Book Description
National Bestseller
New York Times Editors’ Choice
Winner of the PEN Hessell Tiltman Prize
Winner of the Duff Cooper Prize
Silver Medalist for the Arthur Ross Book Award
of the Council on Foreign Relations
Finalist for the Robert F. Kennedy Book Award
For six months in 1919, after the end of “the war to end all wars,” the Big Three—President Woodrow Wilson, British prime minister David Lloyd George, and French premier Georges Clemenceau—met in Paris to shape a lasting peace. In this landmark work of narrative history, Margaret MacMillan gives a dramatic and intimate view of those fateful days, which saw new political entities—Iraq, Yugoslavia, and Palestine, among them—born out of the ruins of bankrupt empires, and the borders of the modern world redrawn.
Customer Reviews:
How we ended up where we are today!.......2007-10-13
Paris 1919 is a good book that looks at the "peace" effort that was forced on the World by the victors of the Great War. It is a good overall look at the competing interest and political difficulties that left the world divided and led to the almost endless struggles in Europe, the Middle East, and in other far off regions.
Paris 1919.......2007-08-23
Margaret Macmillan's Paris 1919 is a masterful work that shows the complexity of the negotiations after World War One and just how enormous the task at hand truly was. There is no blame for what happened, or what didn't happen. She does not blame the future on this treaty. her approach is fresh and inspiring. Her writing style is fast-paced yet she clearly understands her subject.
For many it is easy to follow earlier accounts and say that World War Two had its origin in Paris in 1919. Contemporaries of Wilson, Clemanceau, and Lloyd George used such predictions to drive home their point. When the Second World War erupted, many looked to these critics of Versailles and agreed. For some, these critics appear as prophets.
Not so, says Macmillan. It is an easy cop out to avoid responsibility to place blame, throw up one's hands and say there is nothing they can do, then brood. True, if the Council of Four (Three) had had a better grasp of their world they might not have made the decisions they did, but one cannot blame the past for the future. There were plenty of stubborn decisions at Paris, but the participants had their own hands tied by earlier secret deals and the like. None in Paris blamed the past that led to those secret deals for the quandry they found themselves in, so why should future generations blame the Paris negotiators?
This treaty is so vast, and so complex, it is a wonder Macmillan was able to cover it in just under 500 pages of text. She is a first rate author and a first rate scholar. It will take quite a feat to write a better account of the Versailles Treaty.
A Good Example of How Good Intentions Can Go Wrong.......2007-08-13
This book gives an excellant example of what can happen when people try to make a better world and let too much of the old world invade and frustrate what you are trying accomplish. It shows how when the Allies sat down after the Armistace was signed to create a peace that would last, too many of the promises and treaties signed during the war came back to haunt those same nations that had made them.
The format is interesting in each chapter zeroes in on a specific area of the conference. It is helpful in that all the informaton for say Poland is in one area, but kind of makes you lose the chronological flow of the conference where so many of these things were happening at the same time. It makes for a good reference in that you can look up a certain topic without having to skim through the whole chronological timeline to find it. A chronological scheme of events would have been even harder to accomplish since several topics were handled on the same day at the conference and the reader would have been lost in all the detail.
I highly recommend this book to anyone who is interested in WW1 and how the Treaty of Versailles was drawn up. It shows how all of the participants were human with flaws and strengths. It also shows how different nations can view the same idea differently and how you can end up with less than you hoped for when all is said and done.
A tour de force in historical narrative.......2007-07-03
1919 masses a vast amount of information about the critical period of the negotiations of the Treaty of Versailles and tangential treaties that ended the Great War. At its best, 1919 ties it all together to draw relevance to today's world.
Macmillan charges through a dense web of diplomatic doings but livens the mix with vivid personalities and dramatic conversations. TE Lawrence, Kemal Ataturk, Bratianu of Romania, D'Annunzio of Italy. Macmillan strikes a neutral view overall, but one detects a sense of favor to Lloyd George, her great-grandfather. She teases him about his sense of geography, but generally he seems to rise above Wilson and Clemenceau in the telling. Woodrow Wilson is depicted as a sad and frustrated old man.
Each nation altered by the peacemakers is treated in turn. Ironically, Germany gets the least depth of treatment. Macmillan seems to say "you know the rest of that story" but still connects the dots to the next conflict. More focus is on the less told stories of how Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman empires were carved up and new nations formed.
