Book Description
Many consider the Battle of Midway to have turned the tide of the Pacific War. It is without question one of the most famous battles in history. Now, for the first time since Gordon W. Prange’s bestselling Miracle at Midway, Jonathan Parshall and Anthony Tully offer a new interpretation of this great naval engagement.
Unlike previous accounts, Shattered Sword makes extensive use of Japanese primary sources. It also corrects the many errors of Mitsuo Fuchida’s Midway: The Battle That Doomed Japan, an uncritical reliance upon which has tainted every previous Western account. It thus forces a major, potentially controversial reevaluation of the great battle. The authors examine the battle in detail and effortlessly place it within the context of the Imperial Navy’s doctrine and technology. With a foreword by leading WWII naval historian John Lundstrom, Shattered Sword will become an indispensable part of any military buff’s library. Winner of the 2005 John Lyman Book Award for the "Best Book in U.S. Naval History" and cited by Proceedings as one of its "Notable Naval Books" for 2005.
Customer Reviews:
How the Japanese Blew It .......2007-10-17
This is an excellent book. In a way one might ask what about Midway is untold? There have been numerous books which explained what happened. In a naval operation aimed to destroy the American carrier force, Admiral Yamamoto moved four of his fleet carriers into the middle of the pacific ocean. He aimed at invading Midway Island and hoped that the Americans would come out to defend it. Instead the Americans knew of his plans through radio intercepts and it was they who laid the trap. Aircraft from three of their carriers destroyed the four principal Japanese Fleet carriers and ended what had been up to that time a flood of Japanese victories.
What this book does is to explain how and why things happened. It is in some ways amazing how rudimentary the Japanese naval forces were. Unlike the Americans they did not have radar and the quality of the radios in the fighter aircraft were so poor they were generally not used. At the Marianas the Americans were able to spot the Japanese attacking forces on radar at a distance and to use radios to direct their fighters in the combat air patrol (CAP) to intercept them miles away from their targets. At Midway the Japanese method of directing their fighters now appears ludicrous. Surrounding cruisers would fire their heavy weapons to direct the attention of fighters in the CAP. There was no real coordination and where the CAP went was a matter of luck. In fact probably none of the Japanese probably saw the attacking flights of American dive bombers who did the damage until it was to late. The Americans maximised anti-aircraft fire power by placing their carriers in a fleet of war ships with huge numbers of anti-aircraft guns. The Japanese did not do this. The Japanese strategy was to frantically manoeuvre their carriers at full speed turning in huge circles to doge torpedoes and bombs. Heavier naval units had to keep away to allow the carriers room to manoeuvre and to come close would have led to serious dangers of collision. The only real anti-aircraft guns were placed on the carriers and these had limited ranges.
Despite this the Japanese could possibly have won if their commanders were not idiots. Yamamoto has tended to have had good press in the past. However his planning of this operation was abysmal. For some reason two slower smaller carriers were diverted of to the Aleutian Islands for an invasion which made no logical sense. Another carrier was left in Japan. It would seem the reason for this was that Yamamoto was concerned that the Americans would not engage him unless his force looked small. Despite the victory of Pearl Harbour with its message that battleships were now just targets to be sunk by carriers Yamamoto also had huge number of battleships manoeuvring in the rear whilst exposing his carriers placing them in a position when they could be attacked by land based aircraft from Midway and naval based aircraft from the American carriers.
The writers suggest that the Japanese would have had more chance of winning if they had used their naval assets in campaigns around the Solomon Islands. They could have used their land based aircraft better and the Americans would have been forced to commit forces to prevent the loss of Australia. The genius of this book is in the detail of not explaining the story which had been told many times but explaining why it happened. The detail the level of understanding is well beyond that of this type of history. It is possible to have an insight into the minds of the Japanese and why they fought as they fought. The book also explodes a number of popular myths about the battle through careful research.
Midway seen in another light.......2007-09-10
An excellently researched story of Midway giving a lot of new details and insights, all very well researched and with extensive proof to support the ideas put forward.
I thought I knew the story of Midway by heart, having read every book on the subject I could lay my hands on, who have been copying each other.
This book gives a completely new perspective and with the supporting documentation makes a credible point for a new look at the sequence of events.
The final book on Midway? Not likely, but it will be hard to surpass it in novel approach.
A book to read without stopping.
Only drawback is that (at least at the time I bought it), there was no paperback version, but that probably wouldn't have lasted long anyway because the book is begging to be re-read over and over again.
Solid history, but somewhat over written.......2007-08-17
Shattered Sword is an excellent, but somewhat over written work that is really two books in one. The first is a solid, well documented account of Japanese operations at Midway. The other is a reassessment of certain events that been centerpieces in most popular depictions of that battle.
The former is a foundational piece that should be included in any serious historian's bookshelf; a five-star work that provides considerable insight to Japanese strategy tactics and operations. The latter is an interesting, but ultimately over-advocated piece that deserves credit for correcting the historic record, but ultimately does not contribute nearly as much new knowledge as the first. A three-star work.
Parshall and Tully fill in a huge gap by providing a soup-to-nuts assessment of Japanese planning and operations that made up the Midway and Aleutians campaigns. Their meticulous analysis is remarkable, and seemingly consists of about two pages of analysis for one page of narrative. The end result is a keen understanding of how Japan conducted the campaign, and the fatal flaws that were both latent and all too visible.
It seems that the Japanese Imperial Navy was wholly unprepared to conduct a major war like the one they initiated, and not from a logistical/industrial standpoint either. The picture the authors paint (perhaps unintentionally) is of a military organization that is highly polished but extremely brittle. When they faced a surprised or weaker opponent, the Japanese dominated. But if the Japanese faced a foe even close to parity, their planning and organization would unravel, resulting in a high loss of life and material. The glaring flaws in their strategic and tactical planning, operations, and command structure seem to suggest that even if they won the Battle of Midway, it was only a matter of time before their organization failed and they would suffer some catastrophic disaster at the hands of the Americans.
As for the authors' reassessment of Midway, they try too hard to push these revelations. While I laud them for rectifying these errors, most of these issues are far less important than other topics the authors brought up. For example, the authors go to great lengths to explain how Nagumo's reserve strike were actually in the hanger rather on the flight deck, when the Americans made their decisive strike. It really seems to be a relatively minor detail, since (as the authors stated) the Japanese carriers had unarmored flight decks, and the American strike would have blown the carriers to smithereens in either case. What is of more importance, but is given less promotion, is that the Japanese were unable to launch an attack in the face of uncoordinated but persistent American attacks. This essentially says the Japanese never really had control of the battle from the very beginning.
Nevertheless, Shattered Sword is a fabulous and serious historical study. I look forward to future works from the authors.
Excellent WWII book........2007-08-06
Shattered Sword was a most interesting and informative book covering this famous battle as well as events leading up to it, primarily from the Japanese perspective. This in itself is unusual. The narrative was very detailed yet fast paced, even difficult to put down. What I enjoyed most, though, was that the authors related the events at Midway to strategic decisions made many years earlier. Thus, the battle of Tsushima in 1905 would ultimately affect placement of gun batteries and other such things which would determine the outcome at Midway in 1942. IMHO it is the good historian who is able to connect such distant dots.
So very revealing and in depth abot the Psyche of the Japanese Navy.......2007-07-13
I bought this book based on the writer's excellent website. What I expected was detail and facts. What I got was much better.
