Book Description
The Tiger's Way: A U.S. Private's Best Chance for Survival is not just fun reading for novice riflemen; it is mission-essential information for all ranks and job descriptions. The U.S. military lost on the ground to Eastern guerrillas 30 years ago, and its tactics haven't significantly changed. The Tiger's Way shows how to reverse this trend at a most opportune time. Without better tactical technique at the individual and small-unit level, U.S. forces cannot project minimal force. Without minimal force, they cannot win the hearts and minds of the people. Without winning the hearts and minds of the people, they cannot win a guerrilla war. The Tiger's Way reveals—for the first time—the state of the art in technique for every category of short-range combat. It does so through 100 illustrations, 1600 endnotes, and 31 battledrills.
But the book will also help U.S. forces to suffer fewer casualties in a total war. As Western weapons systems have become more lethal, Eastern armies have turned to tiny, surprise-oriented maneuver elements. Most now give their lowest ranks both conventional and unconventional abilities. Until the U.S. military follows suit, its nonrates will have less field skill, initiative, and tactical-decision-making experience than their Eastern counterparts. That means they will be at a decided disadvantage in any one-on-one encounter and die unnecessarily every time their firepower fails. It also means that their commanders will have trouble winning a "4th generation" war. The Tiger's Way will have a profound effect on how foreign war and homeland security are conducted in the future.
Customer Reviews:
A fantastic implementation of Tokakure Ryu for the modern day.......2007-08-12
I have not finished this book, you should know. However, you should also know that this book made enough of an impression of me that I am writing a review before I have finished in violation of my own rules. I am an author myself and I value these reviews greatly - I wouldn't write if I didn't mean what I say.
This is a great book. In short, it takes the premises - as best we know - of Togakure ryu Ninjutsu and applies them to contemporary military arts. Squad mechanics - the focus of every lieutenant who has ever served - are the focus of Poole's tactical revision of the current philosophy of combat in the US military.
I am not a military man, but I am surrounded by them. I am a ninja, studying Bansenshukai Ninjutsu. We also have some Togakure ryu curriculum, and Poole hits hard on the right stuff. Early in the book he points out that the close combat ryuha are not his focus. Instead, he is looking at the understudied arts of Zanson, Intonjutsu, Shinobi Iri and Hensojutsu. This is a book about how to not fight if you don't have to.
Bujinkan Budo Taijutsu practitioners will argue that this `is not ninjutsu' because it isn't what Hatsumi teaches (in public anyway) but they would be wrong. The taijutsu that BBT teaches is just a small part of what the ninja represents, and this book covers practically everything else. Admittedly, the second chapter references books by Haha Lung and Ashida Kim, who are widely discredited. However, even quacks can have good ideas and Poole expertly extracts the choice tidbits. You will not be displeased.
good over view.......2007-05-13
This book is not a guide for people trying to get a grip on what is happening to our forces in Iraq. It is a good basic soldiers book that is made from many different types of 'field manuals', compiled and catagorized. Nothing new, but a good source for a yound Infantry NCO or Commissioned Officer who wants to keep his 'mind in the game'. Much of the information covers Infantry subjects, some of which is of no use in Iraq. However, we are a world-wide force and need to keep looking over our shoulder at the next conflict. The author speaks with some authority and it shows. As a graduate of the Infantry School at Ft. Benning (I wont say when) this book is a good refresher and contains some new information. If you go on patrol, regardless of you MOS or job title, this is a book you cna use.
Best book of it's kind........2006-11-29
John Poole has written a fantastic treatise on what will be needed to fight and win wars in the years to come. Though it makes for dry reading at times, this book is absolutely fascinating.It not only discusses enemy tactics, it recommends methods on how to develop ninjustsu-like tactics on your own. Spectacular book. A must-read for anyone in, or planning to join, the military. Top-shelf material!
An excellent book for warfighters.......2006-11-28
Readers of this book will look at the Army and Marines different. While the IG and other groups says they care about soldiers the readers of this book will actually care more about the thing that matters: YOUR SOLDIERS LIVES.
Here are two things a possible buyer of this book should consider. In WWII it was thought that the Japanese soldier was born in the jungle. Nothing could be further from the truth. Japan has as much Jungle as Oklahoma. What made the difference between the Japanese and American soldier was training. Their soldiers were taught stealth, hand-to-hand fighting, and all their other combat skills. Little noted in WWII was Japan won land battles against much larger American and British Armies in 1942. Only massive allied firepower turned the tide. Second, in Korea the UN forces often used the machinegun to excess. After a night of fighting the only result would be a few dead communist soldiers. Turkish soldiers, using eastern combat methods, had dozens of dead communists in front of their positions. All were dead by knife wounds.
If this book was followed the results would be nothing but positive things for the USA. First, we would have a better trained Army and Marines that would be able to handle the stress of combat better. We would have less dead men. Second, the Army and Marines could be smaller. We would have more warfighters but less of a logistics tail. Third, we would have less technological dependence. That means a savings of money.
I admire this book. John Poole goes through the combat tables and says what this reader long suspected; we often lose more men in combat with eastern armies. The only real reason we beat German forces in WWII is they wanted to be beat by us, the Soviets were their nightmare. Iraq could have had an eastern army but it was so over controlled and regulated by 2003 that nearly any good army could have taken them.
John Poole says that our infared night vision gear is of limited use. Tanks are not a great asset to any army. Good landmines and RPGs can take out any tank. The weird thing is the US Marines nearly issued the vast store of captured RPGs from Grenada to the Marines. The DoD killed this idea. The reason is American makes superior equipment and all that rubbish...
I really liked this book. This book should be required reading for any member on the House or Senate Armed Service committees. The trouble is our modern politicians are too busy trying to make the mothers of soldiers happy with training and not concentrating on the training of the soldiers to keep them from getting killed and accomplishing the mission.
This is the second book I've read from Poole in a week. It has been sent to my old ROTC school. Perhaps a future lieutenant can take wisdom from the pages of this book.
This book should be the vangard of the change needed in our Army and Marines. We need better training. We need soldiers who can take charge of the tactical situation. We need to get rid of the top-down structure that plagues the Army and Marines in tactical situations.
I wish some good soldiers, marines, and politicians could read this book and put it into use.
Until this book is followed our Army and Marines are little better than Activated Militia.
The Tactical Sphere.......2006-11-17
In our time, we are privy to scores of books, interviews, and op eds dedicated to the strategic sphere of military conduct. Most analysts, those types that enjoy their time on CNN, seek to explain American failures in Iraq and Afghanistan in purely general terms: lack of troops, lack of allies, lack of materials, lack of goals. And while these issues certainly deserve their proper analysis, their role in military failures are grossly exaggerated.