A tour de force in historical narrative. Fascinating.
History woven with personalities and culture.......2007-06-04
What an incredibly powerful point in history. The ending of an era of dynasties lasting centuries and monarchy for several countries along with the evolution of communism. The personalities of the leaders and how they related in the process is fascinating. The process of breaking up the Austrian-Hungary empire as well as the Ottoman empire and the ramifications resulting are worth the read.
I enjoyed the cultural differences outlined between the French, English, American and Italian as well, not to mention the German, Japanese, Chinese, Greek and others. The evolution of America and the American position on foreign affairs is also worthy of note.
There is much complex material and much history of the areas in question but I recommend this book highly.
Book Description
The policy-oriented approach of the New Haven School is widely recognized as a major contribution to the legal and jurisprudential debate on interpretation. Eschewing mechanical textual methods, on the one hand, and anti-textual, solipsistic methods, on the other, the New Haven School has developed a comprehensive and systematic approach to the interpretation of human communication. Drawing upon psychology, legal experience, and communications theory, of which Lasswell was a founder, the authors have developed a theoretically cogent and practical method of interpretation. In the course of doing it, they survey the existing literature, showing its problems. In addition to the original text of The Interpretation of Agreements, this edition includes a new introduction, in which developments since the appearance of the book are examined and appraised, and three important papers which elaborate the theory developed here, including Professor McDougal's scathing critique of the last major international conference on the law of treaties.
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The Origins of the Iranian-American Alliance, 1941-1953
Mark Lytle
Manufacturer: Holmes & Meier Publishers
ProductGroup: Book
Binding: Hardcover
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ASIN: 084191060X |
Average customer rating:
- Great book by two respected academics
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NATO and the Transatlantic Alliance in the 21st Century: The Twenty-Year Crisis
Geoffrey Lee Willliams , and
Barkley Jared Jones
Manufacturer: Palgrave Macmillan
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Binding: Hardcover
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ASIN: 0333657640 |
Book Description
This book examines the nature of international politics in the 20th century. It encapsulates those essential features likely to be present in the 21st century. One important feature is the friction generated by nation states attempting to coexist in a still largely unequal and hierarchical system. The possible impact of three powerful, simultaneous, and intersecting revolutions on international relations and the future of NATO is assessed in relation to the 21st century.
Customer Reviews:
Great book by two respected academics.......2003-04-13
This amazing book by Geoffrey Lee Williams and Barkley Jared Jones of Cambridge University discusses the intricate details, problems and challenges facing the NATO alliance in the next 20 years in the context of what has happened in the past. In particular, the book focuses on the relationship between the US, France, Germany and the United Kingdom. This book seems to have been written to remain relevant for students, military analysts and others to study for years and years to come. Keep it near the front of your bookcase. I refer to it constantly.
Book Description
The nature and function of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) are uncertain now that the alliance has accomplished its primary objective of defending Western Europe from the perceived Soviet threat. Despite uncertainty about NATO's role in the post-Cold War world, its political and military leaders agree that it can continue to play a vital part in enhancing European security and maintaining international stability. This superb analysis explores the evolving functions and future directions of this unique organization, paying particular attention to the political cultures and goals of its member states. "The Promise of Alliance" is important reading for students and scholars of international relations, foreign affairs, and political theory.
Customer Reviews:
The most well written book on NATO I have read........1999-10-15
Mr. Thomas' book is required reading for anyone interested in understanding the political climate that forged NATO.
Book Description
In 1812, at the end of the Napoleonic Wars, a congress convened in Vienna in which the fate of Europe was to be determined for the next hundred years. Attending were the great statesmen of the time -- the wily French foreign minister, Talleyrand; his brave but misguided British counterpart, Lord Castlereagh; the conservative Austrian chancellor, Prince Metternich; and the idealistic but unstable tsar Alexander. Beginning with Napoleon's harrowing retreat from Moscow, the pace of the narrative holds throughout the negotiations in the Austrian capital, where the power struggle to both restore a lost world and ensure a stable future took place. Harold Nicolson's classic is narrative history at its best. "With swift pace, clear focus and a series of brilliant character sketches, this is narrative history at its best." -- The New York Times
Customer Reviews:
Nicolson's Diplomatic Universe.......2001-03-01
The author, Harold George Nicolson (1886-1968), served in the British Foreign Office from 1909 to 1929 prior to his impressive career as a scholar and writer. The present book was originally published in 1946 and clearly reflects Nicolson's diplomatic experiences. `The Congress of Vienna. A study in Allied Unity, 1812-1822' is a historical (re)construction of the background, negotiations and result of the Vienna Congress in 1814-15. This chronologically structured volume begins with Napoleon's abandonment of his troops on the Russian fields in December 1812 and ends with the collapse of the conference system after the Congress of Verona in 1822. This unusual periodization is due to the author's intention with the work, namely to present "an examination, in terms of the past, of the factors which create dissension between independent States temporarily bound together in a coalition" (p. 46). According to Nicolson, the formation of the final coalition (The Quadruple Alliance) that defeated Napoleon began in 1812 and was dissolved ten years later.
