Civil War Generalship: The Art of Command

Book Description

First time in paperback: An incisive analysis of tactics and command during the Civil War-"a fresh approach" (John S.D. Eisenhower) to a topic of never-diminishing interest

In this original examination of Civil War leadership, W.J. Wood looks at the tactical and strategic problems faced by commanders by focusing on three decisive battles and the six generals involved in each one. The Charlotte Observer hailed the way Wood "has interwoven drama, anecdotes, humor, and human glimpses of these commanders" and called the book "gripping." Wood analyzes the campaign at Cedar Mountain, directed by Stonewall Jackson and Nathaniel Banks; the battle of Chickamauga, commanded by Braxton Bragg and William Rosecrans; and the battle of Nashville, where John Bell Hood engaged opponent George H. Thomas-deftly describing the art of war these men developed, an art that still provides paradigms for military leaders today.

Customer Reviews:

Stonewall, Banks, Old Rosy, Bragg, The Gallant Hood, and The Rock.......2006-04-01

CIVIL WAR GENERALSHIP is a treatise on the nature of military command leadership written for the popular market. To make his case, author W.J. Wood, an ex-Army war gamer for weapons system analysis, focuses on three battles: Cedar Mountain in August 1862 between commanders Thomas "Stonewall" Jackson and Nathaniel Banks, Chickamauga in September 1863 between commanders Braxton Bragg and William "Old Rosy" Rosecrans, and Nashville in December 1864 between commanders John Hood ("The Gallant Hood") and George Thomas ("The Rock of Chickamauga").

In a prefatory Part One of the book, Wood pretty much establishes the lack of any formalized pre-Civil War military thought in the U.S. Army as to how battles should be fought and won. West Point, attended by all the aforementioned commanders except Banks, focused mainly on engineering; during the four-year curriculum, only nine hours were devoted to battlefield tactics. Thus, the army commander had to learn his skills through on-the-job combat experience during his ascent through the command structure.

As a reader possessing a casual interest in the Civil War history, I can find only minimal fault with this brief (245 paperbacked pages) treatment of the topic. Indeed, the concise and lucid summaries of the three selected battles, each one supplemented by more than adequate maps, were, for me, even more valuable than Wood's dissection of the leadership skills displayed by each of the six protagonists. After all, a century and a half after the War Between the States, the battles of Cedar Mountain, Chickamauga, and Nashville are sometimes lost against the backdrop of confrontations considered more pivotal to the final outcome, e.g. Vicksburg, Gettysburg, or Appomattox, or simply more high profile, e.g. Shiloh, Antietam, Chancellorsville, Fredericksburg, or Cold Harbor.

At no point does the author explain why he chose these three particular battles and their opposing generals for his book. By definition, each commander had to be exercising independent field command of an army at the time. And perhaps his choice of battles was unconsciously limited to those not including Grant, McClellan, Lee, and Sherman, whose names pop up with consistent regularity in popular Civil War history and whose careers have been fields well-plowed by historians.

Wood's examination of the characters and personality traits of Jackson, Banks, Bragg, Rosecrans, Hood, and Thomas adds an endearing human element to the work as a whole. It also leads to my only minor criticism of the book, which is that no epilogue describing the post-battle careers of the six is included. Jackson, of course, was mortally wounded by friendly fire at Chancellorsville, but the remaining five, as far as I know, survived the Civil War, and it would be nice to know what happened to them without having to resort to further research.

A good review of essential leadership qualities.......2005-08-15

Expecting to find another book on strategy and tactics, I was surprised that the major theme of this well-written book involved the personal characteristics that make a successful general.

At some point in the book, Wood emphasizes to the reader that the general is not a "manager." However, the graduates of business school programs will be quick to point out that the qualities surveyed in the book are also essentials in successful business leaders.

The generals are rated on such points as subordinate selection, ability to delegate but yet remain in control, clearly - defined missions but flexibility in attaining them, ability to view the situation within a "big-picture" context, efficient use of resources, clarity of orders and other communications, ability to work within the existing political environment, a firm but positive leadership style, and creative decisions within the constraints imposed by reality. All of the 6 generals come off with mixed reviews with respect to these criteria, although George Thomas receives a well-deserved favorable evaluation and some of Stonewall's flaws are pointed out. One thing that ran through my mind as I was reading this book was that all of the favorable traits exhibited by a great leader seem to be a composite of a man little-mentioned by the author - General Grant.

