Napoleon 1812

Book Description

Napoleon's invasion of Russia occupied only six months, June to December 1812, but during that period nearly 500,000 men died. At the start Napoleon was at the height of his power, at the end at his nadir.

Why did he invade Russia? Why, in spite of his early successes and the capture of Moscow, did he fail?

Book Description

The author, an editor of Campaigns Magazine for ten years, has written a groundbreaking new study of Napoleon's disasterous Russian campaign of 1812. In doing this, he has employed primary sources never before translated from the German and Russian. He points out the real reasons for Napoleon's defeat which had nothing to do with cold weather but rather were a complex combination of faulty logistics, bureaucratic mismanagement and Napoleon's own but uncharacteristic indecision and bad choices.

Customer Reviews:

Super chronicle of a super debacle.......2002-07-19

Invading Russia doesn't seem to be a good idea. I know of three major campaigns, all ending in disaster: Charles XII of Sweden (against Peter the Great), Napoleon, and Hitler. Charles XII and Hitler were mediocre generals at best, but Napoleon--how could he blunder so grotesquely in strategy and tactics? Riehn's book does an excellent job of explaining it. The lack of maps, as the other reviewer noted, is definitely a problem in following the details of logistics and battles. My paperback edition has one map, but it's lousy. However, Riehn makes up for this with a strong narrative that makes the whole campaign come alive.

My father found a great book years ago--"Retreat from Moscow", by Bourgogne (?) long out of print. It's the memoirs of a French officer who miraculously survived the retreat. If you can find it, read it!

Where are the maps?.......2001-02-12

Richard Riehn has written a great book that is rendered almost unreadable by the complete lack of maps. His book features very detailed descriptions of troop movements and I was unable to fully appreciate and follow his obviously well researched book. It will always continue to amaze me why many authors fail to put maps in their books to allow the reader to follow the troop movements. I don't think I should have to have my world atlas on my lap while I read a book. Maybe future editions will add maps?

1812: Napoleon Invasion Russia-Softbound

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A Classic Soldier's Account of the Russian Campaign
A "best of" first person account of the war
First Person Accounts of the 1812 Campaign

1812: Napoleon Invasion Russia-Softbound
Paul Britten Austin
Manufacturer: Greenhill Books
ProductGroup: Book
Binding: Paperback

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Moscow 1812: Napoleon's Fatal March

ASIN: 185367415X

Book Description

This unique paperback brings together in one volume Paul Britten Austin's acclaimed and atmospheric trilogy on Napoleon's Russian campaign, allowing the reader to trace the course of Napoleon's doomed soldiers from the crossing of the Niemen in June 1812 to the catastrophic finale in the depths of a Russian winter. Drawing on hundreds of eyewitness accounts by French and allied soldiers of Napoleon's army, this brilliant study recreates a landmark military campaign in all its death and glory.

Customer Reviews:

A Classic Soldier's Account of the Russian Campaign.......2001-04-25

1812 is a compilation of Austin's three earlier books on Napoleon's invasion of Russia. Austin's work is deservedly a classic, but due to its complexity is not for novices to Napoleonic history. Nor should this work be read by the faint-hearted, given some of the rather gory and explicit details of a rather savage chapter in the history of warfare. This book is not a comprehensive history of the campaign, since the main focus is on those units that marched to and then retreated from Moscow. Austin uses 100+ eyewitness accounts as the basic material to stitch together a portrait of the campaign as seen by the participants. Readers who seek discussions of grand strategy, the causes of the war or detailed orders of battle will be disappointed by this approach (they should instead turn to Chandler's and Riehn's excellent accounts), but those who want to gain a birds-eye view of the campaign will be very pleased.

Although the account starts with the invasion in June 1812 and covers the battles of Smolensk and Borodino, the most gripping part of Austin's work is the last 400 pages on the retreat from Moscow. The reader will find this account both agonizing and spellbinding, due to the appalling suffering and courage in adversity. This book is about real soldiering, when the chips are down, you are starving and the temperature is sub-zero. Although destroyed by the retreat, the bravery and ability of the soldiers of the Grande Armée shine in these pages. On the other hand, the battle accounts, such as Borodino, are good but a bit confusing and not particularly unique. Better maps with annotations where the major characters were located on the battlefield would have been very helpful.

