance abroad was being tested like never before, Taming American Power provided for the first time a "rigorous critique of current U.S. strategy" (Washington Post Book World) from the vantage point of its fiercest opponents. Stephen M. Walt examines America's place as the world's singular superpower and the strategies that rival states have devised to counter it. Hailed as a "landmark book" by Foreign Affairs, Taming American Power makes the case that this ever-increasing tide of opposition not only could threaten America's ability to achieve its foreign policy goals today but also may undermine its dominant position in years to come.
Customer Reviews:
fantasy-based.......2007-08-06
I'm going to explain why you should do the environmentally correct thing and not buy this book. To begin, it's pedantic and boring. The author spends several hundred pages explaining why other countries dislike American pre-eminence and how they resist it. Once you've read this, you'll be left with the empty feeling that there's nothing that you couldn't have thought of yourself.
So the first four chapters of the book, the why and how, are not worth reading. If you jump to the fifth chapter, you'll see the author's prescription for how to tame American power. He runs through a number of possibilities, but ends up with what he calls offshore balancing. He notes that this has been America's traditional grand strategy. The problem is that the traditional grand strategy left us with September 11th, 2001. I'm not the first to note that the author does not deal well with the threat that became obvious to the U.S. on September 11th.
But even his reapplication of the grand strategy is based on false premises. Here's a quote. "--- new WMD states will go to great lengths to make sure that their arsenals do not find their way into terrorists' hands. No foreign government is going to give up the weapons they need for deterrence and allow them to be used in ways that would place their own survival at risk." Although not a perfect counterexample, one need only point out the A Q Khan network in Pakistan. Further: "Yet the danger that rogue regimes will give away WMD is extremely remote. After incurring all the costs and risks of obtaining these weapons, would any leader either give or sell them to terrorists when he could not control how the terrorist might use them and could not be sure that the transfer would not be detected?" What repercussions has Pakistan incurred since the revelations that Khan game away its weapons technology to Libya and North Korea? None! Here's another nugget: "Had the Bush administration rejected preventive war in Iraq in March 2003, and chose instead to continue the U.N. mandated inspections process that was then under way, it would have scored a resounding diplomatic victory. The Bush team could claim could have claimed that the threat of U.S. military action had forced Saddam Hussein to resume inspections under new and more intrusive procedures. The U.N. inspectors would have determined that Iraq didn't have any WMD after all." This is utter fantasy; Hussein had rope-a-doped the inspections process for more than a decade. The paragraph within which this is contained contains much more fantasy.
Here's another interesting quote from chapter five: "The United States should not let its post-9/11 concern for homeland security interfere with the continued flow of foreign students to our colleges and universities." Only someone at a university would be foolish enough to make such a blanket statement.
Whether you agree or disagree with current American policy, this book is not worth your time or your dollars.
Learned, Low-Key, Somewhat Disappointing.......2006-10-05
I would not normally have bought this book, but the dogmatic criticisms of the work from what appear to be very angry Zionists compelled me to support the author and see for myself. I can certainly understand their objections: the author provides a very fine overview of how Israel has bonded and penetrated the U.S. Government at all levels including junior staff levels in both Congress and the Executive, and how this, in combination with what I consider to be an unholy alliance with the Christian Zionists (the author names Gary Bauer, Jerry Fallwell, Ralph Reed, Pat Robertson, Tom Delay, and Richard Armey), has shifted U.S. policy between Palestine and Israel from being a balanced peacemaker to unleashing Israel and not holding it accountable. The author is at his best when discussing how to cease our support for Israel if they cannot be sincere in seeking a two-state or shared state solution. The author does not, as far as I could see, discuss the complete failure of the Arab nations to provide support to Palestine where it counts: aid, passports, land rights, etcetera.
On balance I was somewhat disappointed. The book is a tour de force at a very high level, but it is rather simplified, primarily state centric, an executive summary of a great deal of the literature, but missing important slices of the broader literature. Nothing here about the ten threats, twelve policies, or eight challengers.
The author does well at making the point that it is US actions, not US values, that are the catalyst for attacks, and he is quite explicit in discussing how specific terrorists attacks follow consistently from some specific US action in the Middle East. He lists the problems with US Foreign Policy, including double standards, short attention span, historical amnesia, and ambivalence about respect for international law, but there is not as much substance in this book as in, for example, David Boren's edited book on "Preparing American Foreign Policy for the 21st Century"--see my review for an 18 point summary--nor is there the fullest possible discussion of grand strategy. The author breaks new ground in defining strategies of opposition and strategies of accommodation (mostly state-centric) but all things being equal, I think Colin Gray's "Modern Strategy" is better.
The author is at pains to state that pro-Israel organizations, but not most American Jews themselves, egged the Administration on toward the elective invasion and occupation of Iraq. He tries very hard to be politically correct, to the point that the scholarship is weakened--note 97 on page 283, for example, avoids stating the obvious and documenting Greg Palast's "Best Democracy Monday Can Buy" case, i.e. that George Bush stole the Florida election in 2000.
The author touches lightly on the reality that you cannot do public diplomacy using dogma and propaganda--it must be based on substance, and he correctly identifies education as the key--something the Broadcasting Board of Governors not only does not understand, but they are actively keeping their head in the sand while the battle rages over where the Open Source Agency will be (in the spy world or in the diplomatic world).
Just when I thought the author was going to reach a cresendo, after a review of Joe Nye's soft power ideas, stating that no other state is capable of withstanding the full weight of US power, I ended up with a cream pull. No real discussion of how that full weight can be defined and manifested.