This book provides much insight into the human aspect of military leadership and is useful to the reader in better understanding any generals and their level of success.

For specialists only, but wonderful.......2004-09-11

This is not your usual Civil War History book. W.J. Wood is uninterested, here, in discussing the course of the Civil War itself, or its battles and capaigns. Instead, Wood wants to examine how Generals controlled their armies, or didn't, and the decision-making process that led to the battles came out.

The result is a book where the author studies three battles from the Civil War: Cedar Mountain in 1862, Chickamauga in 1863, and Nashville in 1864. The author spends much of his time laying out the military situation that confronted the opposing generals, and then briefly recounts the course of the battle, the decisions made, and the outcomes. The three battles involved some interesting personalities in command of the armies, and so the results are rather interesting, also.

Cedar Mountain involved Stonewall Jackson and Nathaniel Banks. The interesting thing here is that Banks doesn't come out as badly as you might imagine, nor Jackson as favorably. Chickamauga saw Braxton Bragg and William Rosecrans face off: both were unsuited for high command at some level, and are duly criticized. Nashville of course was the last hurrah of John Bell Hood, opposite the rocklike George Thomas. This one's not unexpected: Thomas comes out brilliant, while Hood turns out to be an idiot.

All three of these battles are interesting, and Wood advocates an analytical approach that favors what I call ruthless pragmatism. This works well, and I enjoyed the book, finding it worthwhile and the observations inside to be very interesting.

The War Within the Union High Command: Politics and Generalship During the Civil War (Modern War Studies)

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Overkill

The War Within the Union High Command: Politics and Generalship During the Civil War (Modern War Studies)
Thomas Joseph Goss
Manufacturer: University Press of Kansas
ProductGroup: Book
Binding: Hardcover

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ASIN: 0700612637

Book Description

With Union armies poised to launch the final campaigns against the Confederacy in 1864, three of its five commanders were "political generals"--appointed officers with little or no military training. Army chief of staff Henry Halleck thought such generals jeopardized the lives of men under their command and he and his peers held them in utter contempt. Historians have largely followed suit.

Thomas Goss, however, offers a new and more positive assessment of the leadership qualities of these Northern commanders. In the process, he cuts through the stereotypes of political generals as superfluous and largely inept tacticians, ambitious schemers, and military failures. Goss examines the reasons why the selection process yielded so many generals who lacked military backgrounds and explores the tense and often bitter relationships among political and professional officers to illuminate the dynamics of Union generalship during the war. As this book reveals, professional generals viewed the war as a military problem requiring battlefield solutions, while appointees (and President Lincoln) focused more emphatically on the broader political contours of the struggle. The resulting friction often eroded Northern morale and damaged the North's war effort.

Goss challenges the traditional idea that success was measured only on the battlefield by demonstrating significant links between military success and the achievement of the Union's political objectives. Examining commanders like Benjamin Butler, Nathaniel Banks, John McClernand, John Fremont, and Franz Sigel, Goss shows how many filled vital functions by raising troops, boosting homefront morale, securing national support for the war--and sometimes even achieving significant success on the battlefield. Comparing these generals with their professional counterparts reveals that all had vital roles to play in helping Lincoln prosecute the war and that West Pointers, despite their military training, were not necessarily better prepared for waging war.

Whether professional or appointed, Goss reminds us, all generals could be considered political inasmuch as war is a continuation of politics by other means. He shows us that far more was asked of Union commanders than to simply win battles and in so doing urges a new appreciation of those appointed leaders who were thrust into the maelstrom of the Civil War.

This book is part of the Modern War Studies series.

Customer Reviews:

Overkill.......2004-01-18

The author takes 210 pages to come to a conclusion that is apparant after 50. The same information is repeated time after time until the reader can close one's eyes and know the next line (or at least the one after) will mention Banks or Butler or Logan, with nothing that has not already been said about any of them.