Unfortunately, this very well researched and written book tends to fall apart a bit in the last few chapters (perhaps due to writer fatigue, after 1100 pages). Austin's account of the campaign ends once Marshal Ney leads the French rearguard across the Niemen River on 12 December. However, the retreat lasted two more weeks across a Prussia that was about to declare war on France. Austin provides no accounts of the final tally of survivors at Konigsberg. After following many of these characters for 1100 pages, Austin only informs the reader of the final fate of a few eye-witnesses, and then only in footnotes. A solid epilogue with notes on each character is missing.

These eyewitness accounts are the heart and soul of Austin's monumental work. However, certain facts should be made clear. First, they are not representative accounts; staff officers and inner-circle types make up 50% of the accounts, with only a handful of enlisted soldiers, NCOs or junior officers included. This is for the obvious reason that very few of the later made it back to publish accounts, but the staff officers had a better chance for survival. The second fact relates to the subjectivity of some accounts. There are cases of exaggeration, distortion and lies in the accounts, which Austin does his best to correct. One eyewitness for example, claims that the Grande Armée lost all its artillery in Russia which Austin corrects in a footnote (the French brought back at least 50 artillery pieces). Thus it is critical for readers to glance frequently at the footnotes to see where accounts are misleading. Nevertheless, Austin cannot eliminate the subjective factor in these accounts. One glaring case I found that goes without notice by Austin involves one of the principle accounts, by Colonel Lubin Griois, commanding the light artillery in the 3rd Cavalry Corps. Griois constantly complains about General Armand Lahoussaye, who took over the corps after the Battle of Borodino in September 1812. According to Griois, Lahoussaye is new to the corps and is an "imbecile". Austin repeats this every time he refers to Lahoussaye. Unfortunately, this does not mesh well with the facts. According to the authoritative dictionary on French generals by Georges Six, Lahoussaye had been a division commander in the corps for nine months so he was not a newcomer as Griois claims. Furthermore, Griois fails to mention that Lahoussaye had 20 years of combat experience in the cavalry, including the 1805-1807 campaigns in central Europe and 1808-1811 in Spain. Nor does Griois mention that Lahoussaye was seriously wounded at Borodino, which probably interfered with his command ability. Austin fails to mention that Lahoussaye was a baron in the Legion of Honor and that his name is inscribed on the Arc d'Triomphe. Napoleon did not allow "imbeciles" to command for 20 years and thus, Griois' account is probably a case of axe grinding against a former superior. Austin should have provided the background on Lahoussaye to provide balance.

Finally, a critical factor is how Austin uses the accounts, which are often missing crucial pieces. Based upon the pieces of the accounts he offers for example, it seems that almost nobody made it back from Russia. Colonel Chlapowski, commander of the Polish Lancers in the Guard, figures prominently in Austin's account, as do the Lancers themselves. Austin infers that almost all of the Lancers died escorting Napoleon out of Russia. Actually, in Chlapowski's full account, he states that the Lancer's went into Russia with 915 men and came out with 422. Austin uses partial accounts to suggest that the Old Guard came out with only a handful of men. While the Old Guard suffered very heavy losses, it went in with 5,286 infantrymen and came out with 1,430.

Nevertheless, 1812 is an excellent account of the Russian campaign. Reading it will certainly give one an excellent "feel" for the events, if not for all the facts. Therefore, this book should be used in conjunction with other standard campaign histories for balance.

A "best of" first person account of the war.......2000-12-22

The author did a wonderful job of stringing together a diverse canvas of first person accounts into a coherent narrative. A must read if you are interested in what "actually" happened in 1812. You'll not find strategic analysis or detailed orders of battle info here. But if you want a unique and first rate narrative on the subject, this is it.

First Person Accounts of the 1812 Campaign.......2000-11-24

The book is a combination of Austin's 3 previous works: The March on Moscow (out of print), Napoleon is Moscow, and The Great Retreat. Previous reviewers have correctly described these books as providing an atmospheric mood of the unfolding catastrophic events. The descriptions are mainly from army officers observing the campaign and Napoleon. The book is better at providing insights into human nature and reactions to chaos than as an detailed analysis of battlefield strategy.

This should not be the first book one reads on Napoleon. The style assumes a knowledge of generals and familiarity with military vocabulary that I lacked when I started it. A reading of Elting's introduction to his Military Atlas of Napoleon would be helpful to neophytes before starting Austin's book to prevent bewilderment over terms such as voltigeur, hussar, cuiassier, etc.

