Customer Reviews:
Very Sophisticated Compilation of Essays of Mixed Quality.......2007-04-24
This book is not really for the novice or newcomer to deep theories about warfare, and as such can be at times very opaque and hard to follow. As with any compilation of Essays it can also be meandering and lack a central theme or definite conclusions. Nonetheless this is a generally very well produced compendium of the current philosophies regarding general military affairs (and the US RMA, Revolution in Military Affairs), operational art/doctrine, irregular warfare, post-conflict and stability operations, and intelligence.
The essays cover a very wide ground and almost always divergent and contrasting viewpoints are shown. Some of the essays were particularly interesting and well written, worthy of the price of the book, including standouts such as Ch. 2 by Maj. Gen. Robert H. Scales on how to revamp training and education for the services to meet future needs, Ch 3 on whether our commonly called principles of war are actually principles of battle and if a more transcendent set of principles is required, Ch. 5 by Lt. Col. Ralph Peters who is unabashedly aggressive and confrontational but able to argue cogently and persuasively for his beliefs, and Ch. 15 and Ch. 17 on irregular warfare. However, some of the essays seemed of rather poor quality for a variety of reasons and were tedious reads. Practically all of the essays on Operational Art sounded like academics hand waving and using as many big words as possible to sound really smart without really saying much of anything. Others, most particularly Ch. 21 regarding the use of the military in "Human Security Operations", just sounded like "wouldn't that be nice proclamations" of what the authors thought should be the case based on their own feelings and emotions, and less so on the basis of cold hard facts and analysis. The last critique is that based on the current state of the world the number of essays (three) on irregular warfare seemed too small to be justifiably in proportion with those on operational art and intelligence.
Despite all these drawbacks -natural for any volume of individually contributed essays- this is a good book with a lot of great information on where people with serious influence think the US military should go. It's a vigorous and meaningful debate, and suggested for people well versed in military history and theory as such will be necessary to follow many of the arguments. I will probably re-read it myself after exposing myself to Clausewitz's "On War" considering the prominence of his thoughts in this book.
MUST HAVE, BUY NOW!!!.......2006-06-21
This book is a must have. Some of the best and the brightest have contributed to this anthology of 29 chapters.
If you are interested in the US Army RMA, Revolution in Military Affairs, Transformation and the GWOT, this book has a lot to offer. If you are deploying, buy this book and make sure you read it beFore you deploy; especially chapters 1,3,4,5, 15,16,17, 20, 21 and 23,
In my opinion, the entire book is a real jem and you must read every chapter, footnote and reference.
If your deploying and pressed for time, start with the ones I have suggested and then go from there.
If you are really pressed for time start with chapter 23 and then chapter 1 and 3
For the Ops and the Intel guys at the UA/Bde level and Below this book will make you think of FM 3-0, SASO and the Battlefield Framework for planning COIN/SASO in an entirely different light. If you have read any of the required professional reading from CAC you probably already are; but this book will give you a scientific moment of Ah-Haa.
Terry Tucker,US Army, SGM,Ret; PhD
CSTC-Afghanistan
Trainer and Doctrine Developer (for the Afghan National Army)
Reflects Changes in the nature of warfare........2006-01-10
From just about as long as there have been wars people have tried to develop basic principles that define how wars are fought. Sun Tzu, writing about 2,600 years ago, and Clausewitz, writing at the end of the Napoleonic period have both been read and studied for centuries.
In this book leading thinkers from all of the American services as well as other agencies in intelligence, think tanks, the militaries of other nations and more bring together the current thought on how America and others go to war in the current time. Clausewitz's work was based on the concept that nation-states go to war against each other. Today's time where non-governmental agencies, such as al Queda and the various middle eastern revolutionary groups also engage in war brings new aspects to the problem requiring analysis.
Although not an official publication of our Government, this book reflects the thinking that is developing within the military.
Book Description
Did U.S. intelligence know of Japan's coming attack on Pearl Harbor? Did President Roosevelt know? If so, why did he withhold warnings from the commanders in Hawaii? The answers are embedded in the cogent analysis of The Pearl Harbor Myth. Based on voluminous data that does not appear in other books on the topic, it discusses in detail Roosevelt's developing strategy-both military and diplomatic-and his secret alliances to save the world from Hitler. It contains a wealth of fresh material on secret diplomacy; on secret military strategy, planning, and intelligence; and on disguised combat operations that began six months before the Pearl Harbor attack.
Customer Reviews:
Closing the Loop on Pearl Harbor.......2007-05-27
I've not yet read George Victor's book, "The Pearl Harbor Myth: Rethinking the Unthinkable." Indeed, I only found out about this book yesterday, Saturday, 26 May 2007, while reading a review on the book by Rear Admiral T.A. Brooks, USN (Ret.). Admiral Brooks' review is found on page 170 on the May 2007 issue of Naval Institute PROCEEDINGS.
Admiral Brooks is a 33 year veteran of the Navy. He retired in 1991 as Director of Naval Intelligence. (There were four DNI's in 1941, starting with RADM Walter S. Anderson and ending with Captain, later Vice Admiral Theodore S. Wilkinson.)