Shattered Sword not only totally covers the events of the MI raid but it looks back to the start of the war and how these successes actually laid the groundwork for the total failure of the Japanese Navy both at Midway and beyond. The authors reveal Yamamoto as both brilliant and a bully. His plans were shown to be flawed but pushed on the Navy by threats. The actual minute by minute account of the battle goes into incredible detail (based on many survivor accounts). The technical sections show how the carriers were attacked, damaged and how their poor damage control finally sent them to the bottom. Perhaps the most interesting were the debunking of the Myths of Midway. Read the book to find out what I mean.
It is a great book filled with detail, vivid descriptions, stories and analysis of the battle, its causes and its ultimate failure for the Japanese. Just for fun there is a what if section. Again read the book and enjoy.
Alan
Book Description
Here is the definitive history of the battle of Midway, an American victory that marked the turning point of the war in the Pacific during World War II. Told with the same stylistic flair and attention to detail as the bestselling At Dawn We Slept, Miracle at Midway brings together eyewitness accounts from the men who commanded and fought on both sides. The sweeping narrative takes readers into the thick of the action and shows exactly how American strategies and decisions led to the triumphant victory that paved the way for the defeat of Japan.
"A stirring, even suspenseful narrative . . . The clearest and most complete account so far." (Newsday)
"Something special among war histories . . . No other gives both sides of the battle in as detailed and telling a manner."(Chicago Sun-Times)
"A gripping and convincing account." (The Philadelphia Inquirer)
Customer Reviews:
The best book on the Battle of Midway.......2007-07-23
I have read several renditions of the Battle of Midway, but this is by far the most intriguing and interesting one to read. The author writes it like a story and draws you in-it was hard to put down. He has many sources and looks at the battle from both the Japanese and American perspective. This battle was probably the most important one we fought in the Pacific. If we had lost, the Pacific would have been Japanese home waters. The only book you need to read about the Battle of Midway.
A Good Sequel.......2007-05-31
Gordon Prange devoted the second half of his life to researching and writing about the attack on Pearl Harbor. He spent seven years in Japan during the occupation collecting material on this operation. He is the author of the book "Tora, Tora, Tora" and the screenplay for the film of the same name. His masterpiece on the attack is "At Dawn We Slept." He died before he could finish this book and two of his students, Donald M. Goldstein and Katherine V. Dillon, turned his unfinished manuscript into a publishable book. In the course of his work on Pearl Harbor, he kept stumbling upon material related to Midway. Prange decided to write a book on Midway as well, which was also unfinished at the time of his death. Goldstein and Dillon finished this book as well.
The strength of "Miracle at Midway" is that Prange tells both sides of the story, American and Japanese. He offers more coverage of the American side for understandable reasons. The Japanese commander, Vice Admiral Nagumo Chuichi died later in the war, and valuable records were destroyed when the four aircraft carriers sank during the battle. Prange, though, makes up for these shortcomings with interviews he conducted during the occupation years with a number of survivors and important pilots and staff officers at this battle like Genda Minoru and Fuchida Mitsuo. On the other hand, developing the American side of the story is pretty easy. All the major figures in this engagement survived the war as did their records and written reports.
Developing the Japanese side of the story is important, because Prange basically argues that Japan lost the battle more than the Americans won it. The problems the Japanese faced were not the work of any one individual, but rather were large, systematic shortcomings like a flawed battle plan that had two conflicting objectives, overconfidence in their abilities, poor command and control, lack of resources, and sloppy intelligence work. The Americans owed their victory more to luck than any other factor. With those points made, Prange gives a lot of credit to Chester Nimitz for knowing how to use his theater resources, to Raymond Spruance and Frank Jack Fletcher. Prange also argues that Nagumo, who is often seen as being indecisive, made the right decision with what information he had at the time in shifting the armaments of his planes.
Luck was what carried the day for the Americans and Spruance admitted as much. The Japanese had little regard for American torpedoe attacks and with good reason. The U.S. Navy had poor equipment and lousy training. It was only Lt. Cmdr. Wade McClusky's decision to use an unconventional search pattern as his fuel was running low that allowed the Americans to pounce on the Japanese at the moment when their ordinance was unsecured and the fighter coverage was too low to stop the dive bombers.
The shortcomings of the book are more minor than substantial: the writing at times seems overly flowery. The story builds slowly. When it gets to the sexy parts, the fighting, it really gets going. The maps vary significantly in quality. Some are quite good, others are atrocious and appear to have been hand drawn.
To wrap it up: this book is a good sequel to Prang's study of Pearl Harbor. It won't be the last word on the subject, but it is an important one.
A Turning Point in American History.......2006-11-02
Very readable and enjoyable, and packed with interesting details. Because of extensive interviews and exhaustive research, the authors have provided us with an authoritative account of the events and people behind a naval battle with no equal. It gives both sides of the picture and pulls no punches. A great and inspiring read.
Interesting, but not the best.......2006-05-26
This book is an interesting account of the Midway battle. It is unfortunate that Gordon Prange did not live to complete it himself. Although "Miracle at Midway" is definitely worth reading, particularly for its coverage of the Japanese viewpoint, I would strongly recommend that anyone interested in the Battle of Midway also read "Midway: Incredible Victory," by Walter Lord. Lord's book is a better presentation of this highly complex sea and air campaign, especially from the American side, and much easier for the reader to follow. Walter Lord is not only a fine historian, but also an incomparable storyteller, and readers wishing a full picture of the Midway campaign should add Lord's "Midway: Incredible Victory" to their library.
The Turning Point of the Pacific War.......2005-07-19
Gordon Prange, author of the acclaimed "At Dawn We Slept", has written a masterful book about how America struck back against the Japanese at a tiny island 1000 miles west of Pearl Harbor: Midway.
By June of 1942, the Japanese had rolled up an incredible list of victories. But beginning with the Doolittle raid in April of 1942 abd followed by the Battle of the Coral Sea in May, the Americans had finally begun to check the Japanese advance. The Japanese, infected with "victory disease", nevertheless felt that if they could draw the U.S. Pacific fleet away from Pearl Harbor, they would be able to destroy the remains and continue on toward Hawaii and perhaps the West Coast.
However, the Americans had one huge advantage over the Japanese. The Americans were able to read the Japanese JN-25 naval code, and this provided a wealth of information as to where the Japanese planned to strike next. Under the command of Joe Rochefort, the code-breakers at Pearl Harbor soon had enough information to predict that the Japanese were going to strike at Midway. The Americans would be waiting for them.
On one fateful day in June, 1942, the tide of the war in the Pacific turned against the Japanese. In the span of only a few minutes, three Japanese aircraft carriers, all veterans of the Pearl Harbor attack, were sunk by American dive bombers. The fourth Japanese carrier was sunk later in the day. The Americans lost the carrier USS Yorktown, but it was a relatively small price to pay for such a smashing victory. American industrial capacity had increased by this time, and new carriers would soon be coming into service, so the loss of the Yorktown was diminished. The Japanese, however, had nowhere near the capacity of the United States. The Japanese never recovered from this terrible blow.
I've read Prange's excellent analysis of Pearl Harbor, and this book does just as good of a job describing the battle of Midway. From the initial sighting of the Japanese fleet to the final withdrawl, Prange describes the battle in a manner that will keep the reader enthralled throughout. Prange earned the title of "The Dean of Pearl Harbor" with his masterful trilogy, now he has added the battle of Midway to that impressive list. I highly recommend this great book. Read it and discover how a small American fleet destroyed a vastly superior enemy force and turned the tide forever against the Japanese.
Customer Reviews:
A Glorius Page..........2006-06-15
There's not much doubt about the exhaustive detail of this book. It's about as close as you are going to get to a blow by blow account of the most important battle in US Navy history. The authors recount virtually every movement that any ship, squadron, or commander made in those 3 crucial days. Although the detail is minute, I couldn't put it down. The battle was apparently, a continuous stream of action.