Book Description

Napoleon's invasion of Russia and his ensuing terrible retreat from Moscow played out as military epic and human tragedy on a colossal scale -- history's first example of total war. The story begins in 1811, when Napoleon dominated nearly all of Europe, succeeding in his aim to reign over the civilized world like a modern-day Charlemagne. Part of his bid for supremacy involved destroying Britain through a continental blockade, but the plan was stymied when Russia's Tsar Alexander refused to comply. So he set out to teach the Tsar a lesson by intimidation and force. What followed was a deadly battle that would change the fate of modern Europe.

By invading Russia in 1812, Napoleon was upping the ante as never before. Once he sent his vast army eastward, there was no turning back: he was sucked farther and farther into the one territory he could not conquer. Trudging through a brutal climate in hostile lands, his men marched on toward distant Moscow. But this only galvanized the Russians, who finally made a stand at the gates of the city. The ensuing outbreak was a slaughter the likes of which would not be seen again until the first day of the Somme more than a century later.

What remained of Napoleon's army now had to endure a miserable retreat across the wintry wastes of Russia, while his enemies aligned against him. This turned out to be a momentous turning point: not only the beginning of the end for Napoleon's empire, but the rise of Russia's influence in world affairs. It also gave birth to Napoleon's superhuman legend -- the myth of greatness in failure that would inspire the Romantic poets as well as future leaders to defy fate as he had done.

In this gripping, authoritative account, Adam Zamoyski has drawn on the latest Russian research, as well as a vast pool of firsthand accounts in French, Russian, German, Polish, and Italian, to paint a vivid picture of the experiences of soldiers and civilians on both sides of the conflict. He shows how the relationship between Napoleon and Tsar Alexander came to distort their alliance and bring about a war that neither man wanted. Dramatic, insightful, and enormously absorbing, Moscow 1812 is a masterful work of history.

Customer Reviews:

'Never Despair while Brave Men Remain with the Colors'.......2007-07-24

The Russian campaign is definitely the most difficult to write about. In this volume, the author presents a highly readable account of that great campaign that is an valuable addition to the literature of the campaign, but it isn't a stand-alone account of the Russian campaign, and it isn't without its flaws.

Overall, the author has demonstrated a more-than-adequate grasp of the poltical problems facing the belligerents in 1812. The causes of the war are evenly handled, and the sole blame is not laid at the door of the French, or at Napoleon's. That being said, the author has not painted an accurate picture of either Napoleon or Alexander. Napoleon's character is relegated to the 'traditional' view of him being driven 'by a lust for power and domination over others' as well, among other things 'having no sense of justice' (which is a gratuitous and ludicrous statement, Napoleon formulating and giving France and the Empire the Code Napoleon among other civil reforms). It is only recently that an accurate picture of Napoleon's character has been developed by historians and it is a shame that work wasn't taken advantage of here.

On the other hand it appears that Alexander is given the benefit of the doubt at almost every turn, even though he was a particide, an Asian autocrat, who wielded his unquestioned power in Russia, was a treacherous ally, and one who refused to support the alliance he made with Napoleon in 1807. He was slippery, double-dealing, and a coward who deftly used intrigue, deception, and treason to his benefit. He tried to be a soldier, and was not, interfering rather than helping his generals in the field. His chosen advisors, his 'aides-de-camp' were carpet knights and not soldiers, who helped with this interference. He fought the Turks and the Swedes, as well as the French, and it is probably that his lauded stance of not negotiating with Napoleon in 1812 until there were no French on Russian soil was because he feared being assassinated by those same nobles that murdered his father.

There are other errors in the book. The author labels Tilsit a triumph for the Tsar, whcih is a fantastically inaccurate statement; states that the battle of Aspern-Essling in 1809 were 'twin battles' when they were not (it was one action, which the Austrians won-the first battlefield victory over Napoleon since 1796-it is known as Aspern to the Austrians and Essling to the French, hence the hyphenated use of both names by many historians); and War and Peace is mentioned as a quasi-reference for the period, which is a gross error.

The author inaccurately states that the Russian artillery arm was probably the best in the world in 1812, which cannot be supported by any substantive reference. The French artillery arm had been recognized as Europe's best since 1789 and it had not been eclipsed by any other European artillery system since. The Austrian and British artillery arms were also superior to the Russian artillery. The Russian artillery officers were poorly trained and educated, and the 'new' equipment of the 1805 System were copies of Prussian and Austrian material from the 1740s and 1750s. Further, the manner in which Russian artillery was commanded and employed was inferior to French artillery doctrine and this was remarked upon by various Russian artillerymen, notably Yermelov, Sievers, and Kutusaiv.