See also my reviews of Derek Leebaert's "The Fifty Year Wound," Jonathan Schell's "Unconquerable World," Chalmers Johnson's "Sorrows of Empire," Robert McNamara and James Blight "Wilson's Ghost," Tom Hammes "The Sling and the Stone," and Mark Hertsgaard's "The Eagle's Shadow," among many many other books.
The Taming of the Shrew.......2006-07-20
"'Taming American Power' - Why would one like to do that?" This seems to be the standard tongue-in-cheek reaction one gets from a fellow American student who has spotted the reviewer reading Stephen Walt's latest book. Granted, it is a bit hard to swallow Walt's line of argument at first. As the author, academic dean of Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government, himself admits, "by virtually any measure, the United States enjoys an asymmetry of power unseen since the emergence of the modern state system." And more than that: It is highly likely that it will remain the most powerful player in the international system for some time to come. So who would go about trying to tie down this omnipotent Gulliver? Walt does a good job in pointing out that reactions from across the world to America's "primacy" position (the author defines this as "being first in order, importance, or authority") are often lukewarm at best - large parts of the population in the Middle East, Latin America, Africa, and Asia do as a matter of fact detest everything the United States stands for. And even seemingly close allies in Europe and Asia look like they have lost their (Cold War-) love for Mr. Big.
But is it just the "rise in the power of [modern-day] Athens and the fear it causes in the world" that makes America so unloved at the present moment? According to Walt, who is a neo-realist at heart but doesn't shy away from making use of other theoretical models on the way, the answer to the question of "why they hate us" is not so much what America stands for, but what it has done in the past, especially ever since the George W. Bush Administration took office in 2001. But his seminal book is more than just one of the many polemics on the current executive. It is a lucid, and often provocative, account of the current problems U.S. public diplomacy faces in the world. It is a profound analysis of the way states deal with American power, something that "has become an essential element of statecraft for every country in the world." More importantly, Walt gives clear recommendations for policy action as well, something that is so often missing from comparable works.
The author starts by shedding light on how the U.S. got into the position it is recently in. How did the "preponderance of power" (Melvin Leffler) come about? Walt attributes geography, shrewd diplomacy, but also pure luck for the unique situation America is in now. Starting with the end of the Cold War (here an analysis of earlier developments such as the Spanish-American War might have brought further insights) Walt goes through the development in the growth of U.S. influence and primacy. He then sets out to analyze the difference in perception the United States has of itself and that other states have of it. Americans and their political leaders are quite often ignorant of the fact that their country is not well liked in other parts of the world. Worse than that: On a regular basis, they simply do not care about other states' opinions. Walt considers the various strategies that states use if they indeed intend to oppose U.S. primacy. Balancing ("soft balancing" with other states or "internal balancing" on their own), balking (foot-dragging), binding (using norms and institutions), blackmail (threatening to take some undesirable action unless the U.S. offers compensation), and delegitimation (portraying the U.S. as morally bankrupt) are the various means that states put to use, very often in combination with each other and during different time periods. Although theses categories have large explanative value per se, it is however not quite clear whether they really cover the entire spectrum of political action. For example, a state could just refuse to hear what the U.S. has to say, thereby falling under none of the above categories.
But what if a state decides to go along with U.S. primacy? According to Walt, it can then either bandwagon (appease), follow a regional balancing strategy (use the U.S. to balance against neighboring states), bond with (establish close personal ties) or try and penetrate American politics (manipulate the U.S. domestic political system). But here, too, other categories seem to exist. A state can for example go along with U.S. policies while at the same time thinking very little of the nation's administration or even its president. The relationship between former German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt and former U.S. President Jimmy Carter serves as a prime example.
It is at this point that Walt gets to the heart of his controversial reasoning. He lays out an argument against political pressure groups and ethnic lobbyist movements - in itself not necessarily a new argument. Yet although he also talks about the Indian and Armenian lobby groups, his main thrust is directed against the various kinds of Israeli groups such as the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), the Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP), and the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs (JINSA). He blames them for having an undue influence and for pursuing a national interest that is "national" only in Israeli, not in American terms. Yet his argument about the "power of the weak" rings a bit hollow and is only thinly veiled by devoting very few pages to the Indian and the Armenian case. Although Walt rightly states that a solution to the problems of the Middle East is essential to "win the hearts and minds" of the Muslim world and to achieve one of the main objectives of U.S. foreign policy, he walks on thin ice when he makes sweeping statements about the influence of the Israel lobby in the United States such as "Israel is the `gold standard' by which transnational penetration should be judged." Granted, the road for the solution of the Israel-Palestinian problem did not "lead through Baghdad" - U.S. involvement in Iraq turned into a quagmire situation, as Walt rightly points out. But does it really lead through K Street in Washington, D.C.? This seems hardly likely. Lobbies are influential, especially in the United States, but they surely cannot be the sole explanatory variable for why America has so many problems with public opinion in the world.
Bearing these caveats in mind, Walt is at his best when he comes to the actual policy recommendations in the last part of his book. Most importantly, he states, U.S. foreign policy "must be molded with [other states'] reactions in mind." Although this might sound like a truism to European ears, it is something that has not always been at the center of the U.S. foreign policy decision making process. There is hope, however: Consulting with allies and taking their opinions into consideration seems to have been taken up by the current U.S. administration recently - just look at the State Department's new efforts in "transformational diplomacy", increased student exchange and language learning. Walt also makes the important point that the strategy of "pre-emption" - which really is just another word for "preventive war" when the Bush administration uses it - must be abolished at earliest convenience if the U.S. doesn't want to ruin relations with the rest of the world in the long run. For large parts of the global public (especially the European part of it), this seems to be a matter of highest urgency.