Civil War Command And Strategy: The Process Of Victory And Defeat

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A New Look at an Old War
Good facts, Poor analysis

Civil War Command And Strategy: The Process Of Victory And Defeat
Archer Jones
Manufacturer: Free Press
ProductGroup: Book
Binding: Hardcover

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ASIN: 0029166357

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A New Look at an Old War.......2006-01-21

Archer Jones's book Civil War Command and Strategy breaks the war down into its elemental strategic pieces and analyzes and explains the how and why the Civil War was fought the way it was. By breaking the process of victory and defeat down into several important themes Jones destroys many common misguided beliefs and puts the war into a proper perspective that is not clouded by anachronism.
When I teach the Civil War to my 8th grade students I find that I am guilty of unjustly criticizing many union and confederate generals for being too cautious, stupid, ignorant, or foolhardy. That is because I did not look at their situation from their perspective. I was guilty of applying modern standards of war to their actions. By following Jones's contention that "by grounding [my] understanding of the war in the art of war as the participants knew it, this work of military history adopts a good vantage point for understanding and evaluating their performance." Through this boo I have developed a new found respect and understanding for many civil war commanders who previously earned by contempt. In addition, Jones's book addressed many of the common civil war clichés found in textbooks and narratives that fail to address the reality of the war: the effect of the blockade, the impact of the extended range of the rifles, the poor supply of the confederate troops, the damage of states rights, and the general incompetence of the generals all seem to need a thorough reworking.
Jones reworks these beliefs throughout his book by addressing the war in a chronological manner and assigning each phase of it a different theme. A dominate theme of Jones throughout the book is the relative equality of both sides. From the presidents to the troops the war was more a battle of doppelgangers than unique adversaries. Despite Davis and Lincoln's differences in military experiences they both ultimately functioned as very competent war time leaders. Davis had a deep and natural military ability fostered by years in the army and graduation from West Point. Lincoln had no military experience but devoted himself to learning everything he could and found capable advisors such as Scott and Halleck. Both were not afraid to make the hard decisions and were willing to let their generals do their jobs without to much political interference. In this latter appraisal many still claim Davis was an arrogant hands-on commander-in-chief but, in reality, his orders were infrequent and usually for the best such as his order to Johnston to reinforce Beauregard at Manassas. Davis also had little need to interfere as he made many quality appointments that were based on military necessity and not, as Lincoln had to do, on political necessity. And even Lincoln stopped trying to influence his generals once he found one with ability, namely Meade.
A second theme discusses the concentration of troops in time and space. This very Napoleonic strategy of massing troops at the point of contact with the enemy found a home in the Confederate strategy. From the first battle of Manassas the Southern command used the telegraph and railroad to respond to Federal advances. Such technology went a long way to mitigating the disadvantage of trying to defend such a huge area. Nowhere was this better performed than at Shiloh where troops from 800 miles away were concentrated in time to fight in the two day battle. While the confederates effectively used their interior lines to concentrate in space the Federals tried to counter this with concentration of time. By launching simultaneous attacks at different points Confederates found that they were unable to pull troops from one area to concentrate in another. At the battle of Stones River the Confederates were caught at a disadvantage when one of their divisions was caught in transit and unable to help in either battle. But both strategies had their problems. Concentration on interior lines is still depended on quality railroads (that the south had in short supply) and quality maps (that were almost nonexistent) to move the troops in a timely manner. Concentration in time requires a harmony of logistics and command that just did not exists in the Union. While both strategies were useful they needed to be augmented by other less elaborate strategies.
While much hoopla has been given to the foolhardy frontal assaults of Burnside at Fredericksburg and Lee at Gettysburg Jones points out that it was the strategic turning movement that was the mainstay of the civil war battlefield. While the tactical turn had been negated by the flexibility and firepower of the new infantry regiment, the strategic turn was the answer to the supremacy of the tactical defense. The failures of Burnside and Lee are just illustrations of the futility of a frontal assault. To overcome the entrenched defender the savvy civil war general simply moved his army to the rear of the entrenchment or defensive line. At Chanslorsville, Hooker turned Lee's entrenched flank only to be turned by a mobile Lee in response. Hooker, once again facing a frontal assault and not a flank attack wisely withdrew.
Jones explains that the threat of a turning movement not only caused armies to move and abandon their defensive positions but also had the possibility to force the defender into an attack thus giving the turning force the advantage of the tactical defense. It was this theory that motivated McClellan to try to turn Richmond on the Peninsula. Indeed, from the Seven Days to Cold Harbor it was the strategic turning movement that dominated strategy on both sides.
Another strategy illustrated in the book was the raid. The raid found use on both sides during the war but for different reasons. The confederacy used the raid as a defective weapon to slow, stop, or redirect Union forces. The raid was particularly effective because of the heavy reliance that the Union forces had on their supply lines. The Confederacy found many ways to exploit this weakness; like guerrilla raids such as those in Tennessee, organized cavalry raids like those of Forest, and raids in force such as Lee's two invasions into Pennsylvania. It was to the Confederacy's dismay that Davis has trouble grasping the usefulness of such a strategy. For without theater support such activities were left to regional commands and were not as successful as they could have been.
It was not until the last years of the war that the North took to raiding as a military policy. And when they did it is for offensive purposes as opposed the South's defensive ones. Grant decided to abandon the stalemated territory acquisition approach to conquering the South and instead turned to raids that would destroy the South's infrastructure. Sherman's Mississippi and Georgia campaign are excellent example of the policy in effect.
Jones's book did a fantastic job of putting the command and strategy of the civil war into its proper context. In addition to its well documented challenges to many civil war myths and clichés, the reader will be treated to a firmer grasp on the reasons behind the commander's decisions and why the strategy on both sides developed the way it did. For those looking for a unique and interesting take on the civil war Archer Jones's Civil War Command and Strategy is worth the time.