According to Admiral Brooks: "[Victor's] book presents three primary arguments: that FDR knew that a Japanese attack was coming and knew the target to be Pearl Harbor; that he deliberately provoked the Japanese into attacking; and there was a massive cover-up."
Having studied Pearl Harbor thoroughly---as my only job for over 13 years---I fully concur with the three primary conclusions listed above. There are a number of other books on Pearl Harbor that made these same conclusions over the years.
Admiral Brooks also states that "The Pearl Harbor Myth" is "one of the most scholarly and extensively footnoted works on the subject" published since Roberta Wohlstetter's "Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision" and Gordon W. Prange's "At Dawn We Slept." ("Prange's" ADWS was actually written by Donald M. Goldstein and Katherine V. Dillon, see Professor Goldstein's article in the December 2006 issue of Naval Institute PROCEEDINGS.)
This researcher began his own serious study of Pearl Harbor (on a part time basis) in the fall of 1983. He's still working on this very same subject some twenty-three years later.
The undersigned believes that someday someone will "Close the Loop on Pearl Harbor." Intelligence isn't always used the way the average citizen (or typical historian) assumes it is used. Senior officials have many different matters to factor into the way they use intelligence (to say nothing of diplomacy).
I welcome yet another book on Pearl Harbor. This is a subject that every American should know about because the more we learn about our entry into World War II, the more we'll learn about the Greatest Good. We Americans need to think beyond self.
Andrew McKane IV, Missoula, Montana, 27 May 2007
Still Another Revisionist View of the Pearl Harbor Attack.......2007-05-24
Over the years, a group of revisionists (John Toland et. al) have developed a theory that President Roosevelt somehow knew in advance that Pearl Harbor was going to be attacked, yet he failed to give Admiral Kimmel and General Short ample warning. Add author George Victor to the list of revisionists, for that is what this book is; pure revisionist theory.
This book contains all of the usual occurances which revisionists refer to when trying to pin the blame on FDR (the Winds Execute message, the three ships incident, the Lurline, etc). Granted, Victor makes complelling arguments regarding each instance, but there is very little information supporting his arguments. The main thesis is that Kimmel and Short were withheld vital information, and that may be partially true, but, the fact is, Kimmel and Short were woefully unprepared, and much of it was their own doing.
Victor devotes an entire chapter to the Novemebr 27th "War Warning" message. He argues that Kimmel and Short did exactly what they were supposed to do as far as their orders were concerned, yet, the attack was still successful. Victor also argues that the message itself was unclear. How unclear could it have been? The message stated directly at the top that it was to be considered a war warning. Its not FRD's fault that his top two commanders could not interpret a message directing them to be on alert for a possible attack! Despite not being provided with every bit of intelligence available, I believe that Kimmel and Short received enough information to deduce that an attack was a distinct possibility.
The book itself is well-researched and well-written, and much of the information contained within has just been recently made available. I, however, do not believe that FDR knew that Pearl Harbor was going to be attacked and deliberately kept his commanders in the dark. The author makes a point for this possibility by describing acts by presidents Polk, Lincoln, and McKinley which drew the U.S. into war. However, I believe Victor is incorrect in his analysis of FDR. I believe that Roosevelt had a pretty good idea that the U.S. was going to be attacked. I also believe that he didn't know exactly where the attack was going to occur. There were many more distinct possibilities than Pearl Harbor (Kra peninsula, Philippines, Panama Canal to mention a few). The sad fact is, and this wasn't really pointed out by Victor, is that the Japanese executed a completely flawless attack. We cannot blame FDR for Japan's perfect execution.
I did enjoy reading this book; I just don't agree with its conclusion.
Add another Pearl Harbor book to your "Must Read" list!.......2007-05-22
A text published for the sixty-fifith anniversary of the Pearl Harbor attack, Victor gives us a solid and balanced portrayal of the tensions in the world around that time, depicts the major geo-political actors, and provides excellent background information on their respective goals and constraints, particularly the dynamics of the Japanese governmental system.
This book is a very ambitious undertaking which approaches this period with a reasoned viewpoint. It has a clear structure, a logical flow for the reader, and brings to bear a broad set of citations as supportive references.
While stressing that his position is not to pass "moral" judgments, particularly on FDR and his War Cabinet, Victor does overtly rationalize their purpose in using the Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor as bait, and hence the over-arching need to keep Kimmel and Short "in the dark" regarding the known pending attack on Pearl Harbor. That this is so is clearly demonstrated by the very well-known comment in the Knox Report (delivered December 15, 1941), the so-called "Knox December 6, 1941 midnight" Washington message, intended ONLY for Kimmel in Hawaii. That the message was never sent is the "smoking gun" and a stain on America's history and the credibility of those "court" historians who ignore its significance, if they are aware of it at all. And, wonder of wonders, that Knox message has never been found - imagine that!