The truth, as the fella said, is in the details. John Poole's The Tiger's Way is concerned with just such details. Poole knows well the tactical sphere: that area where the average U.S. Army infantry private spends his time. He knows and understands the techniques used by "eastern" opponents against Western forces, and he is better at illuminating our vulnerabilities to those techniques than any author in the last 50 years. If this were simply a book on those techniques and exploits, it would be quite a triumph. But there's more.
This book focuses on why our techniques are failing, as well as how they might be tailored to fit in our current environment. Folks like Rumsfeld can talk "light, mobile, and fast forces" all they want, but without applying the dispersion techniques outlined by Poole, maneuver warfare will remain stagnant.
If you are a citizen seeking to better understand what our forces are doing on the ground, and how they might do it better, you should buy this book. If you're a soldier on the ground, you should buy two: one for yourself and one for your unit.
Book Description
Phantom Soldier: The Enemy's Answer to U.S. Firepower may be the best treatise on Oriental warfare ever produced in the West. Well researched and illustrated, it sheds new light on what an Eastern infantry unit can do in combat: (1) alternate between guerrilla, mobile, and positional warfare; (2) use “ordinary forces” to engage and “extraordinary forces” to beat an opponent; and then (3) run away when fighting holds no more strategic import. While what occurred in history does not change, one's perception of it does — as he comes to better understand his former adversary. Well versed in the Asian arts of deception and delay, the author explains in detail what really occurred at Guadalcanal, Iwo Jima, the Chosin Reservoir, Hue City, and other Vietnam battlefields. It would seem that former adversaries have used strategic retreat and tactical withdrawal not only to save their soldiers, but also to undermine U.S. resolve. By revealing how Eastern soldiers could hold their own without resupply, tanks, or air support, Phantom Soldier shows what U.S. infantrymen must do to survive the more lethal weaponry of the 21st century. This is must reading for any combat leader or concerned citizen.
Customer Reviews:
Outstanding Explanation of Effective Small Unit Tactis.......2007-10-01
Excellent book, but I am not sure the distinction is between Western and Oriental tactics. I suspect that American Indians, frontier scouts, the British SAS, U.S. Special Operations community, etc...would be very familiar with, and skilled at, these tactics.
A classic dilemma that resurfaces every time we go to war. Militaries, at least in the West, prepare to fight the last war and not the next one. As a free society, the public tends to forget the hard lessons learned and shuns warriors during times of peace. The end result is that we constantly are reinventing the wheel after every war/generation.
Victor Davis Hanson, in a recent editorial in the City Journal called Why Study War, gave a perfect example from the Post-Vietnam era; "The public perception in the Carter years was that America had lost a war that for moral and practical reasons it should never have fought--a catastrophe, for many in the universities, that it must never repeat. The necessary corrective wasn't to learn how such wars started, went forward, and were lost. Better to ignore anything that had to do with such odious business in the first place"...."A wartime public illiterate about the conflicts of the past can easily find itself paralyzed in the acrimony of the present. Without standards of historical comparison, it will prove ill equipped to make informed judgments."
A well-written and important book that provides an in-depth analysis of small unit tactics.
Great Wisdom Simplified .......2007-08-21
A sure test of talent and knowledge is the challenge of taking a very complex subject, explaining it in understandable terms and then offering solutions along with the understanding. My very brief stint in the Army ended long before Vietnam called the younger brothers of my generation. From the news reports it appeared that we suffered so many casualties only because the enemy was "sneaky" and prepared to die. How could the US lose to people who could not afford shoes?
Poole does a great job of bridging the gap from Sun Tzu to the muddy jungles of Vietnam and the significance of the lessons to our maneuver warfare. It is no accident that Boyd associate Willian Lind wrote the preface.
Poole finished the book just before 9/11. Our experience in Iraq and the Israeli experience during the past year show that we have much to learn. After 50 plus years of victories over various armies, the Israelis lost to what most consider a rag-tag army. Other than their heritage, they are as unlikely to defeat the Israelis as the sandal clod Vietnamese.
Poole's book is a gift to the small unit soldier and perhaps a greater gift to those in higher command who will order soldiers to assault targets with little understanding of what they may be facing. It may be at a distant command post or in the case of Somalia the commander flying overhead at 2,000 feet but unable to understand the river of lead flying down the street as he instructs troops to consolidate their positions.
This is a great aid to understanding current events and history from the comfort of your easy chair while balancing a martini on the arm. However, my sense is that it is far more valuable as a gift to a young trooper. In addition it should be mandatory reading ( along with Sun Tzu and Boyd's briefing slides) for every reporter who covers wars and "low intensity" conflicts.
Reading the book makes you appreciate Poole but feel uncomfortable with the contents. A great contribution.
Excellent Analysis on the Eastern Warfighter.......2006-11-24
As with all of Poole's works, we are treated here to an excellent analysis of the tactical sphere of war. This time, from the eastern fighter's perspective. Written, I believe, pre-9/11, the work itself is a thorough offering of actual techniques and wartime practices used by small units against western forces, but it is most remarkable in that it outlines in a concise and friendly manner what most analysts still fumble over on MSNBC.
In the world of tactical operations and small unit tactics, we can not ask for a better teacher than John Poole. Keep a close eye out for any and all of his works, for they have a lot to say about how and what western forces will fight for the next fifty years.
NOTE: This work makes a perfect companion to the author's "The Tiger Way," which outlines the ideal western method for combating such tactics.
DANGER, DANGER, WILL ROBINSON.......2006-01-22
Danger, danger, is very much the message put forth in this book and it should be heeded before it is too late. Some reviewers have mentioned Sun Tzu and his rules of warfare. Sun Tzu puts forth a very reasoned and systematic set of rules that define a nations path to victory or defeat. By definition, our present leadership has us solidly on the path of defeat. Our people in the field have to both fight our Eastern enemies as well as carry a great weight of poor leadership at the highest levels. This book is very informative and is for the most part, completely accurate and frightening.
The idea that hardware superiority alone can replace common sense is ludicrous and this book digs deeply into this. I remember seeing news footage of our troops in Afganistan heading up into steep mountainous terrain encumbered with huge heavy packs and body armor. They could barely move. They should have had only their clothes, rifles, ammunition and food and water and some good lightweight footwear. If you are going to fight an Apache you have to be an Apache. It seems at times to me that our soldiers are forced simply to carry as much weight in useless (and expensive) contractor equipment as a mule. Small unit combat and the tactics that win in this arena will be the deciding factor. Something also needs to be done about our so called free press. This game is for blood not for profitable commercial air time and these people should be subjected to the sort of censorship that our country used in WWII and the sooner the better.