This book is really for the dedicated historian and hardcore history buff. It isn't really intended to be a good read, but it sure was for me. The writing style is easy and flowing, not as dry and dusty as you would expect from a history book.
The story really focuses on the men. It is full of pictures of the flyers, commanders and squadrons. There are only a couple small weak points. One is the poor quality of the printed pictures. This is not an expensive book, so it is printed on medium quality paper. Photos don't turn out very clear on this kind of paper. Several captions describe details in the photo that I can't for the life of me see. Still the picture collection here is huge. It was especially touchng to look at the faces of these great heroes. They look like ordinary guys. I guess they were. It impresses me that ordinary guys are capable of rising to such high levels of dedication and valor.
The other problem is the lack of good maps. There are only 6, and they aren't very high quality. The 3 battle maps are given on only 2 pages, and contain too much information to make much sense. I would have prefered more larger maps showing more specific phases of the battle. I tracked down some better maps on the internet, but the data in this text could be used to produce many more detailed maps.
The book starts witb an interesting brief history of Midway atol, itself. Such an important place, and yet it is just a couple of tiny piles of sand literally in the middle of nowhere.
Altogether, I can highly recommend this book if you want a lot of detail in an easy-reading style.
Best book I've read about Midway........2006-03-25
Simply fantastic. I've read many books about this topic but this is the best. No theatrics, just the facts presented in a very readable format. Great work.
A Glorious Page in Our History: The Battle of Midway, 4-6 June, 1942.......2006-02-28
This is one of the most complete accounts of the battle that I have read. It was an excelent book
Battle of Midway researchers: start here........2005-02-25
. This is THE definitive work on the Battle of Midway. It accurately provides the detail that most of the others omit or get wrong, and it corrects all of the popular myths about the battle that some of the others perpetuate, i.e. the controversial flight of the USS Hornet's air group on the morning of 4 June 1942, and the "Midway is short of water" ruse pulled off by the signal intelligence wizards at Pearl Harbor.
. You have to be very familiar with the events and personnel involved in the battle to find even a minor flaw in this book. This reviewer knows of only two (in the 4th printing, March '98); one photo caption cites the wrong PBY squadron and another has the wrong names for an SBD aircrew. Beyond that sort of miniscule nitpicking that very few would notice, "A Glorious Page" can be relied upon as meticulously thorough and accurate to a level that no other volume on the Battle of Midway approaches.
. If you are researching the battle, start here. And if you can only afford one book on the Battle of Midway, this is the one you want. (Reviewed by R. W. Russell, Battle of Midway Roundtable, www.midway42.org)
A Glorious Book.......2000-06-20
This book is the result of a cooperative effort by a number of noted experts in the field of naval history. It provides the latest known facts regarding tactical details, numerous pertinent photos and previously unpublished (to my knowledge) biographical info about many heros of the battle. Every student of the war in the Pacific needs this book.
Book Description
The Battle of Midway is considered the greatest U.S. naval victory, but behind the luster is the devastation of the American torpedo squadrons. Of the 51 planes sent to attack Japanese carriers only 7 returned, and of the 127 aircrew only 29 survived. Not a single torpedo hit its target.
A story of avoidable mistakes and flawed planning, The Unknown Battle of Midway reveals the enormous failures that led to the destruction of four torpedo squadrons but were omitted from official naval reports: the planes that ran out of gas, the torpedoes that didn’t work, the pilots who had never dropped torpedoes, and the breakdown of the attack plan. Alvin Kernan, who was present at the battle, has written a troubling but persuasive analysis of these and other little-publicized aspects of this great battle. The standard navy tactics for carrier warfare are revealed in tragic contrast to the actual conduct of the battle and the after-action reports of the ships and squadrons involved.
Customer Reviews:
Starts great but falls apart at the end.......2007-09-04
Now a college professor, the author was, in 1942 a member of the aircrew on the USS Enterprise at the Battle of midway and clearly the loss of his friends in the torpedo squadron in their infamously suicidal attack stayed with him until it flowed out of him into the pages of this work.
The early parts of this book show where the scholar of now blends with the young mechanic of 60+ years ago in detailing the working of a carrier's air group and the now know to be fatal flaws in US torpedos and aircraft.
Unfortunatly he should have stuck with that and either run that theme through the book or have written a shorter book. The second part of the book degrades as Kernan launches his own strike against the CAG (Commander Air Group) of the USS Hornet whom he blames for the destruction of that ship's torpedo squadron and failure of the Hornet's bomber and fighter squadrons to engage at all. The rest of this epic battle is reduced to little more than "you know what followed..." I was reminded of "The midnight Ride of Paul Revre" where it cover's a day's battle as "you know what happened in the books you have read, how the redcoats fired and fled..."
He details that there was a lack of communication between Enterprise and Hornet and that there was a failure to agree between squadron leaders but all squadrons of torpedo planes were decimated in the attack and other leaders don't get the venom that Kernan spreads on the Hornet. As Kernan was on board the Enterprise at the time, it's never clear why he has such a particular ax to grind with the Hornet's command. If the CAG and Captain of the Hornet were praised today as the hero's of the battle you could see this as "setting the record straight," but as the heros are Nimitz, Fletcher, Spruance and the commanders of the bomber squadrons from enterprise and Yorktown, this comes accross as just a personal vendetta without explanation. The end result is that the rest of the book, pancakes into sea making it almost as pointless as the torpedo attacks it documents.
on a superficial level it's eye-opening; beyond that, it's dreck.......2007-07-28
one of the first things I noticed upon reading this book was that the author was a 'veteran member of one of the torpedo squadrons" that fought at Midway. I thought it was unlikely that any of the pilots of the few surviving torpedo bombers was still alive, though maybe some of the radio-operator/gunners were.
I was a bit disappointed to read that the extent of Kernan's participation in the torpedo attacks in question was as an ordinanceman for Torpedo 6 aboard the USS Enterprise. I am by no means saying his participation wasn't significant, nor am I saying that I don't think he was just as brave as anyone else. I simply thought (and still believe) that kernan was neither then nor now in a position to second-guess command decisions made by men whose level of responsibility was far greater than his own.
For example, another reviewer correctly pointed out that Waldron, while undoubtedly brave and a fine pilot, committed a grievous military offense in disobeying a direct order from his commanding officer. Disobeying a commanding officer in a combat situation is precisely how to get a lot of people killed, and that is exactly what happened except in this case "a lot" turned out to be "every plane in the squadron." Kernan, however, heaps praise on Waldron's correct guess for the position of the Japanese fleet.
I can't help but believe that Kernan, as an enlisted man, feels or at one time felt a certain jealousy or misguided animosity toward commissioned officers, such as those who flew many of the planes or made some of the command decisions aboard the ships. For example, Kernan points out rather uselessly that among the seven surviving TBD Devastators among all three carrier squadrons, "a high number were enlisted pilots." The clear implication is that the enlisted pilots were more skilled than the Annapolis pilots, who were, in Kernan's view, privileged "ringknockers' and other such members of the good ol' boy fraternity that had excluded him.
Excuse me, but I don't think an Annapolis ring or lack of one counted during the devastators' attack runs, as no amount of flying skill could make a lumbering, 1934 torpedo bomber design escape a Japanese Zero pilot at low level, with a height advantage, and little or no American fighter escort. Ironically, by Kernan's logic, it was only a matter of flying skill that resulted in a torpedo bomber pilot's survival or death during the attack. Waldron, Lindsey, and Massey all died, therefore they must not have been very good pilots. Clearly, kernan didn't intend to say this, so there really wasn't any point to him mentioning that a "high number" of the survivors weren't officers, unless he just wants to get that anti-Annapolis shot in.