The author also stated that the French transport corps was 'le train.' Actually, there were at least two different types of 'train' in the French service. The train des equipages (supply train) is the organization to which he is referring. There was also a train d'artillerie which was responsible for hauling the artillery equipment. there was also a smaller engineer train to boot.

While some of the military sections of the book are substandard and carelessly done, the overall impact of the volume is a credit to the author. While many other authors and historians have misinterpreted or left out key factors of the campaign, this author does not. He correctly labels the Russian generals and high command for what it is-in short a mess. Further, the Battle of the Berezina is analysed correctly in that it was a decisive victory for the French. Further, the crucial Battle of Maloyaroslavets is labeled a French victory. The issue with the most impact, however, is that the author correctly states the heavy losses the Russians incurred during the campaign which many overlook, focusing on the disaster that befell the Grande Armee. Russian losses, for the same causes, the cold and exposure, are clearly brought to the forefront of the narrative.

If used with caution in the areas outlined above this is an excellent narrative of the Russian campaign. It is highly recommended and should be on everyone's bookshelf who is interested in the Napoleonic period in general and the Russian campaign in particular. I am looking very much forward to the author's next effort.

A Well Written Account with Fresh Insight.......2007-07-17

The history of Napoleon's invasion of Russia in 1812 has been told many times before so readers might be tempted to shrug their shoulders at the sight of another book on this subject. Don't. Adam Zamoyski's Moscow 1812: Napoleon's Fatal March is a well-written and insightful look at the French march to and from Moscow. The value added component of this book derives from the author's research into post-Soviet archives which has yielded some fresh perspectives on Marshal Kutuzov, Tsar Alexander and the other Russian commanders, as well as some Italian and Polish first-person accounts that haven't made it into earlier works. As military history, Zamoyski does a good job putting the events together into a coherent pattern and there are plenty of sketch maps to support tactical descriptions, although strictly speaking the author does not delve into the level of military detail that one might find in other books, particularly about the Battle of Borodino. Overall, this is a fine work and I was impressed by the level of research that went into it and the author's ability to turn it into a page-turning and gripping account.

Moscow 1812 is divided into 25 chapters, which flow chronologically and each of which covers a thematically-driven slice of the campaign, such as Kutuzov's assumption of command. The volume includes a total of 23 sketch maps, a large number of illustrations, lengthy endnotes, a robust bibliography and an efficient index. The author writes this book for a general audience but with the assumption that even general readers will have some knowledge of this campaign, albeit based on sources such as Tolstoy's War and Peace. Zamoyski is also fairly even-handed in establishing his perspective, favoring neither the Napoleon-centric approach or a chauvinistic Russian defense of the Motherland. Instead, the reader is presented with a fairly objective campaign narrative, told partly through first-person accounts, with only the faintest hint of Greek Tragedy.

Unusually, Zamoyski sees the Russians as much to blame for the war as the French. While Napoleon incited Russia by the creation of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, the author notes that Tsar Alexander was clearly preparing for offensive action in conjunction with Prussia prior to the French invasion. Russian aggressiveness and a desire for revenge after the Treaty of Tilsit were major factors in the road to war. Throughout the campaign, Napoleon's Grande Armée had qualitative advantages that enabled its soldiers to persevere under the most adverse conditions. Yet French logistic planning was incredibly poor and collapsed almost immediately upon crossing the border. Other than possessing very good artillery and more secure logistics, the Russian army was outclassed by the French in almost every other category. Clearly the greatest French disadvantage - and one that is difficult for historians to explain - was that Napoleon entered Russia with only a very hazy plan of campaign to defeat the Russian border armies, but little thought beyond that.

Moscow 1812 is a far more frank and blunt account than most others on this subject, with the full misery of the soldier's conditions conveyed in their own words. Due to lack of water, one French soldier recounts drinking horse's urine out of ruts in the road. There are also very graphic descriptions of battle and non-battle conditions (e.g. frostbite) that gives the reader a much better sense of the hardships endured by the common soldier than is often the case. The author describes how, "some [soldiers] became so disoriented by the cold that they would walk drunkenly straight into a fire and stand in it with their bare feet..." There is also considerable swearing and soldier's language in this account, which is refreshingly honest compared to other more sanitized accounts. However, the author is not always adept at relaying the critical elements of tactical combat - in his account of Borodino for example, he fails to appreciate the Russian mistake in leaving so much of their artillery in reserve at the start. When the Russian artillery commander was killed early in the battle, most of his guns sat out the day unused. The author sees Borodino as a French victory with the Russian army rendered combat ineffective, whereas author historians tend to view it as the beginning of the unraveling of the Grande Armée due to debilitating losses.