The main argument runs as follows: The basic principle that is required in order to establish an alliance is an agreement between at least two states to "subordinate their separate interests to a single purpose" (p. 49). In 1813 (as well as in 1914 and 1939) the purpose was the defeat of a common threat and enemy. However, once victory seems in reach, the common purpose begins to fade away on behalf of the separate interests of the allies. In other words, the constitutive element in the alliance is crumbling. The political controversials between the members are only brought to the surface once the war enters its final stage, even though the disinterests might have been latent all the way. Therefore, the negotiators often lack the necessary rational judgment once the political matter with the defeated enemy has to be settled which often results in frail peace treaties.
This explanation theory appears very universal in its wording, which methodologically is a problem because it is only tested empirically on the Quadruple Alliance against Napoleon. But it is apparent, though, that the theory (as a hypothesis) seems applicable to the two world wars of the twentieth century as well. The Versailles Settlement, in retrospect at least, does not seem as the result of a very rational calculation, and concerning WWII we are already too familiar with the clash of separate interests between the two wartime allies, the United States and the USSR.
Except for this issue of the seemingly general theory there are other flaws in the book. Nicolson's statement that Castlereagh's plans for a `just equilibrium' objectively were ideal is difficult to maintain. Sure the scheme of the foreign secretary might have generated a perfect balance of power on the continent including Russia, but this was exactly in the (subjective) interests of Britain. As long as there would be no continental rival Britain would remain the world's undisputed leader. Nicolson does not deny this either but maintains that the British solution would have been the better for Europe at large. Why then, one must ask, was this plan rejected? I think the explanation is that the other great powers simply were not willing to accept British supremacy in order to establish a perfect equilibrium on the continent. If every continental power was prevented from gaining some kind of hegemonic status so should Britain. That is exactly why each power continued to achieve a balance-of-power-solution on its own principles claiming that this particular scheme would be perfect. Castlereagh's proposal was no different than any other idea. The reason for Nicolson's flaw is, perhaps, that he does not come up with any definition of the concept of `power'. Directing his attention at the negotiators' various proposals to a post-napoleonic Europe he precludes any discussion of the power base of the participants. This is probably why Henry Kissinger has commented that Nicolson was "ascribing to negotiating skill what may have been due to a great many other factors" (Kissinger: A World Restored, p. 342).
One last critique of this book: documentation lacks! Having in mind that the author solely draws on secondary sources (due to the war Nicolson was not able to consult archives across the continent) and that references are omitted, the reader must remain critical regarding the precise wording of quotes and exacts dates and times.
Though I have focused on the negative, the book also includes many positive aspects. It is brilliantly written with an eloquence that ought to inspire many present day historians. What is an even greater delight is that Nicolson is completely aware and straightforward with his philosophy of history, that is the forces that determine historical process and the directionality of history.
The book is suitable not only to professionals but also to the average historical minded reader.
Average customer rating:
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The Treaties of the War of the Spanish Succession: An Historical and Critical Dictionary
Manufacturer: Greenwood Press
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Binding: Hardcover
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ASIN: 0313278849 |
Book Description
From 1702 to 1714, the War of the Spanish Succession affected most of Europe and significant parts of the New World, with battles ranging from the Hungarian plains to the harbors of Rio de Janeiro. The death of the last Hapsburg King of Spain unleashed a struggle for his empire. This book includes entries analyzing the individuals who determined the course of the war, who played a diplomatic, economic, or military role, as well as entries analyzing the pivotal battles influencing the outcome. The provisions of the final treaties, known as the Pacification of Utrecht, are examined in detail, as is the significance of those provisions. The diplomats at Utrecht followed the principles of balance of power, compensation, and legitimacy to mold the peace. The peace set the boundaries of Western Europe until the convulsion of the French Revolution. The book opens with an introduction pointing to the significance of the treaties provisions. The alphabetical arrangement of the entries, the numerous cross-references, the bibliographies at the end of the entries, a genealogical table, a chronology, and the index make this work easy to use.