The drawback of Taming American Power is that its analysis is extremely state-centered. It is perfectly alright to view states as the principal actors in international relations, but even the most hard-boiled realists will have to acknowledge that the U.S. will increasingly have to deal with non-state actors such as al-Qaeda in the future. Also, Walt seems to be a bit too sympathetic to John Mearsheimer's theory of "offensive Realism" to make it fit with his call for a "mature U.S. foreign policy" that takes the opinions of others into account when pursuing policy goals. It is because of theses inconsistencies that Walt's analysis can only serve as a starting point. But it is a good starting point and leads into the right direction. Therefore, it can be recommended highly.
Methodologically and Substantively Weak.......2005-12-28
Taming American Power is a book about relations between and among states. Walt's starting point is a wide-ranging description of the sources and manifestations of American primacy. Then, in the most insightful part of the book ("The Roots of Resentment"), he does a superlative job of describing the ways that others see America and why their perceptions differ from how we picture ourselves. The following two chapters discuss the strategies foreign governments employ in their relations with an America that is much more powerful than they are. These strategies fall into two broad categories - opposition and accomodation, each of which is broken down into several sub-categories. In the final chapter, Walt sets forth a foreign policy that he believes would be in our national interest.
Neo-Realism In an Era of Terrorism
In my view, Walt has considerable difficulty fitting al Qaeda and other Islamic terror organizations into his conceptual framework. This is probably true for most or all neo-realists. A school of thought that has the balance of power as its foundational principle is ill-equipped to understand a world in which the primary security threat is from transnational, religiously-inspired terrorist groups. For the U.S. or any other country to base a foreign policy on the assumption that al Qaeda will respond to carrots and sticks in the same manner as states would be the height of folly.
Many more states are threatened by al Qaeda and/or al Qaeda-inspired terrorism than by aggression from another state. Given the nature of the threat and the unmatched strength of the U.S. military, balance of power theory, if it is to have any validity in the current era, would have to say that other states would have moved into ever-closer relationships with America in the years since 9/11. Except for heightened behind-the-scenes cooperation within the intelligence community, quite the reverse has happened. The counter-argument is that, as has been shown in several public opinion polls, many populations fear U.S. power more than terrorism - even if their governments do not. It would be absurd for America to assign a greater priority to appeasing foreign publics than to eliminating terrorists.
If al Qaeda and the like were not part of the equation, Walt's thesis - that the Bush Doctrine, because it has intensified anti-Americanism among peoples and governments, and allies and enemies - would have merit. But, not only is al Qaeda part of the equation, it is the most important part of the equation. Given that there is scant evidence that the policies of the Bush Administration has undermined relationships among intelligence organizations, it is far from clear that altering these policies in a manner that would lessen anti-Americanism would aid in the fight against al Qaeda. There may be - and, in my opinion, there is - a trade-off between improving our relations with foreign governments and our overseas approval ratings, and the efficacy of our efforts to defang the Islamic terrorists.
Islamic Terrorism
The most disturbing aspect of Walt's book is that it displays only a superficial understanding of the nature of the threat from Islamic terrorism. He does not mention the jihadis' long-term strategy of re-establishing the Caliphate and shows no evidence of having read Sayyid Qutb and other Islamist authors. Accordingly, he mistakes their tactics for their strategy. Not surprisingly, then, his policy recommendations are ill-conceived and, in my judgment, would facilitate rather than undermine their ability to achieve their objective.
As a result of his misperceptions, he believes that U.S. foreign policy, in general, and American support of Israel, in particular, are the root causes of the terrorists' antipathy toward us:
". . . international terrorists have not attacked the United States or its allies because they are opposed to U.S. values, or even primarily because they are worried about U.S. power. Instead, they have targeted the United States because they oppose its global military presence and the policies that presence is supporting." (p. 87)
"Although bin Laden is sometimes critical of American culture, his actions throughout his career have been inspired primarily by opposition to the specific policies of particular states . . . Indeed, bin Laden emphasized in October 2004 that he and his followers were not at war against "freedom," which is why they did not strike countries like Sweden." (p. 85)
"U.S. Middle East policy is one of the main reasons why terrorists like Osama bin Laden want to attack the United States . . . Even worse, America's tacit (and, at times, active) support for Israeli expansionism makes bin Laden and his ilk look like prophets and heroes rather than murderous criminals." (p. 234)
". . . if the United States can portray those who use terrorism as criminals driven largely by a selfish desire for power, then a terrorist campaign is likely to fail." (p. 138)
In addition to not appreciating the nature of the threat, he appears to underestimate its severity and potential impact on the U.S. How else can these words be explained?
(...)
The United Nations
Walt is a multilateralist with a high regard for the UN. Commenting on the run-up to the Iraq war, he says that
"America's opponents [in the Security Council] sought to prevent the use of force in this particular instance, while simultaneously strengthening the authority of the UN system." (p. 146)
There is an alternative perspective that I share: by not authorizing the use of force to punish a serial violator of Security Council resolutions, America's opponents weakened the UN, setting it on the same path as the ignominious road followed by the League of Nations.
(...)
As to winning the War on Terror, he believes that the necessary and seemingly sufficient condition is for the U.S. to lay it on the line with Israel:
"If the United States wants to win the war on terrorism, it must find a way to reverse the steady deterioration of its standing in this critical part [the Middle East] of the world . . . the United States should use its considerable leverage to bring the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to an end, [which includes pressuring Israel] to withdraw from virtually all territories it occupied in June 1967, in return for full peace. If Israel remains unwilling to grant the Palestinians a viable state . . . the United States should end its economic and military support . . . The United States will still support the continued existence of a Jewish state (the same way that we support a Norwegian state, a Thai state, a Polish state, etc.), and it would be prepared to help if Israel's survival were threatened." (...)