Good facts, Poor analysis.......2005-05-01

This book has some good points in it, most notably that it was really much more difficult for the north to win the war, and that overall the sides were basically evenly-matched, which is a rare but relatively valid assessment. The books judgment of the generals and some of the other leaders, mostly Davis and Lincoln, are more puzzling. He states that Davis recognized that Bragg was inadequate, but did not know who to replace him with. Perhaps this is true, but the author does not document anything, and it runs contrary to everything else I have read.

The author also contradicts himself in the book, saying that Lincoln did not believe that the northern armies had to attack and destroy the other armies to win the war, but then the author provides evidence to the contrary, justifying his conclusion by saying that Lincoln never gave orders to other commanders. One could just as easily argue several other points, especially if no sourcing is required, only conjecture. Even if the authors assertion is true, it ignores the fact that Lincoln did in fact set the ANV as the main objective in the east.

The author also falsely assumes that the destruction of an army was impossible. This most probably comes due to a further false assumption of why the Battle of Second Mannasas was lost. The author contends that Longstreet's (very delayed) flank attack failed to result in a decisive victory because "Pope, exploiting the excellent articulation and responsiveness of his now-veteran troops, succeeded in bending his line into an arc." This is, of course, ridiculous to anyone who has studied the campaign in detail. The only reason Pope was not totally annihilated was because darkness fell, and the Confederate advance stopped. It had very little to do with anything on Pope's part. If the attack had come any sooner, Pope's army would have been destroyed.

The author's views on Halleck are somewhat more believable, based more on actual fact, even if many will disagree with his assessment of Halleck, which is as a brilliant overall strategist and soldier. Of course, this is somewhat off set by the fact that the author seems to call every general he mentions a strategic genius, making the term seem somewhat worthless, and muddying just what exactly the author feels the best strategies were. He seems to criticize and praise the same strategies in alternate places, although perhaps he is simply not being clear enough. This reviewer, however, being not as well acquainted with regards to the pros and cons of Halleck and his actions, is not qualified to discuss the strengths and weaknesses of this author's arguments.

He also sees pursuit as a "myth" and a bad practice, although his idea of pursuit seems to be rather unconventional. He fails to show just why it is a myth, instead giving examples of pursuits that failed. This may sound as though it in fact gives credit to the author's position, but one pursuit he sites as proving the folly of pursuit is the battle of Winchester, where the pursuit failed because Ashby's cavalry were not around to conduct it. Instead, the author seems to define pursuit as chasing infantry with infantry, which in some cases will be good, and others will not, depending on the state of the pursuing army. Napoleon rolled the Prussian army across Europe by a pursuit as defined by this author, although the author seems to have neglected this. Anyone who has studied the Campaigns of Nathan Bedford Forrest will realize that a pursuit is a very effective weapon if conducted properly.