Kernan also goes to great pains to point out that American fighter pilots might have been afraid to tangle with the Mitsubishi Zero pilots. This suggestion is so insulting that it alone destroyed Kernan's credibility for me. He doesn't question the courage of the American bomber pilots (as well he should not), and yet the fighter pilots are subject to his accusations of cowardice? Kernan must have had a great view of the battle above the Japanese fleet, from the hangar deck of the Enterprise. He wasn't there and yet he has the gall to write as though he was riding in the cockpit, thinking other people's thoughts. Kernan should know that despite the F4F's deficiencies (and there were many), the Mitsubishi A6M also had many deficiencies which American fighter pilots were gradually learning how to exploit through teamwork and a greater understanding of how to make the most of their own plane's strengths. Kernan conveniently forgets from time to time that in June 1942 America had been in combat with the Japanese for only half a year, against an enemy with a [shrinking] numerical advantage and the initiative. considering these things, the F4F pilots performed very well. Needless to say, the American navy had no lack of volunteers for the fighter units, even if the F4F in use at the time was inferior to the A6M in several respects.
All in all, Kernan writes fluidly enough, and the way he presents his case might convince the casual reader that there was some kind of conspiracy to cover up American incompetence at Midway. A more informed reader will be aware that America was new to the war and still learning how fight it, and still learning how to build the weapons to win it. The A6M Zero was designed in response to the Japanese' experience against Seversky P-35s and Russian I-16s in China. The F6F Hellcat was designed in response to the American experience against the Japanese. Kernan should be applauding the navy rather than bashing it.
He seems to really dislike the elitist Annapolis types, and yet it is clear that his position as a Yale professor paved the way for this dreck to reach the book store.
What's good enough for the goose, Kernan. Whatever.
Another perspective.......2007-05-27
The Unknown Battle of Midway: The Destruction of the American Torpedo Squadrons
This book is a very quick and very informative read and offers a very different perspective as to the Midway encounter. I recommend it.
Filled with substantive and interpretive errors - Kernan gets it all wrong.......2007-04-06
At the beginning of World War II the author was an 18-year old enlisted aviation ordnanceman who subsequently served on several carriers in the Pacific. Readers would hope that he would leverage this experience to provide a unique and original viewpoint of war on a carrier. Unfortunately, Kernan strays far outside his expertise. Many of his comments and some of his facts are dead wrong; some of his comments and many of his interpretations can seem to be creditable on a superficial level, but are also either dead wrong or one of the breed of insidious half-truths that have a life of their own and are hard to squash. This book will be cited in future works, so another cottage industry has been created to correct the horde of myths and inaccuracies that will trickle down into Naval history from this book. To crown this achievement, Kernan creates a new "conspiracy theory" about the Battle of Midway.
Any good conspiracy theorist needs to first establish his personal credibility. This Kernan attempts in a few introductory chapters where he talks about military history, carrier aviation, ship design, and aerial torpedoes. His believability dies quickly. Specifically, I count 20 substantive or interpretive errors or half-truths in the book's first 25 pages.
There are errors where his facts are just dead wrong:
* "The USS Oglala was hit by four torpedoes ..." No, she was not hit by any torpedoes - she sustained underwater damage from a single torpedo hit on a light cruiser that was moored inboard of her. Because she sank without taking any direct hits herself she was later known as The Ship that Was Frightened to Death;
* The Japanese had not "stalemated the Russians in Manchuria," actually the Japanese were soundly beaten at Nomonhan, the 23rd Division being nearly annihilated with 76% casualties. The only reason the Soviets halted was because they had Poland to invade and then the Germans to repulse;
* The US Navy had radar "courtesy of the British." No the first USN radar was on a ship in April of 1937, and the first production radar, the CXAM, began installation in May of 1940. Exchange of radar information with the British did not happen until the Fall of 1940;
* Carriers to launch wanted 30 knots of wind over the deck, not "30 knots [of ship's speed] plus the wind."
... and many other factual errors.
There are errors where his proffered opinions are either only half right or misleading. For example, his comments on the placement of islands on carriers, boiler and engine room subdivision, and stack numbers and placement are superficial and uninformed, and generally half-truths. Tonnage limitations and how the disposal of stack gasses effect turbulence in the landing area is never mentioned. He thinks that early US carrier designs had arresting gear at both ends of the ship because "depending on the wind, the carriers were as likely to launch and land planes while going backward as forward" - no, Alvin, the arresting gear at both ends was for emergency recoveries without having to break the deck spot, or in the event of battle damage.
Even more egregiously, he does not understand the distinction between belt armor and a ships torpedo protection system, mixing them up in his discussion and then laughably coming to the conclusion that carriers succumbed to enemy torpedoes "because they were not armored enough." He uses technical terms improperly: for example, a ship's propeller shafts are referred to as "drive shafts," equating a carrier's propulsion system with that of a 1941 Chevrolet roadster.
After thus establishing his credibility, Kernan then goes on to collect some of the reasons why so many of the US torpedo bombers were lost at Midway. Most are straightforward, collected from other secondary sources dealing with the battle, and are presented in a workmanlike manner. However, when he moves to original material he reveals his true roots, not those of a Navy aviation ordnanceman, but of an English Professor from an Ivy League school. What he really wants is to talk about racism and class barriers in the wartime Navy. Racism he could work in only for a sentence, since it is clearly irrelevant to the story. Classism, however, becomes the centerpiece of the only "original" analysis in the book. Kernan contends that there was a conspiracy among the Navy high command to confuse or suppress the facts surrounding the attack of Torpedo 8 in order to protect the career of the Commander Hornet Air Group (CHAG), Commander Ring.
The bare facts are the following: the enemy carriers were located inexactly. Ring and Waldron have an argument before launch on the flyout course to use to find the enemy, but Ring is unconvinced by Waldron's arguments. Ring, as CHAG, gathers his squadrons and heads out. 30 minutes after launch Waldron again argues over the radio with the CHAG, then, on his own hook, departs from the formation with his squadron of torpedo bombers. Waldron finds the carrier, attacks, and his entire squadron is shot down, inflicting no damage. Ring does not find the target and returns to the Hornet.
Waldron is Alvin Kernan's hero. He dedicates the book to him.
In Kernan's view, Waldron is the self-sacrificing hero and Ring is the goat for not agreeing with him, and subsequently for not finding the targets when presented with the "correct" course by Waldron. This is exactly 180 degrees out, and where Kernan displays a lamentable ignorance of how military organizations work. Waldron was obligated to present his views to his commander; however, he was equally obligated to follow the orders of his commander afterwards. Kernan spends a lot of ink explaining why the Devastator was a poor aircraft and inadequate to the task; how, then, can he make Waldron out as a hero for disobeying orders and leading his squadron on a suicide attack in such an inadequate aircraft? If the TBD was unlikely to penetrate to the target without fighter support and the diversion of a dive bombing attack, points all well made by Kernan, how can Kernan subsequently praise him for doing just that?
Waldron was guilty of disobeying orders, and should have been court-martialed; the real "conspiracy" was that the Navy gave him a Navy Cross for getting himself and his people killed.
Examine what could have been: if Waldron had followed his commander's orders, he would have arrived at the point of no return and turned back, undoubtedly with a great big "I told you so" expression on his face. But then, his torpedo squadron would have been back on the Hornet and available for subsequent strikes, including those against Hiryu and against the Japanese cruisers on the 6th, after the Zeros were gone and the TBD had a reasonable chance of getting hits. Had he acted appropriately, his combat power would have been preserved for later, instead of senselessly thrown away. These points totally evade Kernan as he obsesses with his conspiracy theory.