Bad advice.......2005-12-25
One reviewer of this book said that this book was a "recipe for appeasement" and that were the world to recommend genocide, or a return to slavery, that this book would imply that this ought to be America's policy! Well, is that reviewer right about this book?
After reading the book, I think the reviewer is right.
The author makes the point that opponents of the United States try to delegitimize us. He's right; they do. But the response to this ought to be to do what is best, not to appease our enemies. Appeasement generally makes matters worse for everyone. I think if we have the ability to support truth, justice, human rights, peace, and prosperity, we ought to do so, even if it may sometimes mean battling thugs and tyrants.
The portion of this book that I'm best able to judge is about Israel. I'm a Pagan and a Zionist. And the author does a bad job of describing America's informal alliance with Israel. He somewhat exaggerates the strength of the Israeli lobby here, and in addition, he makes it appear somewhat sinister, as if it were causing America to support policies that are against our own interests. In fact, it is very difficult for small nations to convince us to act against our interests. It is far easier for small nations to agree to do what we say (in an attempt to become or remain our allies) or for small nations to benefit from getting our support when America's enemies attack them.
Yes, the Israeli lobby has done well, but the main reason for this is that it has an excellent product to sell! Israel is a nation which is being attacked by some reactionary and racist thugs and tyrants. The nation most slandered by the United Nations and the international community is Israel. No wonder plenty of decent people find it easy to support it. The Israeli lobby isn't needed to convince most American opponents of all this slander and aggression. Walt does not mention any of this, of course.
There is a big difference between being in favor of human rights for all and supporting all policies of the State of Israel. Walt certainly agrees. But he implies that American Zionists tend to support the latter, not the former. And that's not true at all. There's plenty of opposition by Zionists to specific Israeli policies, and it is an anti-Zionist untruth to say that one can't object to Israeli government policies without running afoul of the Zionist lobby. Such excuses are often used by those who deny Israel's right to exist (presumably in order to deny human rights to Levantine Jews) and then try to say that they merely disagree with some policies of the Israeli government. In addition, Walt fails to discuss the extent to which some American Jews disagree not only with Israeli policies, but even with the idea that Israeli Jews ought not be denied human rights.
Walt implies that Israel wants "to impose an unjust solution unilaterally" to its dispute with the Arabs. That's ridiculous. If there is peace, Israel wins: it gets to stay on the map and prosper on land it is making excellent use of. That's why Israel is willing to put up with a solution which cheats the Jews out of land they would otherwise be entitled to keep or purchase. It is anything but unjust to the Arabs to let Israel have less than its fair share of land! Or to allow human rights for all the people of the region!
The author also comes up with the taunt that denying Arabs "their legitimate political rights has not made Israel safer." That's outrageous. There is no legitimate right to dissolve a neighboring nation and get rid of the human rights of its people. And it does not make one "safer" to agree to get rid of one's human rights, quite the contrary. He's simply blaming Israel for the aggression and slander against it.
At one point, Walt even asks "why should other Arabs believe that the United States is committed to freedom when its money and power are used to deny these rights to millions" of Levantine Arabs. Well, I think that there are plenty of flaws with American foreign policy. However, in my opinion, we deserve quite a bit of praise for supporting human rights in the Levant. We could do better. But if we take the author's advice, we'll be doing much, much worse.
I do not recommend this book.
Book Description
Drawing on his diplomatic experience and expertise, George F. Kennan offers an informed, plain-spoken appraisal of United States foreign policy. His evaluations of diplomatic history and international relations cut to the heart of policy issues much debated today.
This expanded edition retains the lectures and essays first published in 1951 as American Diplomacy, 1900-1950 and adds two lectures delivered in 1984 as well as a new preface by the author. In these additional pieces, Kennan explains how some of his ideas have changed over the years. He confronts the events and topics that have come to occupy American opinion in the last thirty years, including the development and significance of the Cold War, the escalation of the nuclear arms race, and the American involvement in Vietnam.
"A book about foreign policy by a man who really knows something about foreign policy."—James Reston,New York Times Book Review
"These celebrated lectures, delivered at the University of Chicago in 1950, were for many years the most widely read account of American diplomacy in the first half of the twentieth century. . . . The second edition of the work contains two lectures from 1984 that reconsider the themes of American Diplomacy"—Foreign Affairs, Significant Books of the Last 75 Years.
Customer Reviews:
Still very relevant.......2007-05-17
I read this book as a text book for a class in American Foreign Policy that I took and I was surprized to find that it was still relevant to today's issues.
Kennan's premise that our foreign policy is based on idealism rather than realism is still true. Some of the past incidents he covers parallel some of the same attitudes we have today in expecting foreign nations to act like we do.
Our naive idea that Iraq could be turned into a western style democracy is addressed in the historical episodes described by Kennan. The use of the media in the Spanish American war parallels our present experience.
We seem to base our foreign policy on our perceptions of the world as we think it is rather than a realistic evaluation of what is really going on.
Eloquent but Slight.......2004-07-03
The lectures reprinted in this book were delivered in 1951 by George Kennan, the legendary American diplomat who authored the "containment" doctrine that guided U.S. relations with the Soviet Union throughout the Cold War. Each lecture analyzes a key episode or turning point in American foreign policy between 1898 and the onset of the Cold War.