The risk of alerting the Kido Butai was too great, the Japanese had to unambiguously "fire the first shot" ... and that deliberately thousands of lives were lost, that deliberately the Pacific Fleet was crippled, ... Well, the US just had to get into the war against Germany. If this sounds familar, kinda' like the "back door" theory - it should, as it was voiced well over a half-century ago. And, that thesis is correct.
For readers who do not know how the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor is linked to Germany's declaration of war against the US - a bit more noddling might help. The signal, via a 11.29.41 PURPLE message, of the German action was known to FDR, Churchill, and others days prior to Pearl Harbor - and had nothing to do with the terms of the Axis Tri-Partite Pact.
What Victor presents is old news for some. For those many others some revelations might include: (a) many offiicers are named who openly pointed to Pearl Harbor as the Japanese target, (b) the true reason Admiral "JO" Richardson was replaced, (c) that British DIP traffic was being read by the Japanese, (d) more than adequate resources, on a world-wide basis, to handle Japanese traffic (DIP and IJN), adding to what SRH-149 and SRH-255 already shows (d) highly competent deliberations and high-level decision-making to mask pending attack from Kimmel and Short, (e) the woes that were visited upon DugOut Doug and why, (f) FDR's personal quest to save Stalin and USSR, (g) whereabouts of FDR and his War Cabinet the night of December 6, 1941, ..., etc.
Today, as recent books such as Stinnett and Wilford have found their mark, the indefensible positions of "maintained absolute radio silence" and "could not read any of the IJN operational traffic" are clearly apparent. The current "fall back" position being pandered is akin to "noise" or a bureaucratic maze that interferred with actionable intelligence reaching the Washington decision-makers. Victor's text is the "Closing of the Door" on those excuses. That Kimmel and Short were "blinded" by Washington was INTENTIONAL!
Victor's (page 302) "Whether intentionally or not, Roosevelt exposed the fleet to a Japanese attack by stationing it in Hawaii. Then he intentionally used naval units as lures by ordering them on various expeditions in the Pacific. Withholding key information from Kimmel and Short increased the fleet's exposure greatly and it was most glaringly increased by not sending a warning on December 6, 1941.
Despite the history of war, the idea that Roosevelt withheld warnings from Kimmel and Short for the purpose of getting the United States openly into a European war is still unthinkable to many people, but to fewer and fewer as the years past. As has happened over time with other unthinkable acts, the repugnance aroused by the idea of using the Pacific Fleet as a lure will probably continue to fade."
Kimmel and Short need to be set free from the injustice of their bondage and of the tyranny against them. To do otherwise bespeaks the lack of integrity within the US government and the command structure of its military.
Has "Truth, Justice, and the Ameican Way" gone the way of the dodo?
A Good Read, Not Good History.......2007-03-27
I enjoyed reading this book for way it gave a probable timeline of how things occurred around the time leading up to Pearl Harbor. Unfortunately, it is not able to add anything to the discussion of what happened to allow Pearl Harbor to occur.
The author is unable to give any support to his second guesses as to why things happened they way they did. My favorite is the supposed intercept by a German listening station of a message from Winston Churchill to President Roosevelt warning him about the attack. The only problem is that the expert the author quotes indicates that the intercept cannot be verified as being authentic and is most probably a fake. If you are going to include something in a book, at least have someone try to support the item.
I have read many books about Pearl Harbor since it is a very interesting point of history for our country. This book definitely falls into the "Revisionist" camp since it assumes Roosevelt knew the attack was happening, but did nothing to stop it or warn the commanders there.
As I said, this book is interesting to read as long as you think of it as alternate history and not true verifiable history.
Inference not conspiracy theory.......2007-03-15
I'm not sure the above reviewers read the same book I have. Victor's The Pearl Harbor Myth does not really fall into the genre of conspiracy theory literature. Nor is it historical fiction. Victor finds anomalies and inconsistencies in what Roosevelt and other said and what they did and draws inferences from this. When the direction and number of inferences drawn add up, he makes a reasoned conclusion that the notion that Roosevelt did not know about the Pearl Harbor raid far enough in advance to warn the Navy is a myth. Even if we were to chock it up to incompetence or miscommunication or lack of today's detection technologies, there are too many such blunders but also intentional acts. Why Roosevelt failed to warn the Philippines after Pearl Harbor was attacked is compelling. Even circumstantial evidence can hold up in court so why not in Victor's book? I may be entirely wrong, but time may prove this book to be a classic.
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Rethinking Governance of the Army's Arsenals and Ammunition Plants
W. Michael Hix
Manufacturer: RAND Corporation
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ASIN: 0833033220 |
Book Description
Assess options for managing the ARmy's arsenals and ammunition.
Book Description
Fought on what to Westerners was a remote peninsula in northeast Asia, the Korean War was a defining moment of the Cold War. It militarized a conflict that previously had been largely political and economic. And it solidified a series of divisions--of Korea into North and South, of Germany and Europe into East and West, and of China into the mainland and Taiwan--which were to persist for at least two generations. Two of these divisions continue to the present, marking two of the most dangerous political hotspots in the post-Cold War world. The Korean War grew out of the Cold War, it exacerbated the Cold War, and its impact transcended the Cold War.