The author also presents several non-standard perspectives on the campaign, beginning with his description of how Moscow was not totally destroyed by fire and that the French were able to salvage enough food and supplies to partly rebuild their strength - he writes that the Grande Armée was "in fine fettle" at the beginning of the retreat. Nor were all the French units unprepared for winter, since a few French and Polish units did prepare for winter operations and they came through the retreat much better than others. Italian troops also are singled out for their exceptional combat performance in Russia - particularly at the Battle of Maloyaroslavets - while German troops performed poorly.
Napoleon appears in poor form throughout much of this account, unable to fathom the Russian reason for continuing to fight or the danger posed by their climate to his army. Plagued by indecisiveness and periods of torpor, Napoleon seems to drift along to Moscow on inertia and hope, with only occasional bursts of energy displayed during moments of supreme crisis. Yet in the midst of one the greatest crises in military history - the retreat from Moscow - the French troops remained loyal to their emperor. The author notes that, "even when taken prisoner, the soldiers of the Grande Armée refused to say a word against Napoleon." As for `why' this catastrophe occurred, the author does not spend a great deal of effort seeking answers but points to miscalculation and hubris by Napoleon as the likely culprits.

Totally X-Rated.......2007-03-30

Adam Zamoyski truly brings to life the entire campaign of Napoleon's invasion of Russia. The style of writing is so captivating and truly X-Rated in many areas (so vivid and gruesome). Gives very good account of how Napoleon can amass so a huge army only to loose almost 90% of it to war, starvation, summer heat (at first) and to "General Frost" (at last)..... How could a man of Napoleon's talent succumb to so many bad decisions in war? Read on! Such a great read indeed!

Napoleon's fatal march.......2007-03-07

This is a thorough book about Napoleon's invasion of Russia in 1812. The battles of Borodino and other battles are vividly described. Mr Zomoyski also excellently describes the horrible French retreat. It's worth reading!

dont believe the bad press, read this book.......2007-02-02

This is a wonderful book. Contrary to some of the other reviews, Zamoyski's scholarship is sound in every respect. Although this story had been told in English, French, German and Russian many times before, this synthesis adds value. Those who have read other accounts of this disastrous campaign are encouraged not to let their knowledge of the topic keep them from the new insights offered in this book.

Zamoyski does a masterful job of showing the reader how the myths of this campaign came to be--General Winter, the almost mystical celebration of the Russian Spirit, the hubris of Napoleon--and then provides rare insight into the rest of the story. Zamoyski relies on a broad array of previous scholarship, including extensive use of memoirs, as well as new sources. His account of the retreat is perhaps the best that exists in English today.

The collapse of the French army in this account is more the result of a complex of factors whose origin lay not in the brutal and bitter Russian Winter--but rather in serious military and logisitic miscaluculations by Napoleon prior to and during the campaign. In one sense, this campaign reflects Napoleon's generalship at its worst, and in a situation where he needed his best effort most. Nevertheless, from the first pages one feels that one is reading about a doomed army as a litany of errors and mistakes begin their dark parade toward Moscow and then back again.

This book is not for the squeamish. The horrors of the retreat are simply unimaginable. Recent archealogical evidence in Lithuania supports Zamoyski's speculation that the remains of the Grand Armee literally had a sort of group nervous breakdown around Vilna that ensured the death of many thousands who seem to have made it mirculously out of Russia...only to die in the first place they thought themselves at last safe from the cossacks and the winter. A great read and great prose, this book is recommended for the widest possible audience.

1812 THROUGH FIRE AND ICE WITH NAPOLEON: A French Officer's Memoir of the Campaign in Russia

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1812 THROUGH FIRE AND ICE WITH NAPOLEON: A French Officer's Memoir of the Campaign in Russia
Eugene Labaume
Manufacturer: Helion and Company Ltd.
ProductGroup: Book
Binding: Hardcover

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ASIN: 1874622752

Book Description

This reprint of an important French narrative is sure to generate a considerable amount of interest, as Napoleon's epic 1812 Russian Campaign continues to fascinate and enthrall.