The lectures stand up pretty well after half-a-century. Kennan's main point is that the American aversion to diplomatic realism leads to an infantalized domestic debate on foreign policy issues and limits our ability to pursue balance of power strategies. Kennan wrote eloquently and knew what he was talking about -- the ease with which the Bush Administration gulled the American public into supporting the invasion of Iraq is a timely reminder of the need for better public education on foreign policy.
Kennan had a distinguished career as an historian after he left the State Department. However, the reader looking for diplomatic history should know that these lectures are short quasi-philosophical ruminations on the goals and methods of foreign policy in a democracy. They are not detailed reconstructions of diplomatic episodes or negotiations.
A misleading title covers a gem.......2004-04-14
The original title of this book, American Diplomacy 1900-1950, is misleading. It implies that this is a study of American diplomacy between the two dates. Wrong. The book is split into two parts.
The first part is based on a series of lectures given by Kennan. Each talk looks at a specific event (Spanish American War, WWI or WWII) and draws a general lesson from that event that can be applied to other times and places.
For example, the lesson (well, one of them) Kennan draws from his lecture on the Spanish-American War and the US grab for empire is that the US often does not adequately consider the consequences of its actions. In particular, we do not consider what to do after the fighting stops. Hmm, does that sound familiar?
The second part is a reprint of two famous Kennan articles. The first is the Mr. X article laying out the theory of containment. The second speculates about the nature of a Russia that has gone through the changes hypothesized in the first piece.
These two pieces might seem dated, but there are some points that are still vary valid. For example, Kennan stress that US must be on the side of the angels. He thinks that the USSR's fall is inevitable. He wants the Russian people to think well of the US when that event happens. The first article (and the "long telegram" on which it was based) provides a great model for any analysis of an enemy state and the proper way to think about US policy
Canonical Foreign Policy.......2002-02-16
Mr. Kennan is a fine example of the best in American thought. Europeans who complain that U.S. policymakers are not thoughtful about the world would do well to read this book. Fantastic.
Very Interesting Perspectives.......2000-04-29
This book is a collection of speeches by George F. Kennan made during the Cold War. For those unfamiliar with the author, he is the author of the famous "X" article, The Sources of Soviet Conduct, which served as the intellectual foundation of the Containment Doctrine.
Although dated, especially since the fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, this short book provides a useful look not only at the ideas of one of our most eminent Cold War thinkers, but also of the atmosphere and conditions of the period.
Book Description
No survey can capture the breadth and depth of the anti-Americanism that has swept Europe in recent years. From ultraconservative Bavarian grandmothers to thirty-year-old socialist activists in Greece, from globalization opponents to corporate executives--Europeans are joining in an ever louder chorus of disdain for America. For the first time, anti-Americanism has become a European lingua franca.
In this sweeping and provocative look at the history of European aversion to America, Andrei Markovits argues that understanding the ubiquity of anti-Americanism since September 11, 2001, requires an appreciation of such sentiments among European elites going back at least to July 4, 1776.
While George W. Bush's policies have catapulted anti-Americanism into overdrive, particularly in Western Europe, Markovits argues that this loathing has long been driven not by what America does, but by what it is. Focusing on seven Western European countries big and small, he shows how antipathies toward things American embrace aspects of everyday life--such as sports, language, work, education, media, health, and law--that remain far from the purview of the Bush administration's policies. Aggravating Europeans' antipathies toward America is their alleged helplessness in the face of an Americanization that they view as inexorably befalling them.
More troubling, Markovits argues, is that this anti-Americanism has cultivated a new strain of anti-Semitism. Above all, he shows that while Europeans are far apart in terms of their everyday lives and shared experiences, their not being American provides them with a powerful common identity--one that elites have already begun to harness in their quest to construct a unified Europe to rival America.
Customer Reviews:
European Anti-Americanism pre dates Bush Jr.......2007-08-22
I read this book over the weekend and it left me feeling sad, angry, and worried. Anti Americanism in Europe pre-dates the Iraq war and having experienced it I can say it does compare to the anti Semitism and racism blacks and Jews have been subjected to. Most Europeans see their way of life: generous welfare state benefits which were made possible after WWII due in large part to American trade policies, threatened by globalization which they see as being led by America. As they should be the up-and coming economic powers like India and China will roll over Europe unless they change their economic ways. Fabian Socialism is a failure; the EC's own data proves it. Even the French are beginning to realize this. I wish President Sarkozy good luck. So many French brands have vanished in my lifetime here. Christian Dior shirts. Citroen & Peugeot cars, I remember when French fashion companies owned the U.S. market, today they are almost all gone. This happened due to high taxes and excessive regulation during the Mitterrand years. Part of the problem is the largely left wing European news media & also the European education system. I saw a German textbook once blaming Capitalism from everything from pollution (have they forgotten the pig pen the former communist regime in East Germany left?) to high cell phone rates. I once asked a man from Hamburg "The Germans did billions in damage to the Soviet/Russian economy during WWII which can never be repaid. What if Putin starts to bully Europe and Russian gangster type businessmen begin extorting European governments for unfavorable economic concessions? Or begin buying up European assets and saying they will pay pennies on the dollar or else. What will you do?" He replied America will never allow it to happen.
Scholarly Overview.......2007-08-18
This is a good book for those with an interest in the phenomenon of European anti-Americanism, but the potential reader should be aware that it has essentially the flavor of an academic text. That said, it is a thoroughly convincing and well-documented overview of the subject.
Its only shortcoming is that Prof. Markovits seems to want to lump it in with anti-Semitism, to which he devotes an entirely unnecessary chapter, as an example of mere cultural bigotry. I personally think anti-Americanism is more than that, and that Americans could do well to ask themselves if some of these sentiments might warrant a little bit of introspection.