William Stueck presents a fresh analysis of the Korean War's major diplomatic and strategic issues. Drawing on a cache of newly available information from archives in the United States, China, and the former Soviet Union, he provides an interpretive synthesis for scholars and general readers alike. Beginning with the decision to divide Korea in 1945, he analyzes first the origins and then the course of the conflict. He takes into account the balance between the international and internal factors that led to the war and examines the difficulty in containing and eventually ending the fighting. This discussion covers the progression toward Chinese intervention as well as factors that both prolonged the war and prevented it from expanding beyond Korea. Stueck goes on to address the impact of the war on Korean-American relations and evaluates the performance and durability of an American political culture confronting a challenge from authoritarianism abroad.
Stueck's crisp yet in-depth analysis combines insightful treatment of past events with a suggestive appraisal of their significance for present and future.
Book Description
Have globalization, virulent ethnic differences, and globally operating insurgents fundamentally changed the nature of war in the last decades? Interpretations of war as driven by politics and state rationale, formulated most importantly by the nineteenth century practitioner Carl von Clausewitz, have received strong criticism. Political explanations have been said to fall short in explaining conflicts in the Balkans, Africa, Asia and the attacks of 11 September 2001 in the United States.
This book aims to re-evaluate these criticisms by not only carefully scrutinizing Clausewitz's arguments and their applicability, but also by a careful reading of the criticism itself. In doing so, the contributions on this book present empirical evidence on the basis of several case studies, addressing various aspects of modern war, such as the actors, conduct and purposes of war.
The book concludes that while the debate on the nature of war has far from run its course, the interpretation of war as postulatedby Clausewitz is not as inapplicable as some have claimed. Furthermore, the label a war receives, such as civil war, does not necessarily say much about the way this war is fought. Civil wars are not always irregular or unconventional wars. Changes in the conduct of war have unmistakably occurred but change should not overshadow the important continuities that exist in the nature of war and warfare.
Customer Reviews:
Profound Thinking for the New Century.......2005-04-08
There have been numerous attempts to analyze war and the reasons for war. Clausewitz's On War, and Sun Tzu's Art of War are just two of the best known examples.
These books generally cover how and why countries go to war. They are not much help in make more sense of things like ethnic clensing in the Balkans, another genocide in Rwanda, or the 9/11 attacks. Another fundamental shift is the moving of wars away from the major powers to the developing world.
The conclusions reached by a wide selection of researchers and professors of international relations, military theory are mixed. It rather depends on how you intrepret On War, not the easiest book to read. But in any case this book provides some profound thinking on the nature of war at the beginning of the new century. All but two of the contributors are based in Europe. This brings an additional international aspect to the writing.
Book Description
The curriculum materials presented in this guide explore the legacy of the Spanish-American War from a distinct point of view: that of the island nations in the Caribbean and the Pacific, nations whose destiny has been framed for centuries by the tension between foreign domination and the quest for independence. For these peoples, the war lives on, underlying profound questions of culture, society, and language, as well as political and economic issues. Among the vanquished, history is not forgotten.
This guide opens with an introductory chapter, addressed mainly to teachers, that examines the events of 1898 and their aftermath. Student lessons at the end of the chapter explore general themes regarding the role of interpretation in history.
The remainder of the book is dedicated to chapters on each of the countries that came under U.S. rule in this period. Each of the country-specific chapters includes a brief historical overview followed by a series of lessons, including suggested activities and corresponding handouts for students. Both the overviews and the handouts are written to be accessible to students at the secondary level. Terms that may be unfamiliar are signaled in each chapter overview and in each lesson, and are defined in a glossary at the back of the guide.
Student readings include a wealth of primary sources: newspaper articles and political cartoons from the time of the Spanish-American War, historical documents, personal testimonies, and more. Also included are a broad range of contemporary pieces, both fiction and nonfiction. The overall approach is multidisciplinary; many of the materials and activities included here can be used for classes in history, social studies or English, the suggested activities include role plays, debates, writing exercises, classroom discussions, and the creation of stories, poems or cartoons, among others.
Many of the lessons included here engage students in developing their own critical readings, whether of historical narratives, media representations, or policy debates. By listening to the voices that have mainly been left out of the historical record, students can learn to understand how our vision of history and of the world we live in is reshaped according to who is looking and who is being seen.
Book Description
Rethinking Military History is a bold new 'thought book' that re-positions military history at the beginning of the twenty-first century. Jeremy Black reveals the main trends in the practice and approach to military history and proposes a new manifesto for the subject to move forward.
This must-read study demonstrates the limitations of current approaches, including common generalizations, omissions, and over-simplications. Engaging theoretical discussions, with reference to specific conflicts, suggest how these limitations can be remedied and adapted, whilst incorporating contributions from other disciplines. Additional chapters provide a valuable and concise survey of the main themes in the study of military history from 1500 to the present day.
Rethinking Military History is essential reading for all those with an interest in military history, and all who wish to take part in moving the discipline forward.