The evidence that Kernan presents to support his idea that there was a Naval Academy Alumni Association conspiracy to "save" Ring career is that Ring did not submit an after action report (rather, that Kernan could not find an after action report in the archives, quite a different thing), and that Mitscher's after action report was inaccurate as it supposed that Ring passed to the south of the target carriers, when he evidently actually passed to the north. Kernan does not understand that the after action reports, submitted only days after a battle, sometimes reflect the very real confusion of the battle. Considering that Torpedo 8 and Fighting 8 were lost in toto, Mitscher was writing a report based on limited inputs and not a full picture. Often only an exhaustive after-action review is able to get the facts sorted out. From this slim reed - the lack of a report, and an inaccurate report - Kernan claims a conspiracy to protect Ring. That's the jist of Kernan's argument. There is no other evidence, no corroborating testimony, no other facts, just Kernan's perception of class jealousy manifested into a conviction of a conspiracy.
One wonders if Kernan's research in the field of English is held to the same standard of evidence.
One should buy this book if one would like to see a collection of secondary source information regarding the US torpedo bombers at Midway. He has some quotations from works that are not easily located, and collects faithfully most of the arguments against US torpedoes and the Devastator torpedo bomber that are located in disparate sources. One should not buy the book for clear charts or graphics - "minimalist" is the style, so minimalist as to be nearly incomprehensible. One should also purchase this book if one wants to be entertained when the real naval historians go into damage control mode to stamp out all the disinformation spread by this book.
One should not buy this book if you are less than an expert in the field, for you are likely to be misled by what is known in the Navy as "bum gouge."
Dr. Alan D. Zimm, CDR USN (ret) (By the way, NOT a USNA grad).
a sad but illuminating book.......2007-01-02
This is an odd book---part memoir, part history. Kernan was 18 and serving on the Enterprise during the battle. He later becomes a professor at Princeton but never got over the pointless destruction of the torpedo planes at the battle. I hope writing this book lets him puit his burden down. The torpedo planes never had a chance: there was no training for the pilots becuase there were not enough torpedos to practice with; how the torpedos were launced in combat not only did not work but made the planes all to be certain to be blown apart(come in low , drop the torpedo gently into the water, get as close to the enemy ship as possible was tuaght and was all wrong); no fighter cover although argued for by Commander Waldrin and rejected by Commander Ring). And Ring comes in for an allegation by Kernan of cowardice for taking his planes away from the while Waldron follows his gut and headed for it. Was their destruction pointless? Not really---they kept the enemy busy and gave the Enterprise dive bombers a chance to find the Japanese.
Average customer rating:
- Useful, but be careful
- ...at one stroke the dominant position...was reversed...
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Midway
Hugh Bicheno
Manufacturer: Cassell
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Binding: Paperback
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ASIN: 0304357154 |
Book Description
".at one stroke the dominant position of Japan in the Pacific was reversed."--Winston Churchill
In 1942, Admiral Yamamoto, who had so successfully engineered the attack on Pearl Harbor, implemented a new strategy: the Imperial Japanese Army would seize the Pacific island of Midway and lure the US Navy into a decisive carrier battle. And, they felt confident of victory. But, right from the start, the plan proved disastrous--and the Japanese lost decisively, with all four major units sunk. Once and for all, the balance of power in the Pacific shifted, with the United States in control. Filled with exciting images of air clashes, and fiery devastation on the ground, as well as follow-the-battle maps, it's a compelling and authoritative account of the reasons behind the catastrophic Japanese strategy.
Customer Reviews:
Useful, but be careful.......2003-02-23
Hugh Bicheno's book on Midway is the first new offering in this field since the excellent (but unfortunately less well-known) "Glorious Page in our History" was published in 1990. I should mention that I'm the maintainer of a large Web site on the Imperial Japanese Navy...and I am also currently working on a new book of the Battle of Midway myself which will focus on the Japanese account of the battle. So I have a high degree of interest in what Bicheno had to say.
There are some strong points to the book, including:
Social Coverage: I was pleased (and chagrined) to see that Bicheno had covered the social aspect of the navies, something I plan to do myself. I thought he did a good job of that.
Good tabular data: Bicheno presents good order of battle data, as well as some good tabular data on the individual air strikes of the morning. It's by no means complete, but it's much better than what you'll find in books like Prange's "Miracle at Midway."
Visual Presentation: The book is lovely to look at; lots of photos (albeit all the same ones we've all seen in Midway books before--there is a shortage of photographs for this battle), and well illustrated with colorful maps. Nicely done. However, this leads us to some of the...
Less Strong Points:
Some of the Illustrations are misleading. For instance, the map on page 128, showing various attacks on the Japanese carrier formation between 0700-0820 goes into great detail regarding the individual placement of Japanese vessels, the *entirety* of which is completely wrong. The four carriers are misplaced relative to their known divisional alignments. Furthermore, the outlying escort vessels are badly represented as well, with those few destroyers that we can be reasonably sure were close to the carriers (since they were plane-guard escorts) shown out on the perimeter. In other words, for this map at least Bicheno simply took a wild guess and drew some pretty pictures. But the picture is utterly wrong.
Nothing Much New. The author is using secondary sources, and not surprisingly hasn't dug up much new to say about the battle in a concrete sense. That's a pity, because there *are* new things to relate on the battle, had the author done a little more digging. He could have, for instance, read both Dallas Isom's 2000, and my own 2001 articles in the U.S. Naval War College Review about what was occurring with regards to Japanese recon, re-arming, and fighter operations during the battle, some of which is quite important. So, while it's a good read, you can get essentially the same account from Lord, Prange, or Cressman's works. But the pictures, again, are prettier in this one.
Hope this is of some use to people.
...at one stroke the dominant position...was reversed..........2002-02-27
Riveting. I opened the book and had to finish it in one sitting. The charts, order of battle, figures, etc. required some extended review. However, that was just another chance to review the battle with an expanded perspective.
I was impressed with Mr. Bicheno's investigation of the cultural and psychological identity of each nation. That, integrated with insightful profiles of the commanders and their key staff members, and their approaches to the management process of war, created an inside view of the capabilities and limitations of the command and control structures of each side.
The notion of getting inside the head of your enemy is powerful, and basic. "...the field of battle is in the mind and ...to force one's enemy into a denial of reality is surely the greatest victory of all."
An excellent addition to your naval library.
Average customer rating:
- Coral Sea, Midway and Submarine Actions: May 1942-August 1942 (History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, Volume
- The Turning of the Tide in the Pacific
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Coral Sea, Midway and Submarine Actions: May 1942-August 1942 (History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, Volume 4)
Samuel Eliot Morison
Manufacturer: Castle Books
ProductGroup: Book
Binding: Hardcover
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ASIN: 0785813055 |
Book Description
This spectacular fifteen-volume series that charts the U.S. Naval operations during World War II with an insider's perspective. Morison, a Harvard professor, was given a special rank and writing post by FDR. He had active duty aboard eleven different ships, allowing him to witness many crucial battles in both the Atlantic and Pacific oceans. Volume Four - the second in this series on the war in the Pacific-turns the corner from defeat to victory, beginning with the first of the great carrier actions of the war, the Battle of the Coral Sea. Filled with many maps and file photographs.
Customer Reviews:
Coral Sea, Midway and Submarine Actions: May 1942-August 1942 (History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, Volume.......2006-07-23
Book was shipped in a very timely basis with excellent packing materials. The quality of the book was described accurately.