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Versailles and After: 1919-1933 (Lancaster Pamphlets)
Ruth Henig
Manufacturer: Routledge
ProductGroup: Book
Binding: Paperback
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Paris 1919: Six Months That Changed the World
ASIN: 0415127106 |
Book Description
Ruth Henig's fully revised and extended edition includes a new chapter on recent historiography of the subject and provides students with concise coverage of such major topics as the Treaty of Versailles, and the League of Nations. br br li This title available in eBook format. a href="http://www.ebookstore.tandf.co.uk/?isbn=0203134303" Click here for more information /a . br li Visit our eBookstore at: a href="http://www.ebookstore.tandf.co.uk/" www.ebookstore.tandf.co.uk /a .
Customer Reviews:
the [...] of versailles.......2005-09-05
The Versailles Treaty, the most flawed if not the most infamous
treaties between nations, was in 1919, and still is the model of
wrecking the hopes for a "just peace" and at the same time
openly setting the stage for future wars. The 1919 Versailles
"treaty" made the Third Reich of 1933-1945 inevitable.
Reparations, based on Gold-Bearer Bonds of $33,000,000,000.00,
was something Germany or almost any other nation in 1919
could not afford to pay. The Versailles Treaty was the 1919
"garage sale" of Germany's war-weakened economy, and made
Germany weak in terms of any real national defense, even for
a defeated foe. Poland and Czechoslovakia in the 1919-1933
period did their best to try to kick Germany when that nation
had only a 100,000-man "defense force" to defend itself.
France, humiliated by it's stupid war loss to Germany in 1871,
only made things worse: For example, the Ruhr Invasion of
Germany--1923-1924. Also, several attempts to create a
series of pro-French separatist "Rhineland Republics"---1919-
thru-1924. A.K.A.--Divide and Conquer a prostrated Germany.
The new democratic German Weimar "republic" had to accept the
responsibility, and "take the heat" for the deposed Kaiser
Wilhelm-the Second, and also accepting the "fact" that Germany
had to not only admit, under coersion, that the Germans
"started" World War One, but to accept "full responsibility"
for the total costs of the First World War.
Colonel House took advantage of a emotionally disturbed
maniac-depressive called Woodrow Wilson, that tried to create
an abortive attempt at a new world order, that only made
the Second World War inevitable. Wilson's Fourteen Points
of January of 1918, were exposed as the "points" of hypocrisy
and stupid wishful thinking. Wilson was already showing
signs of delusions of grandeur. During the Versailles Treaty's
creation, a British delegate, the Rt. Hon. John Maynard Keynes,
the future "father" of modern Keynesian economics, saw through
Wilson and the phony "peace process" of 1919 the Versailles
"peace process".
The book--Versailles and After 1919-1933, did an excellent
job in exposing the [...] of the 1919 Treaty
of Versailles, and shows that President Woodrow Wilson, and
his puppet-master and controller Colonel House, were at best,
naive to the real aggressor--the Third French Republic, and
in reality, highly educated fools that France played the U.S.
for suckers in 1919-and beyond.
I recommend this fine book.
Thank You;
Dr. Nick Stage--PHD
Book Description
The authors of this groundbreaking book take as a point of departure the precedent-setting agreements established by the Treaties of Westphalia to illuminate the options for maintaining peace. The book describes the system of world order established by the Peace of Westphalia and offers readers an evaluation of its relevance for the increasingly globalized world of the early twenty-fist century, as well as proposing an alternative system of global governance. Provides comprehensive coverage of the causes of great-powers war, the evolutionary course of the Thirty Years' War, durable peace settlements, the relevance of Thirty Years' War to today's environment, and offers an alternative model of world order. For individuals interested in international relations and global issues.