Customer Reviews:
This is a professional's professional-level book........2007-01-11
Jeremy Black accomplishes exactly what he intends to do - he helps the reader to reframe & rethink many long-standing, taken-for-granted, assumptions and myths about military history. This book is a true innovative gem about military history that sparkles in a droll sea of otherwise banal commonality. This book should be on the shelf of every professional military careerist - especially those who believe that good military policy, theory, strategy, operations, and tactics begin with a solid grasp of good military history. This is a book for those who actually understand the essence of good military history - or those who want to learn about it. Afterwards, you will think about new concepts and perspectives regarding military history in ways you never dreamed of.
This book captures a variety of salient issues that all affect how we assess military effectiveness: an over-reliance upon 'junk' history, heavy technology bias in military thinking, Eurocentricness & American-centricity, a dysfunctional separation of land-vs-sea combat, preoccupation with nation-state conflicts -vs- the general continuum of conflict, a generally unfocused "political" guidance for a very wide range of highly important military issues, and our all-too-often cultural 'myopicness' in military understanding and approach.
You should disregard any myopic 'scholarly' critique that falsely purports to know exactly what the vast majority of military history readers want. Instead, you should focus on what you know you want. You should disregard any myopic 'scholarly' critique that would falsely degrade a book simply because it is written in a culturally different style of English than one is normally use to. For without doubt, there are numerous foreign writers whom average Americans as well as highly regarded academics find their foreign style of writing a bit rough in reading. ( And "Herr Clausewitz" is surely at the top of that long list.) Instead, you should focus on the content of new concepts and perspectives - not miniscule nuances in writing style.
If anything, this book may overwhelm the average (or below average) reader only because it is heavily laden, page-to-page, with a plethora of new concepts and perspectives by a master military historian - who has looked at military history from every side of a military Rubik's Cube - and knows exactly what he is talking about.
You cannot read this book only once - for if you love military history, this book WILL captivate you.
A Military Historiography update.......2006-03-20
Bottom line: this book fills a much needed gap in reviewing the state of military historiography and its themes. This alone makes it worthwhile for military historians to read this book.
If you're familiar with Black's work, you're already familiar with many of the themes in the book. However, the book captures all of them and then some. He basically addresses six "problems" he sees in "the state of military history as generally consumed by the public at large:" too much of a Eurocentric (and American) focus; a technological bias in explaining military capability; a focus on leading powers and dominant military systems; a separation of land and sea conflict; a focus on traditional state vs. state conflict; and a lack of focus on "political tasking" in the setting of force structure, doctrines and goals, and in the judging of military success. His argument isn't necessarily that these aspects of military history are wrong, only that they ignore other aspects that lead to a fuller understanding of the world -- it skews the perspective.
Black also reviews how military historians have treated warfare since the beginning of the early modern period with chapters on 1500-1815, 1775-1918, and 1914 to today. Although I've read his opinions on many of these themes, there's enough new in the book to make it interesting, and he pulls it together in a more thoughtful manner. In fact, Black refers to it as a "thought book" with a global perspective.
The book is not an easy read and it's not because of differences between American and British writing styles. Black is always a difficult read, as anyone who has read his other books can attest. As an American who has lived in the UK for seven years, and who earned his Masters in War Studies at King's College London, I can tell you there are plenty of other British military historians who are easier to read (Such as Michael Howard, Brian Holden-Reid, Max Hastings, and Colin S. Grey.) Having said that, he may be tough to read, but he's worth it...especially with this book.
Don't believe every critique that you read!.......2006-02-26
Some critiques are NOT culturally sensitive, intelligent, or insightful - nor are they competent, "scholarly" critiques.
In defense of this fine book versus misguided `unscholarly' critiques {especially by the arrogance of those who might openly beg the moniker of "scholar"}, one should be aware of several fundamental nuances that are highly important:
1) The true merit/worth of any book is embedded deep within the intellectually salient, insightful, timely and prescient concepts that a book presents for review and discussion. It is actually quite irrelevant whether or not a book is "perceived" as containing dreadful prose with awkward syntax by some personal standard. There are many highly intelligent and insightful people who don't speak, write, or read the King's English - and most Americans fall under that category. Yet, this small flaw in writing does not and should not detract from recognizing true intelligence and insightfulness - at least not to those who are truly intelligent and insightful and deserving of the title "scholar".
2) The concepts presented in Jeremy Black's book "Rethinking Military History" are indeed intellectually salient, insightful, timely, prescient, and, without doubt, highly irreverent to those who are hopelessly doomed as only be able to think in the drudgery of old, obsolete, paradigms that no longer work. It is only because some folks are hopelessly doomed to think inside the trap of flawed obsolete thought patterns that they cannot understand true intellectual insightfulness when they see it - which is precisely why they can't "see" anything that doesn't coincide with their stodgy mentality. This book is for those who want intellectual stimulation with fresh new insights on the vast and convoluted subject of military history - it is NOT a book that is for those who are intellectually challenged on the subject of military history. However, it is a book that requires the reader to actually think and reflect - something that many self-professed `scholars' have forgotten how to do. It is NOT a book about battles and leaders, nor is it a "lessons learned" type book. It is a book for the kind of professional development that can only be accomplished through reading and reflecting upon unusual concepts and new ideas.