Out-of-print for 150 years, Labaume's text presents a superb evocation of the Grande Arme'e in 1812. We follow this French officer of engineers as he marches with Eugene de Beauharnais' IV Corps deeper and deeper into Russia, and experience the strange fascination this mysterious land held for Napoleon's soldiers. Battles follow, Labaume relating his experiences at the bloody Moskwa, or Borodino, in particular detail, before the army reaches Moscow.

Soon, events take a more unfortunate turn for the French, and Labaume begins his part in the disastrous Retreat from Moscow, recounting the appalling miseries endured by the soldiers, including the crossing of the Beresina. Somehow, Labaume survives to tell the tale - making his way back over the River Niemen to safety. Key FeaturesA vivid and fascinating personal account of one of the great campaigns in military history.

The author kept daily notes during the Retreat from Moscow by mixing gunpowder with snow to produce ink.

This reprint makes a very scarce work available again to a whole new readership, representing a major contribution to the library of Napoleonic literature.

"Arrived at the opposite bank, like ghosts returned from the infernal regions, we fearfully looked behind us, and beheld with horror the savage countries where we had suffered so much. No person would then easily believe that we had once regarded these climates with envy..." (Labaume commenting upon his safe return from Russia

1812 The Great Retreat: Told by the Survivors

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Napoleon's Men of Bronze
Not a Good Reading Book
Third of A Three Volume Epic: Getting Back

1812 The Great Retreat: Told by the Survivors
Paul Britten Austin
Manufacturer: Greenhill Books
ProductGroup: Book
Binding: Hardcover

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ASIN: 1853672467

Customer Reviews:

Napoleon's Men of Bronze.......2000-08-20

This excellent volume, superbly documented, paints a realistic, grim, and completely readable picture of the Grande Armee's retreat from Moscow. Much new information has been uncovered and used, and this is one of the best books on the subject available today in English. The third of three books by the same author on the Russian campaign, it tells the tale of one of the most tragic and gripping events of the Napoleonic Wars.

The retreat was gruesome. During it, Napoleon reached his nadir as a soldier, but somewhere, possibly during one of the running fights with Cossacks or other Russian irregulars, he regained his identity and courage, and got the remnants of his army out of Russia, the survivors he later proudly nicknamed his 'men of bronze.'

Without a doubt, the French and allied survivors were the toughest men in the Grande Armee by virtue of their getting out of Russia. The best and proudest moment for all concerned, except the Russians of course, was the assault crossing of the Berezina River, the last obstacle facing the Grande Armee on its way home.

Chased by two, and the river line held by another Russian army, the professionalism and stark fighting qualities of Napoleon's soldiers sorted themselves out and they executed a flawless operation, defeating two Russian armies and outrunning a third. Building the bridges they needed as they went, they fought their way across against almost overwhelming numbers of men and guns, the French and their trusted allies, Swiss, Germans, and Poles, outfighting their Muscovite opponents and leaving Russia as victors.

This story has many eyewitnesses, doctors, privates, generals, colonels, and one French actress. They tell of the horror and suffering, of high deeds, and the hopelessness of the snow covered vastness that is Russia in the winter.

This book is excellent, and along with its two partners, deserves wider reading. It is a superb reference for study or fun, and all three have now been produced in one volume.

Not a Good Reading Book.......2000-08-03

I bought this book on the basis of the above review and was looking forward to a gripping tale of Napoleon's retreat from Moscow. Instead, I found a book bogged down with with the author's attempt to document too many minute details. The writing style is choppy and confusing. I'm sure as a reference book it is very well researched, but it is not at all what I would call a "good read". I gave up after several chapters.