In broad terms, is our country a positive force in the world, advancing the progress of civilization and the quality of life for everyone; or are we merely wealthy and powerful, motivated only to increase that wealth and power without regard to anyone else or any higher purpose. Regretfully, it is becoming increasingly difficult to find examples of the former, but easy to find examples of the latter.
Uncouth Europe.......2007-07-18
This book does not pretend to be a history but an argument into the nature of anti-Americanism. It is, if you like, a lengthy (and by and large convincing) Op-Ed. The basic argument is this: anti-Americanism (an emotion masquerading as analysis) is everywhere in the Europe of today. It "is unifying West Europeans more than any other political emotion--with the exception of a common hostility toward Israel. In today's West Europe these two closely related antipathies are now considered proper etiquette. They constitute common fare among West Europe's cultural and media elites, but also throughout society itself from London to Athens and from Stockholm to Rome." Furthermore, in today's Europe "by being anti-American, paradoxically, one adheres to a prejudice that ipso facto, seems to confer on its bearer a stamp not of intolerance but of legitimate resister and opponent against a truly powerful force in the world." Someone who is anti-American is (by definition) "good" and "European"; someone who is (conversely) American or pro-American is "bad", "non-European", and (increasingly although Markovits does not dwell on this racist phenomenon) "Asian".
The America depicted in European discourse does not, of course, have anything to do with the actual America. In European discourse, America "is regarded as "dangerous, commercial, nationalistic, undemocratic, antiwelfare, crude, religious, puritanical, vulgar" (and of course irresistibly attractive to Europeans who are its exact opposite). This is not a picture of nation-state that ever existed or exists; it is the picture of God and Satan (with Europeans as God and Americans as Satan). It should thus not surprise us that when bad things happen to Satan, Europeans can barely hide their glee. In October of 2001, Markovits relates that European intellectual began to tell their audience that "Americans were finally receiving a long overdue punishment for all their misdeeds in the past; that the whole thing was really no big deal because many more Americans lost their lives in traffic accidents; that the destruction of the Twin Towers benefited New York aesthetically; that the Israeli Mossad was behind all this; that the entire event had been staged by the American government" and on and on. Much of this hateful discourse is with us still.
And Markovits points out that this antipathy is not returned by Americans. Quite the contrary. Not only do we want closer ties with Europe (Europeans want to sever theirs with us) but (as Markovits points out) it is quite simply impossible to imagine that, had the Groupe Islamique Armee succeeded in crashing Air France Airbus into the Eiffel Tower on December 24, 1994 the American discourse about Europe in general and France in particular would have been filled with anything but solidarity.
Where Markovits and I part company is in his seeing anti-Americanism and anti-Semitism as twin brothers. I think there is, indeed, a relation between the two "isms" but I don't think that America is the "new Jew" in Europe. I agree with him that "clusters of assumptions embedded in our languages and cultures pre-select how we think about the world." And it is here (in my opinion) that there is the connection between anti-Americanism and anti-Semitism. Europeans have, after all, had two thousand years of conditioning in which to think and speak of a people (the Jews) as omni-present, all-powerful, all-evil, and yet completely seductive to the (innocent and good) Europeans. This is the stuff of classic anti-Semitism--the kind that became (by and large) illegitimate after the Holocaust. But the cultural tropes do not go away simply because you see what a way of thinking has wrought; language especially does not change overnight. And so Europeans (in my opinion) needed a new bogeyman on whom to vent their spleen. And who better than Mr. Big--the all-powerful United States; the only country left standing as it were post 1945? That, I think is the connection, between the two hatreds but it is not a connection Markovits explores--probably because he does not agree with me.
Markovits concludes by pointing out that anti-Americanism is today the only thing unifying all the EU member states and, indeed, the only thing unifying the peoples within those nation states. There is thus every incentive for European leaders to fan the flames of anti-Americanism. Anti-Americanism allows European leaders to keep their jobs and to try to create a "European" identity that (without the Other of America) quite simply does not exist.
If Markovits is right, this virulent anti-Americanism will be with us for many years to come.
Thoughtful analysis.......2007-07-14
It's perfectly fine for some folks to consider themselves rivals of other folks. And I'm not too concerned about such attitudes between Europeans and Americans. Still, there is a point at which such attitudes can become counterproductive and lead to very serious mischaracterizations, demonization, and open strife.
This book, by Andrei Markovits, has plenty of material about these issues. I found it interesting to discover that Markovits is originally from Timisoara, a city I've been to a couple of times. And I also found it interesting to see that Markovits, like myself, is politically a liberal and has reacted to the fact that to be considered a "progressive" today, it's almost essential to have credentials as an anti-American and an anti-Zionist.
As Markovits explains near the start of his book, an aversion to America is "unifying West Europeans more than any other political emotion - with the exception of a common hostility toward Israel." And the attitudes towards Israel are obviously not simply due to its ties to the United States or its "occupation" of land. Britain, Spain, and France have ties to the United States and are "occupying" Ulster, the Basque, and Corsica respectively, but "no European academic has attempted to boycott British" or French or Spanish universities for this!
At what point do we have "real" anti-Americanism, not just relatively benign rivalry? Markovits cites Joffe, who says the elements of the real thing are stereotypization, denigration, ascriptions of omnipotence and conspiracy, and obsession.
I know that some elements of American society are present in Europe. Plenty of people in Europe now speak English, and there are something like 1650 hamburger restaurants in Germany (Markovits reminds us that there are also about 12,000 Turkish fast food shops and 23,000 Italian restaurants in Germany). Still, I don't see this as scary from a liberal perspective!