3) Jeremy Black is a "British" military historian - and the British culture versus the American culture are often noted for being separated by a common language. This small insignificant fact may help account for the misperception that Black's prose is dreadfully laden with faulty syntax and other unpardonable faux pas. Of course, the true cognoscenti can see beyond such small issues, and they automatically ask the question " Awkward syntax by what standard - the British cultural standard or the American cultural standard?
If you seriously purport yourself to be a `scholar' of military history - a true scholar who craves intellectual stimulation with fresh new insights - then read, think and reflect upon Jeremy Black's book "Rethinking Military History" !
Poorly written study of major problems in military history .......2005-03-24
Black sees some major problems in military history today:
1. Eurocentricity-especially in western Europe and the USA.
2. Technology bias in explaining military cabability and fascination with technology.
3. A focus on leading powers and dominant military systems.
4. A separation of land from sea conflict in most analysis.
5. A focus on state to state conflict rather that use of force within states (except for major civil wars).
6. A lack of focus on political tasking in the setting of force structures, doctrines and goals, and in judging military success.
He also identifies several trends, noting that the emphasis on technology is too great; there has been a primitivization of non-western combatants, and that military history has a very battle centered approach. Black calls for lowering barriers between history and social sciences work on war and violence. Why? There has been too much emphasis on operational accounts.
Military history now is the "last stronghold of the Whig interpretation." He urges us to beware of any one "western way of war" (as does John Lynne), meta-narratives, paradigms and mono-causal explantations. He emphasizes diversity of military practice: there is no single western way of war...War is pluralistsic in its character.
There has also been a trend to simplify the non-western military history.
He also calls for a debate on how to explain military change: we can't just assume that it's a mechanisitic or an automatic search for efficiency to maximize force. Traditional military histories avoid using cultural approach, which is related to war and society. With regard to assessing operational capabilities, Black says that care should be taken to avoid focusing too much on resources and technology, especially weapons systems and in the history of asymmetrical warfare.
He also seems to reject Keegan's work to some degree, especially the "Face of battle approach": it shows a timeless quality of men facing combat which may not take into account that battle is much more culturally conditioned and varied.
All of this is important to the current state of military history, and should be the subject of great debate. The problem is this: the vast majority of people who read military history (and thus buy the books on the shelves) want books about battles and leaders, especially with a dramatic, fast paced narrative OR they are military/defense professionals either in uniform or civilians, who want professional development/"lessons learned" type books. The reading audience does not want cultural history overlays to their "trumpets and drums" books, nor do they want to see race, class and gender as the focus of this subject. Black covers this fairly well in the first chapter of the book.
The problem with THIS book though is that Black's prose is truly dreadful. An editor with some backbone should have turned it back to him and said "make it readable." The book is so poorly written, with severely awkward syntax, etc. that its impact will be limited because so few people will be able to tread the whole thing.
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- Attack cities only when there is no alternative
- The Way of War in the Future
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Future War In Cities: Rethinking a Liberal Dilemma
Alice Hills
Manufacturer: Routledge
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Terrorist Trail: Backtracking the Foreign Fighter
ASIN: 0714684945 |
Book Description
This book is the first full-length study of a key security issue confronting the west in the twenty-first century, urban military operations - as currently being undertaken by US and UK forces in Iraq. It relates military operations in cities to the wider study of conflict and security in an era of urbanization, expeditionary warfare and new power conflicts; its central process is urban operations, but its context is the changing security environment, whose features are revealed in conflicts within cities.
Within a framework analyzing conventional operations, the author identifies the contextual factors that affect operations in urban environments. She advances an explanation as to why questions of theoretical understanding and policy response are as important as tactical concerns, and why cities will represent a politically significant area in the future. In doing so, Alice Hills demonstrates that urban operations present a unique set of political and moral challenges to both policy-makers and military commanders. Future War in Cities offers a rethinking of the liberal dilemma associated with the use of force across the spectrum of conflict, from terrorist attacks to major conventional operations.
Customer Reviews:
Attack cities only when there is no alternative.......2005-12-18
"Attack cities only when there is no alternative," advised Sun Tzu 2500 years ago, and after studying recent urban battles, Dr Hills comes to the same conclusion. However two-thirds of the world now live in cities, many of which have a population of 5 million or more. And some of the cities are controlled by inhumanely cruel regimes, or by hostile and dangerous ones.
These regimes pose a dilemma for liberal Western nations. If they do not intervene, they are seen as condoning brutality, and they risk being harmed by large-scale organized crime, or by WMDs.
But if they do intervene, they often become involved in a war that makes existence for the regime's victims even more brutal, consequently increasing hostility towards the West.
Hills compares the response of highly trained British forces in Northern Ireland and Basra (with 3 months special training followed by only 4 months active service) with those of French in Algiers, the Israelis in Jenin, plus the Americans in Hue and Baghdad, and she makes a very detailed analysis of the Russians in Grozny.