Third of A Three Volume Epic: Getting Back.......1999-09-21

In this final volume of the trilogy horror is piled on horror as the remnants of the Grand Armee, of its camp followers, and of the pathetic survivors of the pre-war French colony in Moscow struggle westwards through snow and ice, dogged at every step by swarms of Cossacks and the focus of converging Russian armies. Almost every page finds heights of human heroism and sacrifice contrasted with extreme examples of cowardice, selfishness and cruelty. One always knew that the Retreat from Moscow was an unparalleled disaster, but until one reads this fusing of so many first-hand accounts once never realised just how bad it was. The collapse of discipline, hope and decency is graphically depicted yet in the midst of it perhaps the greatest surprise is how effectively some units, not always necessarily elite ones, still managed to stage effective defensive and rearguard actions, without which the disaster would have even more total. (Readers will inevitably find close and indeed uncanny echoes of Anthony Beevor's recent "Stalingrad"). The story is inevitably dominated by Marshal Ney, who comes across as an even more magnificent battlefield-commander than even his "Bravest of the Brave" title suggests, but Prince Eugene Beauharnais, runs him a close second as a splendid, resourceful and indomitable leader in adversity. The pace of the narrative never lets up and indeed the chapters surrounding the loss of the Berezina bridge to the Russians and the subsequent efforts to get the survivors across by improvised field bridging, in appalling conditions, achieve an almost unbearable level of suspense. It is a measure of the writing that, though one knows the outcome, one still hopes page by page that some miracle will still happen. Many of the personalities whose accounts feature in the earlier volumes appear here again, adding to the reader's sense of familiarity. Like its predecessors, this volume cannot be too highly recommended - it is a magnificent achievement and must surely assume classic status.

The Napoleonic Wars: The Empires Strike Back 1808-1812

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Excellent Overview

The Napoleonic Wars: The Empires Strike Back 1808-1812
Todd Fisher
Manufacturer: Routledge
ProductGroup: Book
Binding: Hardcover

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ASIN: 1579583660

Book Description

In 1808 Napoleon dominated Europe, but the peace was not to survive for long. Todd Fisher continues his detailed account of the Napoleonic Wars with Austria's attack against Napoleon in 1809. Despite being defeated at Aspern-Essling, Napoleon rallied his forces and emerged triumphant at Wagram. With glorious victory behind him Napoleon now turned his attention to Russia and invaded in 1812. Yet the army was not the Grand Armee of old, and even the capture of Moscow availed him nothing--the foe remained elusive, the decisive battle remained unfought. This book tells the full story of the now legendary retreat from Moscow, as the fighting force that had vanquished Europe perished in the snows of the Russian winter.

Customer Reviews:

Excellent Overview.......2003-10-05

This book is another masterful piece of writing continuing the story of the Napoleonic era from 1808-1812. In less than 90 pages, it captures the political thought and military preparedness of each country. It explains why countries went to war. And it explains the campaigns, why they occurred, and summaries the battles in exciting, easy to read prose. It is an exceptionally well written summary of the political and military events of the period. If you want a good overview of the period, this is an excellent choice.

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Written by a Master of History and Strategy

The Russian Campaign of 1812
Carl von Clausewitz
Manufacturer: Transaction Publishers
ProductGroup: Book
Binding: Paperback

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ASIN: 1412805996

Customer Reviews:

Written by a Master of History and Strategy.......2007-04-02

No one interested in military affairs could possibly have avoided hearing of Clausewitz. His masterpiece, 'On War' has been a standard text for military officers, historians and the general public for almost two hundred years. Much less well known is his writing on military history.

After the defeats on the Prussians, Napoleon, actively recruited the Prussian forces to join with his French to attack Russia. Clausewitz left the Prussian forces to fight for the Russians against Napoleon.

This book on Napoleon's invasion of Russia is a supurb first had account of the Russian defeats in 1812. But beyond that is Clausewitz's analysis of the battles, of the campaign, and the generals. This campaign by Napoleon is interesting because Napoleon won all the battles, at the beginning of the campaign he was at the peak of his glory. His victory in Russia was a "Pyrrhic victory," at the end of the campaign his army was almost destroyed.

BORODINO: THE MOSCOVA: The Battle for the Redoubts

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The books in the series
What a Deal!
Battles,Generals,Uniforms,Maps
Borodino for Beginners

BORODINO: THE MOSCOVA: The Battle for the Redoubts
F. G. Hourtoulle
Manufacturer: Histoire and Collections
ProductGroup: Book
Binding: Hardcover

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ASIN: 2908182963

Book Description

Readers of F.-G. Hourtouille's acclaimed Jena-Auerstaedt will find the same extraordinary detail in this study of Napoleon's 1812 campaign.

Over 300 uniforms and over 120 flags are featured in the color plates as well as paintings of the battle. The evolution of the battle is described with the aid of numerous new color maps.

By the same author and available from Casemate

Jena-Auerstaedt: The Triumph of the Eagle

Wagram: At the Heyday of the Empire

Customer Reviews:

The books in the series.......2004-07-02

I have all the books in this series (Four to date) plus a few others by H&C. The color plates are one of the stronger reasons why I collect the books, but there is some information about the topic the book covers as well. These books are translated from the original French versions, so the writing portion is not perfect. These books are of very nice quality and value though with colorful uniform plates.