I feel also that some of the opinions voiced on China are a bit over the top. The Chinese wish to better themselves and are not necessarily motivated by a desire to hurt us per se. It is very possible that in future that the Chinese could help us. They should not be blindly antagonized. They think and plan in a fashion that is very, very, long term. Our own leadership is cripplingly shortsighted in strategic planning.
I have lived and worked in the Mid East for a number of years and my personal opinion of the Iraq war can be summed up as follows:
1. The US leaves Iraq now and the country will dissolve into a bloody civil war.
2. The US leaves later and Iraq dissolves into a bloody civil war.
This book documents many of the reasons why this is so. Anyone who cares about the future of our country and indeed the world (China included) should read this book.
Inside Out.......2006-01-17
I read all these reviews and in the main agree with them. However, the real "way of western combat" is exemplified right here: we -- AT THE BOTTOM LEVEL -- are discussing all this and implementing it as we go. And as another reviewer mentioned, our soldiers are getting at it and learning from this NOW. Here's the clincher: does the oriental soldier or citizen do this. No way. It's not in their culture. Hasn't been for thousands of years. Unlikely to be unless huge changes occur in their citizenry. West = democracy / more free / BOTTOM-UP APPROACH. East = tyrrany / less free / TOP-DOWN APPROACH.
SUMMARY: I'd much rather be in the West facing the Eastern way of war rather than be in the East facing the Western way of war. Let's be data-driven: what is the kill ratio of WW2, Korea, and Vietnam? 40-1? 10-1? And yet, Poole's talk about Japan in WW2 making "infantry the most valued weapon". What?! Americans (and all European armies before them all the way back to Alexander) don't line up rows of infantry and charge across open fields to be mowed down. Doubt it? Guadacanal. Korea. etc. That's the "cultural" difference highlighted here: we value life, even a single soldiers.
Further reading: Carnage & Culture, by Victor Davis Hanson.
Book Description
Another volume in Praeger's The Military Profession series, this revised edition of the 1984 Praeger classic tells the story of infantry in the 20th century and its impact on the major conflicts of our time. Its purpose is to provide the reader--whether infantryman or not--with hitherto unavailable insights on the role that infantry plays in the larger battle and how that has helped shape the world that we live in today. Unique aspects of the book include the treatment of technical issues in non-technical language, the extensive use of German and French sources generally unavailable to the English-speaking reader, and the shattering of some long-cherished myths. Combat motivation and combat refusal, the role played by small units (such as the squad and fire team), the role of infantry in the Blitzkrieg, and many other issues often papered over in the literature of infantry are discussed and analyzed in detail in this revised edition.
Customer Reviews:
An Examination of Infantry.......2006-08-14
John English's "A Perspective on Infantry," and its revised edition, have been enduring residents on the bookshelves of military professionals since first publication in 1981. English's topic is the tactical role of infantry on the twentieth century battlefield. As a Canadian officer, his focus was primarily on the wars in which Canada participated, but this is not a history of the Canadian Army. His narrative closely examines the evolution of infantry organization and use in the American and British armies, and in their 20th century opponents such as the Japanese and German armies.
English discusses, in very accessible prose, how changes in warfare and technology tended to drive changes in basic infantry organization down to the fire team and squad level, and how infantry was used on the battlefield. He relies heavily on the historical record of the two world wars, but other conflicts are referenced. English's prose is straightforward and matter-of-fact, even sometimes moving, as in his description of the heroic performance of the U.S. First Marine Division in the breakout from the Chosin Reservoir in 1950.
English was a professional writing primarily for other professionals. The reader without military or historical background may not fully appreciate the value of this work.
The extent to which integrated joint and combined operations have come to dominate the actions of the U.S. military and to a lesser degree of its NATO allies is an event largely postdating this edition, as is the degree to which netcentric warfare is now commonly used. Nevertheless, the basis of the infantry continues to be the human soldier: on that basis, "On Infantry" endures as a very worthful professional read.
Painful development process detailed.......2006-03-14
Books such as English's "On Infantry" are difficult to review because it is wise to examine source material in conjunciton with the text. I ordered this book a year ago and have been working on this review since.
Due to the scope of this book, I'll only talk about the evolution of the infantry squad as English and Gudmundsson outlined throughout "On Infantry." Please note that there are multiple interpretations.
The infantry squad had its roots in ancient times as an administrative unit, a sort of "family grouping" with a big brother serving to mold the younger soldiers. The authors pick this up in the first chapter, "The Open Order Revolution," in the period between 1854 the Crimean War) and 1914 (the outbreak of World War One.) A combination of rifling (extending range) and repeater mechanism (increased fire volume) rendered the earlier means of command, control, and concentration of combat power a certain means to defeat; the enemy would shoot the closed-ranks regiments to pieces in minutes. Dispersion while mutually supporting the rest of the regiment or brigade forced the very junior leaders to assume responsibility for what had been the regimental commander's decision-making, as the battlefield became "empty" in the face of the hail of accurate rifle bullets. Rapid fire weaponry, which included both the machine gun and the quick-fire field piece (one with a recoil mechanism that limited the necessity to relay the gun after each shot--and often used recoil energy to eject spent cartridge casings, increasing the rate of fire), only added to this revolution--and made the old Napoleanic tactics pure suicide.
The squad (often thought of as an American invention) became a tactical unit during the Great War, and its evolution from administrative element (for guard duty, for fatigue details, for grouping into mess elements for distributing rations or for issuing supplies) into a tactical element possessing independant internal manuever and fire elements is spread out through "On Infantry"-- but the most important chapter is 7, "A Corporal's Guard." Oddly enough, the French Army almost got it right during the Great War, and was one of the three models for the modern infantry squad. The French put an automatic rifle in the squad and formally divided the squad into two elements--one grouped around the automatic rifle for fire support, and one for manuever with "ordianry riflemen." The French squad leader went with the maneuver element and the assistant squad leader stayed with the automatic rifle--but the French failed to exploit this innovation. French Army regulations stipulated that the squad was indivisible and that the smallest element capablie of being assigned an independant task was the platoon. The Germans did it right (funny about those Germans) by exchanging the squad's automatic rifle for a light machine gun, keeping the squad leader with the LMG and making that element the main killing system, with the assistant squad leader running a manuever/assault element of riflemen that supported the machine gun's tasks. The Germans called this universal squad the Einsheitsgruppe, and then proceeded to reinvent the wheel due to deterioration in their non-commissioned officer cadre due to casualties to form a second, "guerrilla" formation armed (on paper) with the assault rifle and grenade launcher. Simplified tactics also reduced the ability of the squad for independant action--for a single objective (ie, taking or holding a single small building) the minimum maneuver element was the platoon or even battalion. It should be noted here that even though--on paper--the 1944 German Volksgrenadier squad was supposed to have eight men, it was more common for the actual strength to be four, five, or six. There was no assistant squad leader, and Germany relied upon indoctrinating every soldier to take charge of the situation and continue the mission even when leadership personnel became casualties. The third squad formation is one I was most familiar with, the USMC's three fire team rifle squad standardized in March of 1944. Derived from the Chinese Communist practice of grouping three men around a single automatic weapon, this system was first tried out by the Marines in the Second Raider Battalion under Colonel Carlson. Three independantly-maneuvering four-Marine "fire teams," each organized around the Browning Automatic Rifle, achieved a balance of mobility and firepower which could be controlled under chaotic battlefield conditions that was hard to improve upon. Too bad that it was squandered in mostly frontal attacks against an enemy whose defense was basically an area ambush, a trap that sucked in attackers for annihilation. It is a credit to the Marines and their lowest-level tactical organization that they managed to prevail over the Imperial Japanese infantry's defensive webs--something like the fly overpowering the spider after getting entangled in its web.