This belief lead the author to an even muddier conclusion, though it is grounded in solid fact. The author rightly notes that many of Lee's victories were costly frontal assaults, which gave him little in terms of results. He then seems to advocate that battles were thusly not important to the war, they were not decisive, and could not be decisive. This is faulty logic, however, based mostly on his previous faulty conclusions. His believe that pursuit was a myth and a poor strategy, as noted are based on a few isolated incidents. The author contends that Lee acknowledged the folly of pursuit, when the reality is probably more along the lines of his lack of understanding the power of a successful pursuit, which is more likely considering Lee's misuse of cavalry in nearly every engagement. As Clausewitz said, "The importance of the victory is chiefly determined by the vigor with which the immediate pursuit is carried out. In other words, pursuit makes up the second act of the victory and in many cases is more important than the first." The victories seemed so meaningless due to the fact that a pursuit was hardly ever employed, much less a vigorous one. A single battle had an incredible potential politically, but it had to be decisive and mostly total, something which only an effective pursuit (after all, where is the folly in continuing to pressure a beaten foe? Why allow him to recover if you yourself are perfectly capable of keeping him on a disorganized retreat?) or trapping of a Union army by cutting off its escape route could bring about. (This latter strategy Lee had the opportunity to attempt on his Gettysburg campaign, but his lacking this vision led instead to the opposite of what might have happened. He also had such an opportunity at 2nd Mannasas, during the battle itself, and also beforehand, when Pope had placed himself in such a precarious situation that annihilation would have been perhaps the only result if Lee had only carried out the necessary maneuver. At Chancellorsville, the enemy escaped due only to the wounding of Jackson and then immediately afterward of Hill.) Contrary to the author's statements, a field army could most certainly have been destroyed. Remarkably, the author surveys the previous wars to the 1700s, and while there is in fact an example of an army being destroyed, concludes that such a scenario is virtually impossible. Apparently, the author failed to observe the possibilities that came about in the civil war, which showed that it was quite possible indeed. Saying this may sound like a step into judgment in hindsight, but at the time the potential was recognized by Stonewall Jackson at and before 2nd Mannasas, but not by Lee, who was in overall command. The author also recognizes the fact that the weaponry was far more deadly than in the past, but fails to see how such weaponry would aide in such a trap. The trapped army would have almost no hope of escape considering how ineffective the frontal assault is. And the effect politically of such a defeat would likely be sufficient to bring victory. It was, however, a strategy which only a very few understood, and Lee was not one of them.

The fact that Lee's victories appeared so meaningless is due mostly to the fact that many of them were hardly victories at all, and that none of them were carried out in such a manner to make them decisive. (Due mostly to Lee, not to any impossibility of doing it) They were consistently pyrrhic victories which hurt his army without actually helping his cause. After all, the Union army was still there just as much as the Confederate and such continually pyrrhic victories hardly had any effect at all politically. The fact that Britain and France were on the verge of recognition further gives credence to the fact that all Lee needed was a decisive victory. His victories prior to Antietam were not overly impressive in actuality, but still nearly led to recognition and an end to the war. Lee was no superior military genius, and whenever his victories actually had any potential, he totally failed in following up on and in following through with them.

Against the author's opinion, the war could well have been won on the battlefield. Many of the wars victories had seemingly small effect because they were hardly victories at all, with each side suffering similarly. To contend because of this that the war could not be won in battle with the enemy is pure folly, and ignores the very real and almost simple opportunities missed.

The book covers raiding in a somewhat new light, giving it probably more credit than it is due, but still giving it better recognition than is usually the case. Generally good here.

The author does in fact point out many things which are contrary to popular opinion but which are in fact quite valid, but draws faulty conclusions from nearly all of his new insights.

He does, however, give too much credit to Lee, who engaged in numerous frontal attacks. He states that Lee had learned his lesson after the seven days, but this is difficult to reconcile with the record. While Lee did not conduct as many frontal attacks later, there were some, such as the most brutal at Gettysburg, but also similar actions later at the Wilderness and into 1864. Even when Lee finally learned (or more likely was forced onto it because he had destroyed his army) the lesson of the strong defense near the end of the war, he always sought to go back over to the offensive. It is debatable whether Lee ever really learned the lesson or not, especially considering victories such as 2nd Mannasas and Chancellorsville were successes due more to his lieutenants than actually to Lee. With Jackson gone, Longstreet could not dissuade him from his frontal attacks, and Lee reverted right back into them, and at Gettysburg it was worse than anything on the Peninsula.