Thank you for service,
Marie
The Turning of the Tide in the Pacific.......2002-12-20
1942 was a bleak period for the Americans in the Pacific, but within the span of one month, the Americans smashed back at the Japanese in two decisive battles and turned the tide of the war. The first of these battles was fought in the Coral Sea. The Japanese wanted to invade Port Morseby and use that as a springboard for a futute invasion of Australia. However, the Americans, with their top-secret code breakers, already knew the composition of the Japanese forces and where they planned to strike. In early May, 1942, the two sides engaged each other. The Coral Sea battle was the first sea battle fought where the opposing ships never saw one another. This was a tactical victory for the Japanese due to the fact that the American carrier Lexington was sunk along with a destroyer and a tanker, but it was a strategic victory for the Americans, because the Japanese recalled their Port Morseby invasion force.
The most important battle of the Pacific campaign was fought less than a month after the Coral Sea battle at a tiny island known as Midway. The Japanese hoped to capture Midway and use it as a springboard for a possible invasion of Hawaii or even the west coast. Once again, Nimitz knew of the Japanese plan thanks to his wonderous code-breakers. The Japanese launched a massive air assault from four carriers against Midway but failed to destroy the airfields. Aircraft were left on the decks of the carriers waiting for a second strike against Midway when the American torpedo and dive bombers appeared. The torpedo planes were slaughtered by Japanese fighters, but they didn't die in vain. They pulled the Japanese fighters down to sea level and gave the dive bombers a clear shot at the carriers. In a matter of minutes, three Japanese carriers were turned into blazing infernoes by accurately placed bombs. The fourth enemy carrier was sunk the next day. The tide had now turned against the Japanese. Never again would they regain the offensive.
This book does a good job of explaining both of these important battles. Important charts and maps are also included which made reading and understanding the battles much easier. Also included are early submarine attacks against the Japanese, the story of the Aleutian campaign, which was designed by the Japanese in the hopes of luring the American forces away from Midway. Fortunately, Nimitz recognized this as a feint and didn't bite. The opening stages of the Guadalcanal campaign are also discussed. The following volume in this series deals exclusively with Guadalcanal. I recommend this fine work of naval history. It will help the reader understand these two important battles and the role that they played in changing the course of the war in the Pacific.
Customer Reviews:
Period where the Pacific War was won...........2004-06-16
The Barrier and the Javelin proves to be well written and well researched book which centered around Japanese and Allied strategies that led up the stalement battle at Coral Sea and total American victory at Midway.
The book revealed that Japanese naval forces, despite of all its abilities, superior ships and planes and its highly trained crew, could not defeat its outnumbered enemies due to poor strategy. It was clear that the Japanese have badly over extended themselves and try to be too clever with their strategies which backfired on them.
I agreed with the previous reviewer that the author, H.P. Willmott was bit too judgmental on the wrong sides at times. A good example would be those Japanese raids into the Indian Ocean which was a terrible waste of men and material, especially since the British navy in that area served as no threat and primary duty of the Imperial Navy was to chased down the American carriers. But on the other hand, I thought Willmott's condemnation of Admiral Yamamoto was right on the mark. Too long have this Japanese admiral been overrated by many historians based on one successful attack on Pearl Harbor. Yamamoto fumbled terribly at Midway. (Personally, I thought he fumbled badly at Pearl Harbor too.) The author also cites superior American military intelligence as well as a lot of luck to win a battle of Midway that the Japanese should have won hands down.
Anyone with any interest in this subject should be reading this very insightful book. Its not really for casual reader so I would recommended folks who already have a good background on the Pacific War to tackled this book. A good companion book to Willmot's earlier book, Empires in the Balance, both books, in my humble opinion, belong to any library of a military historian who got an interest in this field.
The Battles of Coral Sea and Midway.......2002-12-16
This book is about Japanese and American planning and strategy in the naval battles of the Coral Sea and Midway. At the Coral Sea in May 1942, the Americans scored their first semi-victory of World War II. At Midway in June 1942 the Americans stunned the over-confident Japanese by sinking four of their aircraft carriers at the loss of one of their own.
Willmott's theme is that Japan should have won both battles against an out-numbered and inexperienced American navy, but did not because of woolly strategy and poor planning. At Midway Japan had two objectives: conquer the island and destroy the American fleet. These objectives should have been reversed in priority. Moreover, Japan split its superior naval forces into three isolated groups and thus permitted the Americans to meet and fight one of these groups on equal terms. The Japanese also assumed that the Americans would always do exactly what Japan wanted them to do and were unprepared for surprises.
The Americans, on their part, had superior intelligence (based on breaking Japanese codes), more durable ships and planes, and good luck. Willmott illustrates luck in his minute-by-minute examination of the mishaps of the Japanese in locating the American fleet at Midway. First, mechanical problems delayed the dispatch of a scout plane for half an hour and, next, the pilot inexplicably lingered near the American fleet for an hour before he reported the presence of carriers, an oversight that paralyzed the Japanese when they should have been attacking. As a result, American bombers scored first -- and decisive -- strikes against the Japanese carriers. But, Midway was a very near thing! 41 American torpedo bombers attacked in the first wave -- and only five came home again.
Willmott, a Brit, is opinionated and in the course of 500 pages, he makes some judgments I found questionable. For example, he seems to think it would have been a good idea for the Japanese navy to invade the Indian ocean and expel the British. That seems like a very bad idea. In my opinion, after the fall of Singapore in February 1942, Japan's overwhelming priority should have been to destroy the American aircraft carriers in the Pacific- but Japan dithered with raids on Ceylon and Australia and invasions of New Guinea. The delay proved to be fatal.
This is a good book for those whose interests go toward detailed examination of the thought processes of military planners and the battlefield decisions of leaders in charge of ships, planes, and men. Willmott probes deeply and provocatively into the calculations and miscalculations of men at war.
Book Description
At Pearl Harbor when the Japanese attacked, Ed Layton knew exactly what had gone wrong as he watched the bombs and torpedoes wipe out the U.S. Pacific Fleet. But he kept those secrets to himself for forty-three years—until the government released half a million classified documents from its intelligence archives. Finally free to tell his story, the retired admiral published his revelations in this memoir in 1985 to worldwide attention. It is the first book by a top-ranking American naval officer to describe how Japan had managed to inflict such damage. Layton names those who knew about the Japanese intentions, how they acquired their knowledge, and how they misused it. He speaks with unique authority. An intelligence officer, he was responsible for keeping Admiral Nimitz informed about Japan's strategic objectives, capabilities, and intended operations.
This blow-by-blow account of a war within a war describes admirals fighting admirals while civilian officials in Washington vied for power and turf and disregarded the national interest. It tells of a secret deal between Roosevelt and Churchill that called for preemptive air raids on the Japanese homeland and how this deterrent strategy failed. It is also the first book to detail the background of the secret radio intelligence war against Japan and to break the story of how Washington repeated its blunders of Pearl Harbor and almost lost the crucial Battle of Midway. Calling the shots as he saw them, Layton writes in salty, unvarnished prose but thoroughly documents his revelations.
Customer Reviews:
A 'Must Read' for Anyone Interested In Pearl/Midway.......2006-05-16
As the Fleet Intellegence Officer of Admirals Kimmel and Nimitz Edwin Layton was in a unique position to see and to understand what was going on regarding the battles at Pearl Harbor and Midway. This welcome reprint to the 1985 book has to be considered one of the more definitive books of the couple of hundred on the subjects.
Layton was a language officer stationed in Japan before the war to learn Japanese. He followed Japan and the Japanese developments closely. He was at Pearl before the attack and remained there throughout the war. He was on the Missouri at the Japanese surrender.