There are other subjects covered in "On Infantry," but for brevity, I've just covered the evolution of squad organization. This evolution was impacted by such things as changing American Army drill--instead of forming the squad as two ranks of four men, the "new" squad of 1940 formed as a single file of 12 men--or any other number. Another factor in the evolution of the squad was conversion from foot mobility to motorization--the twelve-man squad of 1940 became a six-Soldier dismount team aboard a Stryker or Bradley. Due to low priority given to "bayonets on line," these dismount teams may number a mere two soldiers at times. Infantry squads always suffer attrition-often administrative attrition (mess duty, guard details, "give me a guy for a patrol,") and frequently casualties due to non-combat accidents, illness, or combat injuries. This messes up tactics because it isn't unusual for a rifle squad to be missing as much as 2/3rds of its strength in combat. The American idea of men as interchangable cogs in a massive machine ignored the human element, but this has changed due to combat experience. When a bunch of "weekend warriors" who have limited training time, but have known each other for years and have built mutual bonds of confidence out-fight "better-trained" active-component soldiers in both war games and actual combat, something is obviously wrong with regarding the infantry squad as an ad-hoc grouping of individuals. Sports teams train together to develop team work. The best individual players tossed into a game as a mob will almost always lose to a team of mediocre players who are lead by a competent coach and who play as a team. Infantry combat is a "team sport" rather than an individual event, and the long-overdue recognition of this simple fact is one reason why American infantry out-fights the Iraqi "insurgents."
An extensive bibliography and a very useable index enhances "On Infantry." This well-read book is an important part of my small unit tactics library.
Interesting survey of modern infantry's evolution.......2004-09-01
This is one of a series of surveys by Bruce Gudmundsson on different combat arms. (This book also has John English as a co-author.) As always, Gudmundsson's books are informative and delightfully easy to read. In this book the authors examine the evolution of infantry tactics resulting from the massive increase in firepower as muskets gave way to rifles and then to automatic weapons, in addition to the vast array of supplementary infantry weapons (i.e. grenades, anti-tank weapons, mortars, etc.).
They start off by looking at the effects of dispersing troops in open order to mitigate casualties and different armies' responses to this organizational and mental requirement. As the machine gun speedily became ubiquitous early on in World War I, some armies adjusted rapidly and easily, such as the Germans, while others lagged behind, e.g. British, Americans. English and Gudmundsson examine and compare the tactical infantry doctrines and small-unit organizations of the French, German, Russian, British, Japanese and American armies of World War II. Also examined are the Chinese Army from the Korean War and the Vietnam-era American army. In each case, they utilize real battlefield examples to demonstrate how this doctrine was actually put into practice, how effective the chosen tactics were, and their strengths and weaknesses (e.g. the American army's reliance on firepower instead of expert technique). They also examine the importance of psychological conditioning in preparing infantry soldiers for 'the emptiness of the battlefield'. The concluding chapter then briefly examines how different modern armies have organized their infantry arms, e.g. by reducing mechanization & heavy equipment.
This was a great survey on infantry organization and tactical doctrine. I highly recommend it as a brief introduction to the infantry arm. A more detailed study by Gudmundsson of the evolution of small-unit tactics can be found in 'Stormtroop Tactics'.
Excellent, but a bit extreme.......2001-04-07
This is an excellent discussion (historical and schematic) of what goes on at the nitty-gritty level of infantry combat; the squads, platoons, companies, and battalions. It shows how various systems succeed or fail at tasks such as flexibility, manouver, combat cohesion and morale, and why the German army was generally qualitatively superior to both Western and Eastern rivals in both world wars.
That being said, the authors tend to overemphasize the capabilities of infantry on its own -- particularly unsupported light infantry, and particularly in the theoretical section which concludes the book.
While rightly critical of the excessive logistical tail some modern "armies of drivers" drag around, they lose sight of the fact that foot infantry by itself totally lacks operational mobility -- 20 miles a day vs. over 200 for forces with their own organic transport. And they neglect the degree to which infantry alone lacks even tactical mobility on a battlefield saturated with automatic weapons.
It's no accident that the armies which actually do a lot of fighting -- the Israelis, for instance -- structure combined-arms teams around honking great monster tanks like the Merkava III or the M1A2 Abrahms, 70 tons or so of massively protected lethality.
Mobility means the ability to move, but tactical mobility means the ability to move _under fire_.
This poses a genuine strategic dilemma; forces light enough to move rapidly _strategically_ are often too heavy to be mobile in the tactical and operational sense -- you can fly light infantry quickly to the other side of the world, but they can't move when they're actually fighting.
Still, an excellent book on the whole.
Infantry won WWII, English explains why.......2000-08-14
John English is a brilliant tactician and historian who has written THE masterpiece on the origins of Infantry. I would have English describe infantry to about the Vietnam era and have Col Dan Bolger take the coverage from there to the future in his own book Death Ground: American infantry in battle. Bruce Gudmundsson was attached to the updated English book to attempt to bring the work up to date.