Average customer rating:
- Reluctant allies in war,reluctant co-aothors in peace
- USEFUL TREATISE ON RELEVANT SUBJECT
|
Reluctant Allies: German-Japanese Naval Relations in World War II
Yoichi Hirama ,
Berthold J. Sander-Nagashima , and
Axel Niestle
Manufacturer: US Naval Institute Press
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Binding: Hardcover
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ASIN: 1557504652 |
Book Description
Often forgotten among the many aspects of World War II is the alliance between Germany and Japan. Because of the vast geographical separation between these two Axis nations, and because of some of very real philosophical and operational differences, the alliance was fraught with difficulty. But in the vast middle-ground of the Indian Ocean, these "reluctant allies" did come together to conduct naval operations that might well have had disastrous consequences for the Allies but for the intervention of fate and the inevitable friction of war. Captain Krug served in U-boats in that theater and in the Far East and, with the assistance of scholars of both nations, he has produced a very readable and meticulously researched account of German and Japanese naval interaction. Besides thoroughly covering--for the first time--this neglected topic, the authors provide valuable insight into the faulty mechanism of an alliance between totalitarian powers, characterized by suspicion and a reluctance to freely share information and assets. They also bring to light the difficulties--and ultimate consequences--of dealing with the megalomania and criminal intellect of Adolf Hitler, which resulted in war-crime trials for some of the participants. Proving that not every aspect of the world's greatest war has been covered, this book is a valuable contribution to the ever-expanding lore of the war and will be required reading for those with an interest in naval operations, global strategy, and international diplomacy during the period.
Customer Reviews:
Reluctant allies in war,reluctant co-aothors in peace.......2005-01-10
This is a most disappointing book which is supposed to shed some light on the much neglected naval relations between the Kriegsmarine and IJN,
Billed as an co-operative efforts by German submariner, naval historian and their Japanese counterpart (total of 4 authors), the book reads like a disjointed, poorly written, amateurishly researched undegraduate thesis.
When you are expecting some strategic explanations of the lack of co-ordination in the Axis efforts in the Indian ocean, one is treated, ad nauseam, brief and shallow overviews of Japan German naval and diplomatic relations, repeated anew as each author takes his turn.
What the authors have missed completely are the ploar opposites in naval war aims of Germany and japan, and their strategies to achieve them.
Germany's Atlantic strategy aims to knock out Britain before USA joins her in the war, thus ending the nightmare of a 2 front war with the only 2 superpowers, USA and USSR on her flanks. To achieve same, barring an invasion of the British Isles, would ential her imposing an ironclad blockade of all British imports and beating her into submission with hunger. Hence the "tonnage" strategy which aims to sink as much food and fuel oil transports as possible.
For Japan, her aim is to secure the resources in South and Southeat Asia for a long term defense of her conquest, and to fend off the expected US counterstrokes after Pearl Harbour. With the invasion of Hawaii being a no goer, Japan aims for an ironcald ring around her possessions, and fight off all inturisions with force. hence her "big guns" strategy which seeks out to meet, and destroy US carriers and battleships.
USEFUL TREATISE ON RELEVANT SUBJECT.......2002-06-21
This book is valuable for two reasons. First, it treats in detail a long-neglected subject, namely the attempted cooperation before and during World War II between Germany and Japan. Second, it is an object lesson for the US and our Allies today(!) in how "international coalitions" which look like good ideas can fail to live up to their potential. As we fight the Anti-Terror War and contemplate (somehow) the "final containment" of Saddam Hussein, the pertinence to modern thinking of "Reluctant Allies" grows exponentially. A word of caution though: This book is for serious history buffs and can at times be a tough read. Structurally it is somewhat jagged and repetitious, despite its authors' best intentions, because it feels like a melding of separate monographs on the same subject written by different people working separately. The timeline of the discussion in the book is thus occasionally a bit circular, and the exposition often exhibits sudden twists and turns that cover a subject already mentioned in an earlier chapter. For this reason I take away one star and rate it as "only" four stars; but four stars is still good. The Naval Institute Press has done the world an important service by publishing "Reluctant Allies." This book is all about understanding nuance, and the subtleties of cause and effect, in real-world history. It teaches much about appreciating opportunities lost, about the damage caused by fragmented leadership and inconsistent (or ill-defined) objectives in any alliance, and above all about the dangers of delusional over-reaching by totalitarian regimes. Japan knew the worst thing Hitler could possibly do was attack Russia. The German navy knew the Japanese didn't stand a chance if they went to war with America. And yet it all came to pass, and tens of millions died.
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