There are a series of revisionist history books that propose such things as Roosevelt and Churchill conspiring to let the Japanese attack at Pears. Yes there is evidence that we had some intelligence pointing to the Japanese attack. But you have to look carefully at how much material there was, how many messages had been intercepted, how few had been translated and you come up with the basic understanding that it just hadn't been put together. A lot like the situation with 9/11, Monday morning quarterbacking is much easier than being in the midst of the game.
Layton was there, he knew what Kimmel and Short knew, indeed he had briefed them with the material on hand. Could they have been better prepared, yes, Layton says, if Admiral Richmond K. Turner had forwarded the information. But like any inter-departmental power struggle, Turner held the information to himself.
I was also surprised by the relatively little animosity shown towards the Redman brothers who bounced Rochefort and Safford out. Indeed Layton points out that the do it themselves style of Rochefort and Safford probably wouldn't have done a very good job of managing the Navy Radio Intelligence activities that grew to almost 8,500 people by the end of the war.
All in all, a must read for anyone interested in what happened at Pearl and Midway.
Navy coverup for their Pearl Harbor incompetence.......2004-03-24
And I was there.
This is a great book by one who was there, Adm Layton. He was Adm Kimmels intelligence officer at Pearl Harbor.
He shows how the incompetence of the Navy in Washington led to the surprise attack at Pearl, by the Navy, specifically adm Stark and Kelly Turner, not giving Pearl the vital information they had about Jap intentions, but refused to give Pearl. The Navy also had 2 intelligence groups fighting for the information, and control, evaluating, and dissemination of the information. This too sabotaged the intelligence efforts, and does to this day.
Gen Marshall is also responsible for the debacle. He was reprimanded, but Roosevelt set aside the Congressional verdict on him.
Kimmel was judged not guilty of any wrongdoing by the Navy, but found derelict by Congress, a tragic miscarriage of justice, due to lies under testimony by Stark, and Turner.
The Redmon brothers are faulted too for ousting the most brilliant Navy intelligence officer, Rochefort, who correctly guessed the time and location of the Midway battle.
Another tragic aftermath of Pearl, was the loss of Wake Island. Kimmel had a carrier task force sailing to resupply and relieve the garrision that was under attack by the Japs. This would have surprised the Japs and could have sunk many Jap ships, saved Wake Island, and kept open the supply lines to the Phillipines. Unfortunaely, Kimmel was relieved, and Adm Pye replaced him Pye lost his nerve and cancelled the mission.
MacArthur is noted, as being in charge of the Phillipines, and being under orders to attack Formosa with his B17's when Pearl was attacked. He had a 9 hour warning after Pearl had been attacked, and had been told to attack. It was not until years after this book was published that the records of why Mac did nothing in the Phillipines were found. He was paid $650,000 by Pres Quezon of the Phillipines to do nothing, as he wanted to be neutral. MacArthur lost the Phillipines, a far more important strategic outpost than Pearl, as well as half the B17's we had, and 1/5 of our fighters, on the ground, just as what happened at Pearl, only 9 hours later, after he had multiple phone calls from Washington to attack the Japs.
The battle of Guadalcanal and other Pacific battles is also gone into in some detail
It was Nimitz, not Mac Arthur that devised the island hopping idea.
A great book by a hero who was there.
A Codebreaker's Analysis of Pearl Harbor and Midway.......2003-07-14
Edwin T. Layton served as Fleet Intelligence Officer for Admirals Kimmel and Nimitz. He, along with the other members of station Hypo, were assigned the task of breaking into Japan's secret codes, especially their JN-25 cypher. Through exhausting efforts by its members, they were finaly able to penetrate enough of the JN-25 code to make reasonable assumptions as to what the Japanese navy was planning. "Magic" was the term used for the intercept and decryption of these secret codes.
However, no decoding was actually done at Pearl Harbor, because there was no "Purple" decoding machine there. All intercepts had to be sent to Washinton for decryption, and Hawaii relied on Washington for their information. Layton's thesis is that Pearl Harbor was denied vital intelligence which, if issued in a timely fashion, could have alerted Pearl Harbor to the impending attack which occurred on December 7, 1941. Although I agree with some of his thesis, I also believe that the Pearl Harbor commanders made terrible mistakes of their own which also contributed to the unpreparedness of Pearl Harbor.
One message that Washington failed to send Pearl Harbor which I believe, along with Layton, could have alerted the fleet to the attack was the so-called "bomb plot" message. In a nutshell, this message divided Pearl Harbor into several sections and placed ships in each section; almost like laying an invisible grid over the harbor. Of all the messages that Pearl Harbor failed to receive, this was probably the most important.
However, with this stated, I also believe that the commanders made grievous errors of their own. On November 27, 1941, a "war warning" message was sent to both commanders at Pearl Harbor. Both seemed perplexed and unsure of the course of action to be taken. Why was this? Both Admiral Kimmel and General Short were high ranking members of the military, yet they both dragged their feet when they received this message. Short simply ordered defense against sabotage instead of ordering an all-out alert, while Kimmel failed to order any further long-range patrols, plus he didn't order the battle force to sea. They seemed incapable of making any independent judgement of their own. Instead, they needed to be told directly what to do. These omissions are unforgivable.
Inter-service rivalry also played a role in the failure. As pointed out by Layton, there was very little inter-service cooperation or sharing of messages, so most of the time, one usually didn't know what the other was doing. Further, during the Midway operation, a rivalry betwen station Hypo and the Washington-based intelligence unit nearly cost us the battle, but fortunately, Layton and commander Joe Rochefort were able to convince Nimitz that Hypo, not Washington, was correct.
I thought this was a good book, but I disagree with Layton's assertion that Kimmel and Short were scapegoats and had no clue what was happening. Granted, there was some intelligence that was definitely denied to them, but they should have been able to interpret events on ther own, namely the war warning message. This book is a good counter-argument to other works, such as "At Dawn We Slept". The information about the battle of Midway is especially interesting, plus the story of the codebreaking activities was well-done.
A real eye opener!.......2002-04-29
Before you jump on some revisionist books about Pearl Harbor, like Stinnet's Day of Deceipt, you should get it from the horses mouth! Layton, et al, tell a little known side of the war in the pacific. His opinions of some famous naval personalities like Stark and R.K. Turner will really have you thinking about how war is run when powerful, ambitious officers are running the show. It's a shame that lives had to be wasted while the U.S. got its act together to finally win the war in the pacific, but Layton's tale will give you a new perspective and supports much of what was previously written, like Prang's "At Dawn We Slept", about the debacle of Pearl Harbor and the genius that followed at Midway. Buy it!
CONCISELY.......2001-05-23
First and major portion of book covering Pearl Harbor is excellent. However, after Layton's death, the book was continued from his notes and descriptions of campaigns after Pearl Harbor suffer in quality by comparison.
Amazon.com
On the morning of June 7, 1942, six months to the day after the attack on Pearl Harbor, the USS Yorktown "turned over on her port side and sank in about 3,000 fathoms of water with all battle flags flying." Many of her men watched from the decks of the Vireo, the Benham, the Hughes, and the Hammann, weeping as the Old Lady went down. The Battle of Midway was finally over. Though the Yorktown was lost, the battle was won--what John Keegan has called "as great a reversal of strategic fortune as the naval world has ever seen." From that point on, the Japanese remained primarily on the defensive at sea.
On the morning of May 19, 1998, Robert D. Ballard stared into a video monitor hoping for a glimpse of metal on the bottom of the sea. "Thar she blows! Bingo!" After almost three weeks out, painstakingly scanning the ocean floor with high-altitude sonar, and many months of research and planning, Ballard and his crew had spotted the Yorktown some three miles down. The wreck was in remarkably good condition: "It was as if we had stumbled on the ship a few minutes after it made its death plunge."