These forces all began with rules of engagement calling for minimum aggression, to protect non-combatants and the urban infrastructure. But when the intervening soldiers started receiving significant casualties, their tactics became much more violent. Hills relates how entire Russian artillery batteries, with unlimited supplies of surplus Cold War ammunition, were used to level tenement buildings containing just one sniper. To little avail: the demolished buildings then impeded their armoured vehicles while their Chechen enemy were still protected in tunnels and sewers.
Despite the recent development of digitized technology that was so successful in the open country of Afghanistan, today's urban warfare remains surprizingly similar to that of three decades ago. GPS and sensors are not as effective as mouse-holing bars and mirrors on sticks. She notes that the most effective urban weapons are the controversial thermobaric rockets derived by combining WWII-style RPGs and flame throwers.
Western armies are developing tactics for urban warfare, but Dr Hills says that to date that there have been no strategic urban studies done in the West. She suggests that the critical strategic element is infantry with high morale, good NCOs, and relevant urban training.
The first section of this book is rather heavy going. Try dipping into some of the more descriptive chapters in the middle of the book first. And if you only have limited time, go to the last chapter and "afterword" where she has summarized all her thinking.
Dr Alice Hills was formerly a lecturer at the UK Joint Services Staff College at Shrivenham, and now lectures in conflict, development and security at the University of Leeds.
The Way of War in the Future.......2005-05-27
The fighting in Iraq has tought the US Army several things about MOUT (That's Army talk for Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain). The Army spent years thinking about, planning for, buying equipment for fighting the Russian Army coming through the Fulda Gap in Germany. Then they had to learn about fighting in jungle. Then they fought some in desert. Now all of a sudden they are getting killed one or two at a time fighting while trying to patrol a city.
In a city there isn't much need for the Abrams tank. But a Humvee isn't enough. The new Stryker armored vehicle that the Army is just now fielding used a new concept in armor for the Army (www.army.mil/features/stryker/default.htm) - although not for the Marines which have been purchasing this vehicle under the name LAV (Light Armored Vehnicle).
Equipment is just one of the points covered in this book which is a survey of current thinking from around the world. Other points include the general concepts of such operations, other technologies such as air power, the different types of operations from policing to warfighting and much more.
This is one of the first books to begin to define this type of fighting which has been largely learned by accident at troops have had to engage in fighting in cities around the world.
This is likely to be the way of war in the future.
Customer Reviews:
The Kennedy Years needs to be rethought and retaught.......2007-07-07
Utilizing the declassified documentary record during the Kennedy Administration, Chomsky makes quite clear the unpleasant fact that John F. Kennedy was essentially no different from Eisenhower, Johnson or even Nixon with regard to foreign policy.
While I am a fan of Oliver Stone's JFK, this book provides a detailed refutation of many claims and assumptions the film implies. For example, the notion that John F. Kennedy was secretly against U.S. intervention in Vietnam (yet the troops remained there the entire 3 years he was in office), and National Security Memo 263 has been totally taken out of context, as Kennedy made it quite clear that he didn't want withdrawal with failure, and that the "overriding objective" was victory in Vietnam. And National Security Memo 273, the memo which essentially reversed the "withdrawal" plan noted in 263, was drafted on November 21st (while Kennedy was still alive), and signed by LBJ on November 26th, clearly indicating that Johnson was simply continuing JFK's policies in Nam. As for his remarks, he gave similar remarks to that of why Bush gives that the US should stay in Iraq. On June 17th, 1963, Kennedy said, "For us to withdraw from that effort would mean a collapse not only of South Vietnam, but Southeast Asia. So we are going to stay there", then saying, "I don't agree with those who say we should withdraw" - that's just a sample. On November 22nd, 1961, Kennedy authorized a large scale attack on South Vietnam (yes, South), napalm and "counter-terror" (U.S. terror). It's interesting that this authorization was signed on November 22nd, 1961, exactly 2 years before Kennedy suffered the fate he authorized - murder.
As well, Kennedy authorized the invasion of Cuba on April 17th, 1961, and authorized Operation Mongoose, and only turned down Operation Northwoods because he was he knew it wouldn't work. Kennedy, according to the official documents, sanctioned crop burnings, germ warfare, sinking fishing boats, etc. John and Bobby knew all about almost everything that happened, and anyone who says otherwise is full of it.
Cross reference everything Chomsky says with the declassified documentary record, which is available in book form in the book The Kennedys and Cuba, assembled by Mark J. White.
Once you learn about Kennedy's policies, his assassination, and all the conspiracies become completely irrelevant because he didn't do ANYTHING different from his predecessor and successors. He wanted Vietnam to be a sphere of influence of the United States, regardless how many civilians died, he wanted Castro to be murdered, and Cuba to return back to being mafia and US Corporation ran, and even implemented the fascist dictatorship of Brazil to take power, which they did in 1964, all of which break international law. But then again, since when does the US observe international law?
This is a must read.