There is a very thoughtful chapter on anti-Semitism. And perhaps the most serious point is that European anti-Zionists rarely show much concern for Arabs or Muslims. Instead, they tended to ignore killings of Muslims by Hindu mobs, and they often supported Serbian attacks on Bosnian Muslims, given that the United States supported the Bosnians.
For many years, I avoided using the term "anti-Semitism." It seemed too vague. But I finally have decided to use it in situations where I see people participate in a gratuitous war against the Jews. On the other hand, this is probably not a very good definition of anti-Semitism on my part. Markovits, by way of comparison, says that "above all, anti-Semitism is an obsession that blames all Jews for evil deeds, dangerous acts, and subversive behavior independent of how each individual Jew - or even Jews as a collective - behaves in reality." As Markovits further explains, there are some clearly anti-Semitic "dimensions" to some "criticisms" of Israel. These include the `singling out' of Israel, the double standards, the constant comparison and equation of Israel with the National Socialists, and the utilization of classic anti-Semitic depictions and stereotypes.
Not all European nations have had the same frequency of anti-Semitic violence. And I think that's a good way to look at the relationships between such violence and, say, anti-Semitic propaganda. For example, Finland, Luxemburg, Ireland, and Portugal have had the least anti-Semitic violence, while France, Belgium, and Holland have had the most.
Meanwhile, in Eastern Europe, Markovits finds less anti-Americanism and less anti-Zionism, with the main anti-Semitic theme being that Jews are Bolsheviks.
The author quotes some amazing comments by Deborah Orr about Israel. Writing in the Independent, Orr tops some gratuitously malicious statements about Israel with the following: "If the Jews `continue to insist that everyone with a word to say against Israel is an anti-Semite, [they are] going to find one day that the world is once more divided neatly between anti-Semites and Jews.'" I think that the sort of argument Orr has supplied is indeed going to lead to trouble. Do we say that the world is divided into anti-Tutsis and Tutsis? Markovits says that, "Oxford University dons would never have dreamt of banning Russians, Croats, Serbs, Spaniards, Sudanese, or even Ulster Protestants from their laboratories." But this did in fact happen to an Israeli at Oxford.
We see some other examples of hypocritical language. Even the Europeans rarely say something such as "I hate Bush, but I do not mind America's existence." On the other hand, Israel's existence is questioned all the time. When Tom Paulin describes Israel as a "'historical obscenity' that `never had a right to exist,'" some folks defend him on the grounds of "free speech." But when Mona Baker fires people for not being sufficiently anti-Israeli, many of these same folks defend her right to do what she pleases, throwing free speech to the winds. I think this is an excellent point by Markovits.
I think that European anti-Americanism has resulted in some denial of reality. Markovits cites a poll by the European Commission showing that 59% of Europeans see Israel as being a great threat to world peace. That ranks Israel first, ahead of Iran, North Korea, the United States, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, in that order. And such ideas are coming from the political Left, not the political Right: "the Guardian, the Observer, the Independent, and the BBC" were not "under the influence of the right-wing extremists of the National Front."
I found this book very interesting, and I recommend it.
Excellence in Political Science.......2007-07-09
"Uncouth Nation" makes not only for factual and intelligent research into anti-Americanism, it is also a fascinating read. As Markovits delves into the history of anti-Americanism in Europe, noting the mixture of myth and fact that makes up a great deal of European perceptions, he allows the reader to understand the true nature of anti-American sentiment. It is not only a product of the current presidential administration, but a much older result of "American exceptionalism" and, to a degree, anti-Semitic sentiment. All in all, a superior read from one of America's academic treasures.
Book Description
Embassy architecture and design ranges from the humble to the stately, from the practical to the grand. Building Diplomacy is the first comprehensive photographic portrait of the official face of American diplomacy around the world. Elizabeth Gill Lui traveled to fifty countries to photograph American embassies, chanceries, and ambassadors' residences. This record of her journey includes approximately five hundred artful and eloquent interior and exterior views shot by Lui with a large-format camera. Keya Keita, Lui's daughter and partner on the project, shot a live-action documentary of embassies and the cultural milieu of each nation Lui and Keita visited. The text includes an essay by Jane Loeffler detailing the history of the U.S. Department of State's building program.
America's commitment to historic preservation of properties has been realized in Buenos Aires, London, Paris, Prague, and Tokyo. The modernist tradition is showcased in Argentina, Greece, India, Indonesia, Mexico, the Netherlands, and Uruguay. Vernacular buildings adapted to diplomatic use are widespread: Lui photographed examples of adapted reuse in Ghana, Iceland, Mongolia, Myanmar, and Palau. Buildings that reflect Europe's colonial legacy are also in evidence. After the 1983 bombing in Beirut, embassy construction began to reflect increased security concerns. Embassies built after 1998, although isolated within walled compounds, are well regarded by those who work in them. The author makes a case that embassy architecture is a critical aspect of American identity on the international landscape and can be formative in defining a new cultural diplomacy in the twenty-first century.
Structured geographically, Building Diplomacy portrays embassies in Africa, East Asia, Europe, the Near East, the Pacific, South Asia, and the Western Hemisphere. An appendix lists the architects and designers of the featured buildings.
Customer Reviews:
Architecture for peace.......2006-07-25
The volume lays out in beautify photography the modern architecture of American diplomacy abroad. This is a book is a must have for all those interested in foreign policy and the diplomatic service of the United States. Our embassies are a projection of our nation, its culture and heritage. The creators of these structures clearly recognized their awesome challenge. Their work captures our imagination and our pride as American citizens.