Taking the masterpiece for what it is, it delivers an important lesson mechanized maneuverists do not want to realize---that the German "blitzkrieg" died in the forests and cities of Russian when it met infantry that would not crumble if surrounded or cut-off from comfortable supply lines. Using a defense-in-depth, a nation on a total war footing can absorb and defeat another less committed nation that hopes to use a smaller force to penetrate and collapse. Many, maybe even most people mistake the German defeat in Russia--and hence WWII---with the cold Russian winter, and this is incorrect. The next critical---perhaps most important lesson and contribution English makes to the defense of freedom is---that a mechanized "combined arms" unit is ONLY AS GOOD AS ITS INFANTRY. When terrain and weather go sour, artillery and tanks will reach a point where they cannot contribute--and the entire battle then falls on the infantry. When this took place in Russia--the German infantry was NOT up to the task with inadequate numbers, clothing and bolt-action rifles. English points out and lesser historians should take note--that the German war machine was good together but not really that good because its PARTS were weak. When combined-arms technotactics could not be employed in the forests of Russia, the battle rested on the German infantry and it failed.
The cryptic lesson here is that we need GOOD infantry in large numbers and we don't get it by placing them into the back of armored vehicles in less than squad sizes, shut off from what's going on because they can't open a hatch out and see because we put a turret on the vehicle and we are afraid it will rotate into them. The Army made this mistake with the Bradley Fighting Vehicle, is trying to correct it with its vehicle for the new Brigade Combat Teams while the marines are about to repeat the error with a huge autocannon turret on their next generation amphibious assault vehicle. The second lesson of English is still being ignored---those that do mechanized combined arms don't value infantry action---they ride too long in their vehicles and get ambushed by missiles and RPGs fired from enemies hiding in key terrain that should have been taken first by the infantry. To do this you need a large amount of aggressive, not complacent infantry. As the Russians found out in Grozny, when their armored vehicles became flaming coffins, the battle then falls on the infantry to clear out enemies hiding in urban terrain.
This is not to say English believes in a "Super Infantry" since we saw in Mogadishu the best light infantry in the world get shot up because it was without armored fighting vehicles to shield it from enemy fire. What English is saying is that we should start with quality infantry when building forces and not in the process of creating combined-arms organizations ruin the infantry capability by reducing numbers, battle awareness and use as a separate maneuver element.
On Infantry should be required reading for ALL U.S. military personnel coupled with Bolger's Death Ground. I'd like to see the book updated to the present with a fresh perspective for the 21st Century where we apply English's lessons to the future battlefield.
Book Description
Learn how their strategies and tactics have evolved, both to exploit and to counter new technology, through the use of specially commissioned maps, diagrams and insightful text. Illustrates harrowing battles fought and the tactics employed.
Customer Reviews:
Glossy history without strategy or tactics.......2002-11-11
This book is subtitled "The Theory and Practice of Infantry Combat in the 20th Century" but this is not what the book is about at all. It is a reasonably well done, glossy history, cliff notes review of conflicts with little or no insight into infantry tactics, who developed them, or how they evolved. For casual readers looking for a historical overview, this will be adequate, but I expect it will be a huge disappointment to anyone who is interested in a book with this title. To give a few examples: there are no details on what infiltration tactics really are, never mind how they were developed; there is no discussion whatsoever of airmobile or paratroop tactics, and the evolution of infantry weapons is ignored except for some "gee whiz" comments on current developments at the end. If you are interested in infantry tactics, I'd recommend the classic "Forward Into Battle" or even the more recent Stormtrooper for anyone seriously interested in infantry tactics.
Book Description
This in-depth analysis of the tactics and equipment used by Japans infantry during World War II examines the training received by infantrymen and marines.
Customer Reviews:
If you thought that al Qaeda was bad news, read about Japan!.......2005-10-13
If you think al Qaeda is bad news, let me introduce you to Imperial Japan, a xenophobic society of death-worshipping nationalist religious fanatics. Leo Daugherty describes the Japanese soldier in 95 pages divided into six chapters:
--martial tradition
--induction and training
--military organization
--tactics
--individual weapons and equipment
--Japanese infantry division support weapons
Want to know what motivated the Imperial Japanese soldier to hunker down in a spider hole clutching an unexploded American aircraft bomb and a hammer? That soldier was going to blow up an American tank-and himself. The Kamikaze came about when military defeat and lack of war material meshed with the duty of the Japanese soldier to die in battle-if necessary, by killing himself. Daugherty wrote that the state religion of Shinto and the code of Bushido incorporated in 1867. Emperor Hirohito was considered a god, and anything done in service to that god was good. The national goal was unifying the world-under Japanese leadership. The soldier's code, Senjinkun, was pounded into already-prepared recruits. A military junta ruled Japan and this junta prepared the Japanese people for total war. On page 21 a table lists the year-long conscript training cycle-but this wasn't the beginning of military training. School children were indoctrinated early. "By 1934, more than one-third, or 915,000, of Japan's young men in the appropriate age bracket studied and drilled at these youth training centers."
No wonder part of the Japanese Imperial Guards rebelled when Emperor Hirohito announced Japan's capitulation!
Japan had no jungles to train in, yet the Japanese soldier was an excellent jungle fighter. This was the result of long, thorough training. The Japanese soldier was trained to fight at night as a means of overcoming enemy forces superior in numbers and firepower. The bayonet and hand grenade were preferred over the rifle-especially for close combat in the dark.
I found the descriptions of weapons and equipment brief but useful. Many criticize the Japanese for having poor small arms, for lacking a submachine gun, for "over reliance" on the bayonet. Actually, Japanese rifles and light machine guns were quite effective. Japanese pistols weren't, and the Type 100 submachine gun was a failure. The United States didn't really have a good submachine gun either, and its Browning Automatic Rifle was no match for a light machine gun. The famed knee mortar provided close-in 50mm shellfire on enemy positions. Oh, perhaps a semiautomatic rifle like America's M-1 Garand would have been nice-provided Japan's industry could keep her soldiers supplied with ammunition. Unrestricted air and submarine warfare by the United States went a long way towards insuring that there was never enough ammunition for the Japanese defenders.
At the division level (roughly 20,000 men-on paper), Japan shortchanged its soldiers on heavy weapons. No matter-there was a decided lack of motor transport in the Japanese armed forces. Couldn't haul artillery pieces and ammunition even if they had the hardware-a severe lack of petroleum was one reason Japan attacked the Western nations. Against lightly-equipped Chinese formations, Japanese units had ample firepower. When confronted by Soviet armored formations, Japan lost a chunk of Manchuria during 1939 in the Khalkyn Gol Incident. Initially, Japan crushed more-heavily armed British Commonwealth and American troops, but by 1943 the shoe was on the other foot. Eventually, islands such as Iwo Jima would bear the full brunt of American air power and naval gunfire unaided-it would just be the Japanese infantryman and a handful of artillery pieces buying time. Like the Vietnamese Communists of 40 years ago and al Qaeda today, the Japanese soldier believed it was just a matter of time before the soft Americans gave up and crawled back home. Given the disparity in divisional artillery and in tanks, this was quite the leap of faith!