Anton Batey
Anton_Batey@yahoo.com
Chomsky: the CIA's favourite dissident.......2005-10-01
Chomsky's pseudo-dissidence is revealed by, among many other lies found throughout his oeuvre, his repeated insistence upon the CIA's unwavering fidelity to successive Presidents. Where the evidence is contrary, he ignores it. Nowhere is the suppression more systematic than in Rethinking Camelot: JFK, the Vietnam War, and US Political Culture. Consider, in particular, his Stalinoid survey of the Vietnam coverage of the New York Times from October 3 to December 4, 1963 (in this paperback edition, pp.82-83). One omission, among many, will suffice.
On October 3, 1963, the NYT carried a column entitled "The Intra-Administration War In Vietnam." It opened: "The Central Intelligence Agency is getting a very bad press in despatches from Vietnam..."
Its author, Arthur Krock, proceeded to quote extensively from one such despatch, "Arrogant CIA Disobeys Orders in Vietnam", by Richard Starnes of the Scripps-Howard group. The quotes below are from Starnes's courageous and hauntingly prophetic original.
According to Starnes's source, "Twice the CIA flatly refused to carry out instructions from Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge", even though one set had been brought direct from Washington. Likening the CIA's growth to a "malignancy", which he was "not sure event the White House could control any longer", the source predicted: "If the United States ever experiences a Seven Days in May it will come from the CIA" (Washington Daily News, October 2).
Chomsky was, and remains, the creation and creature of the Central Intelligence Agency. Rethinking Camelot represented the cashing of the CIA's most important dissident chip in its unending war against both genuine dissent, and JFK's memory. It is a measure of the fear, corruption and cowardice prevalent in mainstream Anglo-American academia and media that Chomsky's imposture has gone unchallenged for so long.
Mixed bag.......2002-08-16
Just finished reading this book and found the portion
debunking JFK idolators' revisionist history to be well done,
although rather long winded. The rest of the book is pure paranoia - I was alive during the Vietnam buildup and well remember the motives that led to intervention. Surprisingly,
Chomsky attributes dark motives to practically everything
the US did during those times, and virtually never touches on the motives most often at play - the defeat and containment of Communism, which at times looked as though it was going to win.
Chomsky seems to think that Communism was essentially just a sort of ultra socialism. That is his biggest error in the book:
a severe naivete about what Communism was and why much was sacrificed to ensure that it didn't envelope the planet. In other words, he displays an extreme case of tunnel vision.
Chomsky Critiques Camelot!.......2001-04-27
Excellent overview of the relationship between American political/corporate culture and the origens of the Vietnam War. In this case, Chomsky looks at the historical revisionism that clouded the discourse on the assassination of JFK. The book does not debunk the notion that a conspiracy in Dallas occurred; rather the emphasis is on how JFK simply continued (and, in some cases,expanded) the basic thrust of American foreign policy. Using mostly the internal record, Chomsky details JFK and his virulent hawkish and anti-communist ideology, a fact which Camelot propogandists attempt to hide or minimize. Once again, the point is to highlight the reality: a single political party exists today to do the bidding for the corporate sector (of which the military-industrial complex is a large component). Remember, JFK had increased defense spending and forced through a great deal of pro-corporate legislation (while also dragging his heels on Civil Rights legislation and scolding the Warren Court for its progressive leanings) prior to the assassination. All in all, another worthy contribution from one of the great American intellectuals of the 20th century.
Closer to Insanity.......2000-04-10
What is missing from Chomsky's book is the notion that if anyone told JFK right to his face precisely what the United States was going to do in Nam for the following ten years (I think George Ball tried to do this), the president himself wouldn't have believed it, and could have told him, "You're crazy . . . " (as I remember this, the president expressed himself with an expletive) and really meant it. Anyone who thinks that American policy in Vietnam ever made sense is underestimating the ability of the government to lie whenever it is trying to picture what its national honor adds up to in evens and odds. I knew that something was crazy when I read in Rethinking Camelot that John Newman had written a letter to "The Nation" in which he said, "Let's get serious." Actually, the policy always begged to be compared with some outrageous joke, and "The Nation" has been great at coming up with jokes (I have even read the admission by Calvin Trillin that he used jokes in his column) to match such situations. Possibly the funniest thing that I ever read just showed up again in the April 10, 2000 issue of "The Nation," in a book review by John Leonard. "It's worth recalling that when Freud finally got permission to leave Vienna in 1938, the Gestapo obliged him to sign a certificate saying that he had been well treated by the authorities. He added a sentence of his own: 'I can heartily recommend the Gestapo to anyone.'" (p. 26) American policy in Vietnam was always a dream of imposing that kind of order in a country in which a majority of the people were not Americans, and might even try to kill Americans, if you want to know the truth. I can name one Kennedy adviser who was willing to tell LBJ in November, 1965, that the odds were about even that things were getting worse in Vietnam, and were going to get a lot worse as the plans at that stage were implemented, but he wouldn't have even been keeping his job if he told everybody what he thought. I'm actually glad McNamara didn't resign in protest, because he knew that other people could do his job worse than he could, and he was willing to sacrifice himself to save the country from the kind of stupidity that was assumed for anyone in his position, of which he was highly aware.
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Rethinking Resistance: Revolt and Violence in African History (African Dynamics, 2)
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