In Return to Midway, Ballard weaves a compelling narrative, blending the story of the famous battle with his battle to find the sunken ships--the Yorktown and the USS Hammann, as well as four Japanese aircraft carriers. First-hand accounts by the men who were there, including two Japanese and two American servicemen who joined Ballard and his crew for the hunt, as well as paintings and archival photographs, detail the battle in all its horror, while capturing the honor of the men who fought on both sides. Military-history buffs will find this book--the first in decades specifically about the Battle of Midway--especially valuable, though fans of Ballard's work as an oceanographer will be equally captivated. --Sunny Delaney
Book Description
It has been called "the greatest naval battle since Trafalgar." On June 4, 1942, near a tiny island 1,500 miles from Hawaii, the course of the Pacific War changed dramatically. Before the battle of Midway the forces of Imperial Japan seemed unstoppable. After Midway the Japanese would never again take the offensive.
Fifty-six years later, famed underwater explorer Robert Ballard embarked on a search for the lost ships that had sunk in that historic battle. Accompanying him were a group of Japanese and American veterans who had once faced each other as enemies. Their memories of the epic conflict act as an affecting counterpoint to the story of the high-tech hunt for this great sunken battlefield.
Dr. Ballard's search area was enormous and his targets -- the Yorktown and four Japanese carriers -- lay over three miles down, far deeper than the Titanic or the Bismarck. Equipment failures and time constraints kept working against him, and it often seemed that he might return with nothing. But finally, on May 19, 1998, Robert Ballard and his team located the remains of the aircraft carrier U.S.S. Yorktown.
Astonishing underwater photographs of the Yorktown by David Doubilet and Ken Marschall's haunting paintings of the nearly intact carrier are among the visual highlights of this richly illustrated book. In addition, archival and modern images and paintings by leading aviation and maritime illustrators complement this gripping account of one of history's great air-and-sea encounters and the mission to document the lost ships that today bear witness to it.
Customer Reviews:
Should Pass on this One.......2004-11-19
Most of Ballard's books are large, well illustrated, and to the point. This one however spends most of the page count on his thoughts about the veterans aboard Ballard's research vessel, the battle itself, and WW2. I wouldn't mind reading about his thoughts in another book as he is usually very insightful but it wasn't what I bought this particular book for.
After Ballard's commentaries and the history sections we see only very little relating to the Yorktown and underwater archeology which is rather disappointing.
A first class account of another famous ship........2004-09-21
Dr Robert D. Ballard seems not to know when to stop - and why should he? We who admire his work and, of course, his books, are much the richer through his sharing of his many adventures with us.
Just as soon as I took delivery of "Return to Midway" I was aware I was a holding a 5 Star Book and there was nothing contained within it's 190 pages to make me take away any of those stars. On the contrary, I could so easily have added stars for the factual detail, the readable style of writing, the photography and undoubtedly the artwork. But, in the same way as 5 stars are the most that can be awarded to either a military Generals or an hotel, so 5 stars are the most I could possibly allot to this particular book - and each one is thoroughly well deserved.
As the name suggests, this book is about the author's return to Midway - the scene of one of the fiercest naval battles of WW2. In what has become his customary style, Dr Ballard skilfully takes the reader through his own journey towards his eventual goal whilst giving an accurate account of the Battle of Midway itself. In so doing, he treats us to historic facts, memories from some of those who were there (Americans and Japanese), documents, maps, historic photographs and his own photography which are all combined to produce a story which is as complete as it should be.
The greatest loss on the US side during the battle was the 19,900 ton Aircraft Carrier USS Yorktown - and Ballard's discovery of this wreck almost 3 miles down on the seabed is as great a discovery as either the Titanic or the Bismarck.
Having found this famous and yet elusive ship so deep, the author has again skilfully put together the most complete account of his search, discovery and final success. The various underwater photographs of the ship are then cleverly matched with a description of what the reader is looking at coupled with a photograph of that particular view from when the ship was afloat.
As I have said before when reviewing this man's work; As I know from researching and writing about lesser ships, he really has done the most thorough job of work on all fronts.
Once again, the book's front cover shows the artwork of Ken Marschall. From thousands of photographic images taken far below the surface, montage after montage of the various sections and profiles of the USS Yorktown were created so that Mr Marschall was able to provide us with a number of paintings which are every bit as accurate as a colour photograph.
I congratulate Dr Ballard on yet another excellent and professional job of work. Once again he has succeeded where others only dream.
NM
The Turning Point of World War II Revisited.......2004-03-18
In June, 1942, the Japanese and American navies clashed near a small island in the central Pacific; Midway. This battle turned out to be the turning point of the war for both sides. For the Americans, they finally managed to stop the Japanese advance, while the Japanese suffered a crushing defeat and were put on the defensive, never to regain the offensive again. One of the ships sunk in this momentous battle was the American aircraft carrier Yorktown. This ship, the "fighting lady" as she was known to her crew, became the objective of undersea explorer Robert Ballard.
Ballard, who discovered the Titanic, Bismarck, and the lost fleet of Guadalcanal, journeyed to Midway to locate the sunken Yorktown. What he managed to find was a ship in almost pristine condition. The excellent photographs and drawings of the Yorktown contained in the book bring her back to life. Resting in several thousand feet of water, the Yorktown looks in remarkably good condition. The torpedo holes on her side are visible, but the flight deck and island are in very good condition. Also included in the expedition were several Japanese survivors of the battle. Ballard had hoped to locate the four Japanese carriers sunk during the battle, but he unfortunately could not locate them.
The book also describes in great detail the battle itself, and there are many actual photos from the battle contained in the book as well. I have the video of the expedition entitled The Battle For Midway, and this book makes a fine companion to the video. I highly recommend both the video and the book. They do an excellent job describing one of the most important battles of the 20th century as well as bringing a "fighting lady" back to life.
Comparatively Disappointing.......2004-02-20
The above reviews address the factual and textual quality of the book. While these are fine, I wish to draw attention to those who may be hoping for a similar quality of book to Bob Ballard's previous works. Alas, a quick flick through the book reveals a significant lack of photographic and illustrative imagery, certainly bare bones stuff to other excellent works such as Lusitania, Bismarck etc...
What this has to do with National Geographic as publisher I don't know, but I was a little disappointed over all.
Return to Midway.......2001-04-09
Overall, this book does a good job of telling the story of the re-discovery of the carrier Yorktown, which was lost in the Battle of Midway in June, 1942. The book also gives a pretty good, albeit slimmed down, account of the battle, as well as talking to veterans of the battle who are still alive today. The only problem I have with this book is that very little of the book is actually devoted to illustrating the Yorktown (either in words or pictures) as she appears today, resting on the floor of the ocean. Out of 200 pages in the book, maybe 25 are actually used to show the results of the discovery, and I would really have enjoyed more of this material. Regardless, this is a good book, and should be a welcome addition to the collection of any World War II or nautical enthusiast.
Books:
- Suite Française
- Telling the Truth About History
- The Classical World: An Epic History from Homer to Hadrian
- The Classical World: An Epic History from Homer to Hadrian
- The Conquest of New Spain (Penguin Classics)
- The Count of Monte Cristo (Penguin Classics)
- The European Economy since 1945: Coordinated Capitalism and Beyond (Princeton Economic History of the Western World)
- The Gashouse Gang: How Dizzy Dean, Leo Durocher, Branch Rickey, Pepper Martin, and Their Colorful, Come-from-Behind Ball Club Won the World Series--and America's Heart--During the Great Depression
- The Gods of Eden
- The Gospel According to Judas by Benjamin Iscariot
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