Outposts of America.......2006-03-04
This is a magnificent book that reveals to the general public the story of many of our diplomatic and consular posts in spectacular photos and concise text. As a former Foreign Service Officer, I hope the book will be read widely, to give Americans a look at how our country is represented abroad through architecture, in styles ranging from former palaces to modern "fortress" embassies. Elizabeth Gill Lui and Keya Keita have done a superb job.
Since I served in our embassies in Seoul (twice), Tokyo, Rangoon and Manila, I was particularly interested to see how the ambassadors' residences and chanceries (embassy office buildings) in those posts were presented. Overall, Ms. Lui and Ms. Keita did an exceptional job on them. The historic residences in Tokyo and Seoul are beautifully portrayed in some detail, including the original legation building in Seoul (built 1883) which is on the residence grounds and which must be our oldest diplomatic building in Asia. There are fine photos of the residence in Rangoon (aka Yangon), constructed for a great British timber company and acquired by the US circa 1950. There is also a photo of the interesting, though rat-infested, chancery in downtown Rangoon which was built early in the last century for the Armenian banking firm of Balthazar Brothers. Unfortunately, part of that view is marred by the blur of a passing bus. In 1988, the street in front of the chancery was the scene of a massacre, as Burmese soldiers shot down scores, perhaps hundreds, of peaceful pro-democracy demonstrators. Buddhist monks, students and others were saved when Ambassador Burton Levin told the Marine Guards to open the front doors and give refuge to survivors.
Embassy Manila did not fare so well in my view. The chancery is an architectural landmark in US-Philippine relations, since it was built for the US High Commissioner to the Philippines in 1940, when the country took a major step toward independence. The building's flag pole still carries scars from the 1945 combat to liberate Manila from Japanese occupation. In 1946, the controversial court-martial of the Japanese commander General Yamashita took place in the embassy's ballroom. For some reason, Ms. Lui chose instead to show the rather non-descript 1960's vintage chancery annex and a photo of the back wall of the chancery compound facing Manila Bay.
Building Diplomacy is a great visual tribute to the outposts of American foreign policy. Elizabeth Gill Lui and Keya Keita do not overlook the price we've sometimes paid for sustaining our overseas presence. They have dedicated the book to the American and Foreign Service National victims of the devastating embassy bombings in Beirut, Nairobi and Dar-es-Salaam, and include a photo of the haunting Nairobi memorial. As another measure of the cost of our diplomatic operations, I would add the little known fact that in the last half-century, many more US ambassadors have been killed in the line of duty than US generals.
American Splendor.......2005-04-08
Wow, what an incredible book, the photographs are so sharp and clear. The text is highly informative and every major building is shown inside and out. Many of the buildings are just breathtaking and I was blown away at all the styles represented, though I must confess I will always be partial to the hotel de Rothschild in France, to think my country owns such a treasure. Again, I just can't say enough about the photographs, they are obviously done with a trained eye and a real talent. I have been looking for a book on this subject for some time and just was not impressed with what I had found, that is until I came across this wonderful book. I highly recommend it to anyone who has any interest in architecture or fine photography.
Average customer rating:
- An essential compilation.
- An important publication on treaties with the Indian Nations
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Documents of American Indian Diplomacy: Treaties, Agreements, and Conventions, 1775-1979 (Legal History of North America)
Manufacturer: University of Oklahoma Press
ProductGroup: Book
Binding: Hardcover
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ASIN: 0806131187 |
Customer Reviews:
An essential compilation........1999-12-16
This two volumes compilation of Indian Treaties is essential for anyone who wants to learn Native American Diplomacy with the U.S.A., Spain, Mexico and a great number of U.S. states, particulars, etc...
Two regrets : first, the references end with year 1979 (end of President CARTER's periode), but so many laws were established during Presidents REAGAN, BUSH and CLINTON... should have found its place here;
second, it's quite difficult to find a particular problem, while an important final index (pages 1500 to 1540) offers interesting possibilities. If You want to learn how Treaties were written and failed, You have to buy (or consult) those two books.
(Please excuse my bad English; I'm a natural French writer)
An important publication on treaties with the Indian Nations.......1999-12-15
This is an extremely important book for readers interested in the history of treaties between the United States ( and others ) and the Indian Nations.
This is a two volume, 1500 page work. This is surprising enough without considering that the texts of the 350+ traditionally acknowledged treaties - that have been accessed over the years through Charles J. Kappler's "Indian Affairs: Laws and Treaties" - are not included here. Citations to Kappler's compilation are provided in Chapter 5 on "Valid Treaties." The scope of this work is demonstrated by the inclusion of early and very late treaties or agreements; by an analysis of the railroad/irrigation agreements; and by the enumeration of treaties and agreements rejected by Congress or by the Nations. This last group of documents is added to land grants to private parties, and to unratified or miscellaneous treaties or agreements, that collectively comprise the entire second volume.
Deloria and DeMallie state ( page 1475 ): "The goal of this collection is to identify every document that can be understood as representing a diplomatic negotiation by an Indian nation." For those interested in this area of history, this publication will be an asset to their collection.
Average customer rating:
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Peace Without Hiroshima: Secret Action at the Vatican in the Spring of 1945
Martin S. Quigley
Manufacturer: Madison Books
ProductGroup: Book
Binding: Hardcover
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ASIN: 0819180564 |
Book Description
Quigley was a World War II OSS agent in Ireland and Rome who posed as an American motion picture industry representative. Charged with intelligence-gathering functions, he was also asked by OSS director William J. Donovan to investigate the possibility of the Vatican mediating the surrender of Japan. That request is the basis for this meager treatment of a minor event. The secret action resulted in no more than two unenthusiastic cables from Japan's Vatican ambassador to Tokyo; they were never even acknowledged, let alone answered.
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