Japan declared war on the whole world and her infantrymen did more than humanly possible. "Fighting Techniques of a Japanese Infantryman" describes in general terms how the Japanese infantry achieved this, and the tools that Japan gave its soldiers.
Bang for the Buck.......2002-09-18
A tremendous amount of information for such a small book...and consequently small price. Quite good on tactics. Organization and weapons are not so well done as are some other sources, but the other sources are commonly available and easily found. I'm glad I bought this book and hope that MBI will continue to expand this excellent series.
Book Description
One More Bridge to Cross: Lowering the Cost of War shows American units how to take (and cause) fewer casualties in battle. Minimal force can be best projected by highly trained and semi-independent squad-sized units. One U.S. service branch officially shifted over to "maneuver" from "attrition" warfare in the mid-eighties, but none have as yet been willing/able to decentralize control enough to use it at the squad level. Until they do, lives will be lost unnecessarily.
Customer Reviews:
The Good Soldier.......2006-11-20
In this another excellent work from John Poole, the author has chosen to examine the moral aspects of good soldiering by focusing on their application on a tactical level (although his suggestions might be equally well applied on the strategic level.) Don't be mistaken, however. This is not simply a theological tract. The author, a Roman Catholic, probably has more first hand knowledge of good solid tactics than any other "expert" going. He knows how to kill another man, another unit, and/or another tank. His interest, however, is in the proper aim of maneuver warfare: winning the war with an eye on what Liddell-Hart called "a better peace."
It's been over twenty years since the U.S. military formally outlined their emphasis on maneuver warfare (hastily summed up as "achieving our objective(s)") rather than attrition (again, hastily summed up as "destroying the enemy"), and yet our forces still seem bogged down in no-win attrition style wars. Were they to pay closer to attention to the evaluations of gentlemen such as Poole, they'd have a much easier time winning those "hearts and minds" we're always hearing about.
There are, of course, a multitude of religious undertones here, but even the most atheistic amongst us will have to recognize the strategic pragmatism of Poole's suggestions. The bombardment of a city by air may win you some rubble, but it doesn't win you a war. A wake of bodies doesn't make for a victory, and it doesn't lay the groundwork for "peace-keeping." As we've seen, it only encourages resentment and an insurgency.
If there's an intruder in your neighbor's house, you seek out and remove the intruder. You don't blow up the building. If your goal is to show an eastern peoples that you've come to remove an indiscriminately violent dictator, you don't use indiscriminate violence.
The Bridge Combatants Are Forced to Cross........2005-10-19
One More Bridge to Cross addresses something that often gets forgotten- the training of our souls and establishing a natural moral compass when engaged in combat will instinctively take over as chaos ensues. Fight or flight instincts take over on the battlefield. If training is not effective and becomes a part of ones character, it's left behind in lieu to what already exists in one's moral fabric. This book is about avoiding killing when the opportunity exists in order to minimize loss of life and limb. It's about applying only the appropriate amount of force in order to meet mission requirements. Before going into combat we train mentally and physically with a quick skim over the morality of war, and the mental, physical and moral costs of war without ever realizing what war actually may entail.
So what happens when human beings ignore training of the compass? We have incidences like Abu Ghraib, WWII soldiers say they were only following orders when exterminating Jews, Serbs and Muslims of the Balkans revenge killing each other, Palestinians and Israelis going tit- for-tat, Special Forces Operators being accused of needlessly killing detainees, news reporters concerned about getting stories out without considering their uninformed or biased approaches. All of the above named actions contribute to the continuation of war.
Service members who are not mentally prepared for this reality may become susceptible to mental and emotional illnesses i.e. Post Traumatic Stress Syndrome. They may feel guilt ridden for something they have actually done correctly, but do not realize that they had taken appropriate measures because faith in themselves and their training were not reinforced.
Again, war is the ultimate clash of HUMAN WILLS. The ultimate clash of wills is highly emotional for people on the front lines of a battle fields. Unless one has been in a combat environment, one will never truly understand and will attempt to subjugate the importance of the human in combat vice the machine. People die, friends die, and this causes anger, pain and the desire for revenge.
Poole's book stresses the importance of maintaining a moral compass in combat. He is training the subconscious to contend with a reality that some hi-tech supporters of weapon systems do not understand. Killing is killing whether one pushes a button, or the other pushes a trigger. One kills people and calls some collateral damage and perpetuates the fight by providing the enemy a battle cry and information operation tool, the other engages face to face and knows he truly killed a legitimate threat. This is the bridge combatants are forced to cross.
One More Bridge to Cross.......2005-09-27
One More Bridge to Cross is an inside look at the Noncommissioned Officers contributions to warfare. By providing direct insight to the Noncommissioned Officer, the author allows the reader to gain a great deal of in-depth knowledge in a short time. He provides the reader with real life experience as well as researched facts that build upon one another and enlighten the reader. A definite read for anyone interested in military tactics and training.
Military Sense in the 21st Century.......2005-08-18
As much as anything, this is a "how to" manual for warriors in the 21st Century. While some things have changed since this book was written in 1999, it is my contention that these much needed changes in ground force organization, training, and tactics were influenced greatly by this book and John Poole's recommendations. There is still a lot more to be learned from the thoughts and ideas this book, and it should be read by more than just warriors. This book would help legislators, parents, teachers, potential recruits, and ordinary Americans (voters and supporters) to understand what has happened to our military forces in the past 50 years and where we have to go to address the wars we are now fighting and those of the future.
John Poole provides a challenge to America's conventional military philosophy - In 1999, America's military leaders were not preparing the military for the current nature of war which some call 4th Generation War and others Asymmetric War and still others Irregular Warfare. In many respects, the reforms that John Poole calls for in One More Bridge are still not in practice. The price for not understanding what Poole has to say will be excessive casualties, disruption of indigenous populations, and erosion of their support for our military objectives. This is the very frightening and realistic picture that John Poole (a retired Marine Lieutenant Colonel and former Gunnery Sergeant) paints in One More Bridge to Cross: Lowering the Cost of War. John Poole is a recognized and noted expert on small unit battlefield tactics. He is the author of Phantom Soldier, The Tiger's Way, Tactics of the Crescent Moon, and The Last 100 Yards and has spent twenty-eight years leading and training Marines in small unit tactics, serving two tours in Vietnam.