What a Deal!.......2001-09-26

I have only browsed this book, but as the owner of many Napoleonic pictorial books this is a wonderful deal. I would expect to pay at least $[PRICE] for a volume of this type, most of which are only available with French text. This is NOT a narrative, it is meant to be a adjunct to books that are. If one were interested in starting a collection of illustrated books of the Napoleonic period this is a wondeful place to start. The same goes for the authors book on the Prussian campaign.

Battles,Generals,Uniforms,Maps.......2001-08-06

I always like to respect the ideas of all the pleople that share their ideas with the public but this time I think I disagreed with one of the writers, I do not see this book as a introduction to the battle of Borodino if you are looking for a book that gave you a good introduction may be the one of Digy Smith would help(Is not that good but it would gave you the idea) This book is more for the people that are enteresting in Uniformology of the Grande Armee, the confederation of the Rhine and the Russian Army,it also gave you names of who was in command at time of the battles. There is a good introduction that tell you why this nations confront on this date but is really small,maps are really hard to follow but they gave you the idea of what was happening. This Translation from the original french version have alot of mistakes in Uniforms,the plates which are made by Andre Jouineau show you everything the equipment,weapons, calvary items etc..

The great thing about this book is that is fully illustrated with russian and french paintings this is not that common on books of the Napoleonic wars and specially the ones on uniforms.

Mr Hourtoulle made a great work with the Jena Auertaedt Book but in this new book about the Moskova the uniforms plates are made much more better(remenber there is some mistakes on the plates) I was looking for a book that show me the uniforms of the Russian army, there is plates from the Pavlovski Grenadier to the Platov Cossacks and from the french side almost all the allied and La Garde Imperiale and I can tell you that I find it, you would enjoy reading this book but if you are looking for a great work I recommend The books from the late John Elting Napoleonic Uniforms.Vol III & IV

Borodino for Beginners.......2001-04-20

Those who loved F.G. Hourtoulle's "Jena, Auerstaedt : The Triumph of the Eagle" will also like his new book on Borodino. As in "Jena, Auerstaedt" the chief attractions are the illustrations of battle scenes and lavish uniform guides. Most of "Borodino's" battle illustrations are from Russian works on the subject and include several sections from the grand panorama of the battle in Moscow. These include a wonderful picture of the two Russian Guard Cuirassier regiments charging the two Saxon Guard heavy cavalry regiments. The book is profusely illustrated with uniform plates organized around the author's corps by corps, division by division review of the combatants and their commanders.

The downside of this is that the text is poorly written and translated with numerous typos. As with "Jena" you will have a difficult time following the action using only this book even with the nice tactical maps which are included. If you want a good clear discussion of the battle, try Christpher Duffy's book or the West Point Atlas of the Napoleonic Wars. You also need to be a bit careful of the uniform plates as an error or two has crept in such as showing a blackened cuirass for a Russian regiment distinguished by its French style armor or not identifying a plate as being of an NCO trooper. However, that said, for sheer color and basic information this is a great book to begin a collection on the era or for a veteran enthusiast to have around just to enjoy now and then. I know that despite the quibbles, I will buy all the books like this that M. Hourtoulle can write---as long as he continues to illustrate them like this.

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History of the Expedition to Russia 1812
Philip De Segur
Manufacturer: Nonsuch Publishing, Limited
ProductGroup: Book
Binding: Paperback

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History of the Expedition to Russia 1

ASIN: 1845880226

Book Description

On June 23, 1812, with virtually all of Europe under his control, Napoleon Bonaparte and his Grand Armée, the largest force yet assembled for war, crossed the River Niemen into Russia in an attempt to defeat the Russian army and force the Tsar, Alexander I, into a Treaty confirming Napoleon's dominance over the whole of continental Europe. Over half a million men embarked on the invasion and, initially, the attack went well, the Russians retreating before the French to within 70 miles of Moscow. Here, though, the Russians turned and fought one of the bloodiest battles of the war, at Borodino, with total casualties approaching 100,000. The Russians withdrew further and Napoleon entered Moscow on September 14.

These events were experienced by the author of this account, General of Brigade Count Philip de Ségur. His detailed, eye-witness account of an epoch-making campaign is compelling reading.

The first volume relates events leading up to the burning of Moscow, a precursor to the horrors of the French retreat related in this second volume, which covers the period after the Battle of Borodino to the end of the campaign.

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