His thesis is based on the history of the last fifty years from past wars. Poole stresses the need for radically different small unit decentralized training to prepare U.S. soldiers and Marines to fight the wars of the future (remember, this is 1999 that he wrote this). Poole states that change is needed in three areas: implementing effective decentralized light-infantry training, returning the moral quotient to the destruction of war by minimizing disruption of civilian life, and understanding and respecting the enemies' philosophy of war. This requires our military strategists to change their focus from attrition warfare to a more balanced approach with maneuver and Stability and Support Operations (SASO) as the counter. This idea is something that the military-industrial complex has been trying hard to ignore. If one looks at the guidance given to the Quadrennial Defense Review in 2005, however, that guidance seems to reflect a change in the old ways of thinking about how we fight. It is a decided shift toward what Poole was trying to tell us before 9/11.
Poole states that, "Attrition Warfare has become as much a part of American military thinking as apple pie." Modern warfare dictates that the military must add a new philosophy that enables America to win in many different environments in which attrition warfare will lose.
As this review is being written, some 30 Army artillery battalions are being transitioned to more appropriate types of units such as military police, military intelligence, and light infantry in recognition of the fact that our new enemies have neutralized attrition warfare, as Poole suggested. We are learning to adapt, but is it enough?
Poole's new military philosophy was based upon analysis of a new and different enemy, who is not obliging enough to sit still and face the military in massed formations to slug it out, where America's overwhelming firepower would prevail. Instead, he is a phantom living in the hidden jungle vastnesses, treacherous mountains, and maze-like cities, where he organizes his military into decentralized, small mobile elements. America, therefore, cannot destroy the whole country to get him. The French learned this in their defeats in Vietnam and Algiers. Americans saw the effect in Vietnam, Lebanon, Somalia and now Afghanistan and Iraq, but we have been late to adapt.
Poole explains how eastern warfare and military thought is very different. In the East, the decision maker takes everything as a whole and then proceeds with a comprehensive and intuitive bringing together of its every aspect. In the West, the decision maker divides a complex matter into its component parts, and then deals with those parts one at a time with the emphasis on logical analysis. For ground combat, the Eastern way of thinking may have more utility. The Asian large-unit commander is a bottom-up, holistic thinker. He briefs every subordinate (no matter how low ranking) on his overall goals and then encourages them to either make a contribution or get out of the way. As a result, his unit can more quickly adapt to the fragmented and ever-changing nature of modern battle. He exploits what his subordinates accomplish rather than dictating their every move. Does this even vaguely remind anyone of Osama Bin Laden?
In the West, the emphasis was, and still is in some respects, on long-range warfare and large-unit training, i.e., battalion and above. In the East, the emphasis is on short-range warfare and small-unit training, most notably, the individual, fire team, and squad. This means that the Asian soldier generally acquires more of the basic field skills he will need to survive in close combat.
In this book, John Poole tells us that American Soldiers and Marines have always been expert at using their equipment and following orders. Unfortunately, one must know more than that to survive against a loosely controlled and arms-poor but woods-wise opponent. Poole goes on to enumerate those areas where we need to train our grunts and all those who would participate in this kind of war.
Former Gunny Poole reminds us that those best qualified to develop the prerequisite procedures will be the non-commissioned officers (NCOs). By allowing his 30-40 NCOs to collectively design their own portfolio of tactical techniques up to squad level, the company commander will not only give his small-unit leaders tactical decision-making experience, but also he can ensure their non-predictability in war.
Until we reform our military philosophy, these new wars will be costly to our soldiers and the civilians that we are trying to win over to our cause. Read this book!
Vital Lessons on the Moral Factors of War.......2005-08-09
One More Bridge to Cross takes a truly unique approach to studying warfare and military reform. One More Bridge to Cross offers a close look at the moral factors of war that John Poole examines so insightfully in his other books. Most great military theorists (including Sun Tzu, Clausewitz and John Boyd) have emphasized the importance of moral factors. John Poole goes beyond theorizing about these moral factors and examines their importance in conflicts past and present. He shows how the United States has gained strength throughout its history by supporting worthy causes. He gives examples of how upholding moral standards in the conduct of war has contributed to ultimate victory. Finally, he shows how the United States has begun to loose the moral highground in recent times by practicing heavy-handed attrition style warfare. One More Bridge to Cross is particularly relevant to today's war against terrorism, where perceptions of values and morality can sway public opinion at home and rally new enemies abroad.
Book Description
You are the neophyte platoon leader in this informative and entertaining, interactive work from the author of Armor Attacks.
Customer Reviews:
Not relevant in post-Iraqi Freedom world........2003-06-05
As a former Light Infantry soldier in the US Army who doubled as an Anti-Tank weapons operator, I bought this book to see if what I learned held water. In this book, I was shocked at how little flexibility the scenarios offered. Life, including Army life, is about small decisions. This book only emphasizes big decisions. A quote I read once said "Life is what happens when you are making big plans." In this book, that is all that needs to be remembered. The commander you play in this war game is a West Point graduate, and a graduate of several Army schools, including the Rangers. To paint him as a newbie is a real stretch, especially when dealing with an incumbent and overbearing platoon sergeant. The United States is played as a continually unprepared military power and the enemy is made out to be on steroids. This book is almost irrelevant post-Iraqi Freedom. Save your money and buy a David Hackworth book instead.
Good basic primer, but heavily weighted to "proper" response.......2002-02-21
The reader jumps into the boots of a green platoon leader taking command of a platoon on the eve of battle, with the assignment to lead his platoon in protecting his company's flank in an imminant battle, and the reader given choices as the story progresses, with these choices altering the story's path by sending him to different sections of the book that show the results of his decisions as the story progresses.
It's a good basic tactical primer, though there are flaws in the storyline that make no sense. The three main flaws are as follows...
The personalities of the characters shift depending on whether the reader makes choices that agree with what the author has deemed to be the best choice. If he makes choices that the author disagrees with, the platoon leader, (the reader's role,) is portrayed as a weak and indecisive leader, bullied by an overbearing and obstinate platoon sergeant who leads him down the wrong paths at every turn. On the other hand, if he chooses as the author thinks best, the platoon leader magically becomes strong and forceful in personality while the platoon sergeant becomes almost sycophantic in nature at times, confirming his decisions to be wise. I found these personality shifts to be distracting to the basic concept of the book, which is to examine the probable results of the various choices offered, and implying that the only leaders who make mistakes are weak willed and indecisive.
The second major flaw is that identical events, unrelated to the previous choices made and completely outside the platoon leaders ability to affect in any way, have different results depending on the reader's agreement with the author's preferred choices, with them being more detrimental if he has made choices the author has deemed to be inferior to others, and more beneficial if the reader has chosen what the author has deemed to be the best course of action. (I went through and tried every available path through the story line out of curiosity.)
In one example, if the reader chooses as the author has deemed unwise, the enemy makes a counterattack that never appears under nearly identical circumstances if the reader chooses in agreement with what the author thinks best.
These slant the book in favor of the authors viewpoint rather than letting the results themselves teach the reader what would or would not be the best choice in an impartial fashion. The end results of these choices are not always consistant either with one set of choices, for example, resulting in the platoon taking very heavy casualties, but the rest of the company's casualties being very light, and this being deemed inferior in the authors eyes to the platoon itself taking relatively light casualties, but the company as a whole taking -very- heavy casualties in far greater numbers than the platoons first example losses, though it is the job of the platoon to protect the flank of the company. This seems backwards to me, though in both scenarios, the platoon did ultimately accomplish it's mission.
A third flaw is that the choices given are not always clear as to what is being chosen. What may appear, when reviewing the choices, to be a decision to seek defensible ground will, every so often, turn into the platoon being ordered to try to defend in the open, and what may initially appear to be a decision to defend in the open that appears ill advised will occasionally end up having been a choice to find good, defensible terrain to occupy.
Even with what are, in my opinion, these flaws in the book, it is as I said, a good basic primer in small unit tactics on the modern battlefield, and an entertaining and informative read.
Good teaching tool, exciting adventure story, excellent game.......2002-01-11
This is an above-average gamebook and war novel; it's not as polished or deft as a war novel by David Drake or Jerry Pournelle, but its writing style is better than many books written by serving officers such as Harold Coyle. Some books by active officers have good storylines that are hard to concentrate on because the inept style, esp. dialogue, grates on the ear. Not here - the prose is workmanlike and generally smooth.
The game situation is a Choose Your Own Adventure book based in modern warfare. While there is one best answer to every question (and you don't always have enough information to know what that will be in advance), there are several ways to win, and several levels of victory - you might accomplish the mission with few casualties, with many casualties, with near-complete casualties, or fail the mission altogether. The choices are exciting and nerve-wracking, because no matter what you choose, you can easily see how unexpected circumstance or plain bad luck could wreck your platoon. And luck is kept in its proper place - a laser-directed artillery barrage will reliably bust up an enemy column, but when a single tank is charging your position, inches make a difference and the dice will determine whether you as Lt. Bruce Davis live or die. Luck will definitely not save you from the fallout of a bad plan, nor completely derail a good plan, although it can turn an average plan into a failure.
As a teaching tool, its value lies in seeing the effects of your choices and being able to go back and start again. There are a few pages of general tactical advice, but they, like many Army tactics manuals, are so general as to be worthless. Indeed, the "lessons learned" sections appear to come verbatim out of Army manuals - as indeed they should, given the subject, but I would have preferred it if the author had rewritten them in plainer language and made some distinctions. For example, "mass" and "economy of force" are both important tactical concepts, but they're also antithetical. Some plain-English advice on when to concentrate and when to spread out would have been welcome.
Nor is this sour grapes - I actually made it through the first time to the optimum solution! Except for one important typo: there's a place where if you decide so-and-so, you are directed to section 88. That section has nothing to do with what you decided; it's part of a different decision chain altogether, although that was not immediately obvious to me. I don't know which section I was supposed to consult, but it sure wasn't 88. Copyediting in general has slipped across the book industry over the last decade - it's commonplace now to find, as in here, that the character "Piper" is called "Pipe" at one point, Lt. Bruce Davis is referred to as "Steve" Davis on the back cover, and so on. But when a misplaced digit sends you off into the ozone, it's almost as bad as transposing a range figure when calling in arty.
Required Reading.......2002-01-10
This is an excellent training book. It should be required reading for all platoon leaders, platoon sergeants and squad leaders. I gave it to my platoon leader and team leader. They also found it to be an excellent learning tool.
You and your men live or die based upon your own decisions. That's what I enjoyed most.
SSG Eric Hunt
A Co. 1/105th Inf
Imaginative design but not about leadership..........2001-12-13
...which is why I had purchased this book, that is, thinking it would have something to do with leadership. In this fictional, interactive account, a newly minted West Point Lt is given a rifle platoon and faces overwhelming odds against him. The reader makes choices throughout the book, usually about tactical decisions, which leads the reader down a "decision field," usually to the reader's own demise. This is imaginative. However, the basic principles of leadership are not discussed, other than working together, making sound and timely decisions, maintaining positive communications, and so forth.
Average customer rating:
- a great encyclopedia for anyone interested in the military
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Brassey's Encyclopedia of Land Forces and Warfare (Association of the United States Army)
Franklin D. Margiotta
Manufacturer: Potomac Books Inc.
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A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962 (New York Review Books Classics)
ASIN: 157488087X |
Book Description
Written by international military experts, this volume is the result of a multiyear effort and includes more than 130 articles on combat theory and operations, leadership, land forces and warfare, logistics, manpower and personnel, military law, and intelligence.
Customer Reviews:
a great encyclopedia for anyone interested in the military.......1998-06-02
just like the name it is an encyclopedia, not just in name, so there is no contents just alphabetical order. Also the book does not have one author but all articles are written by military leaders from around the world.
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From Flintlock to Rifle: Infantry Tactics, 1740-1866
Steven T. Ross
Manufacturer: Routledge
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ASIN: 0714646024 |
Book Description
This book provides a comprehensive study of the major changes in infantry tactics from the time of Fredrick the Great to the beginning of what many see as the era of modern war in the 1860's. Ross lays social and political change side by side with technical change. He argues that the French revolution, due to the fervour and loyalty it inspired in its participants, led to huge citizen armies of devolved command which were able to make use of new tactics that swept the poorly paid and poorly treated professional armies of their enemies from the field. Shortly after the Napoleonic wars other European countries experienced similar social change and by the middle of the Nineteenth Century these massive conscript armies were equipped with breech-loading rifles and more powerful artillery. The battlefield of the late 1860's had become a place where close infantry formations could not survive for long in the linear formations of the past. Ross's book comprehensively covers this seminal era in the history of warfare,it is vital reading for anyone interested in the evolution of modern war.
Customer Reviews:
Dated But Useful.......2006-02-13
As it was printed in the late 1970s, Steven Ross's well written book, covering from 1740 to 1866, is now somewhat dated but still interesting and useful. It is flawed in some of its conclusions, and it neglects issues of weapons effectiveness as well as the psychological features of battle in favor of an almost exclusive focus on formations and other 'nuts and bolts' issues. Use of columns for maneuver and attack are well covered as are the the use of skirmishers and changes in doctrine of various Western armies over time. The author gives many examples from battles of the era. So this book is a good introduction to tactics of the era but understandably shouldn't be taken as the 'be all end all' on the subject. It is best read in combination with Nosworthy's and Muir's more recent books for a fuller, more accurate view.
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