As a final note, the author fails in his assessment of Lee's position at Gettysburg, saying that if he were to threaten a city such as Baltimore after a victory at Gettysburg, he would have no way of retreating south later, and that he would be laid siege by the AoP. This, of course, does not address the whole issue. If Lee were to have won a battle on northern soil, and then proceeded to threaten a city, Lee would not have had to retreat south, as the war would end. Such a move would cause panic among the civilian populace, and even a President such as Lincoln cannot ignore public opinion indefinitely. This authors opinion of such a threat rests on a faulty assumption on his part. Lee's army would not have to capture the city, and thusly would not be put under a Vicksburg-like siege. Instead, it would constitute cutting rail lines and the food supply to the city and damaging northern industry. This is sound doctrine, and is quite in line with what Clauswitz said concerning such civil wars. The only basis that the author seems to have suggesting that Lee would have to retreat is one of logistics and that Lee could not have supplied his army for any length of time. This fails in that an extended length of time would not have been required. The Union army would not be at leisure to follow at its own, pace, but would instead engage in a foot race after Lee's army. Lee could choose his own ground anywhere on the way to Pennsylvania, and fought a battle he knew he could win. This, of course, would in any likelihood end the war. Such a logistical objection also fails to note that even when Lee lost horribly at Gettysburg, he was able to forage for a week or so afterward before he eventually went south, and not even because of supplies. Supplies were not going to cause the defeat of Lee's army. His cavalry were perfectly capable of foraging and there would be plentiful food as he moved to Philadelphia.

The biggest assumption the author makes is that all battles are equal. This leads to many faulty conclusions about the war winning potential of some battles in relation to others. A battle above Philadelphia would have a monumental effect on the north and end the war, as would the destruction of a Union army.

Overall, the book is forcefully written, but only convincing if you know little of much of the strategy and political situation of the time. It simply fails in too many respects.

The American Civil War and the Origins of Modern Warfare: Ideas, Organization, and Field Command (A Midland Book)

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Why CW combat degraded into trench warfare
One for the specialist ...

The American Civil War and the Origins of Modern Warfare: Ideas, Organization, and Field Command (A Midland Book)
Edward Hagerman
Manufacturer: Indiana Univ Pr
ProductGroup: Book
Binding: Hardcover

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ASIN: 0253305462

Customer Reviews:

Why CW combat degraded into trench warfare.......2006-03-13

While author Edward Hagerman agrees with the questionable assumption that the rifled musket transformed warfare by strengthening the defense, he takes a broad view to explain why Civil War combat degraded into trench warfare. Hagerman stresses Mahan's doctrine of using field fortifications in one area in order to allow maneuver elsewhere on the battlefield. Lower population density than Europe meant that Napoleonic logistics assumptions were completely inadequate. Making frequent mention of an army's wagons per 1,000 men, as well as the distance it could march from its railhead, the author shows how wide ranging maneuver was impractical, forcing all commanders, but Lee in particular, to confront his adversary directly. The author also states that American ideology prevented staff development, which combined with generally poor use of signals and the telegraph, helped lead to indecisive combat. As a result of all these factors, Civil War combat was indecisive, and trench warfare was the inevitable result. Minimal mention is made of the failure of Civil War armies to make combined use of infantry with cavalry. This could be explained by the author's conclusion, without discussing weapons in any meaningful way, that the rifle musket was a significant improvement over smoothbores. The book is strongest on the Army of the Potomac, and some of the author's conclusions are questionable, but the book is full of thought provoking insight and is well worth reading. It is an invaluable addition to our understanding of the war. Unfortunately, a conclusion, which could have made his thoughts more clear, is not given, and the book ends abruptly. Although it is well written, the book may not appeal to beginning Civil War buffs.

One for the specialist ..........2000-10-24

I enjoyed this book, but must admit it comes behind Archer Jones, Bruce Catton, Peter Cozzens, Paddy Griffith and the other great historians who have tackled military aspects of the Civil War. It is rather dry, but one can see how the US army became one of the best equipped armies in history with an enormous logistical 'tail' compared to (say) the Russian, Chinese or British armies. What Hagerman showed for me the falsity of the claim that the Civil War was the first 'modern' war - e.g. while railways were important, away from the railhead, the armies depended on horses and oxen, much as Napoleon did. McClellan does emerge as somewhat of an innovator in his proposal for 'flying columns' living off light rations. Oddly enough, Grant put this experiment to an end when he became commanding General - perhaps he felt that with such hard fighting ahead, it might be unwise to cut the amount and variety of rations. Similarly, while there were innovations in staff organisations (Jackson, for example, make very effective use of his staff), there was no revolution such as was then taking place in the Prussian army. I suppose the Civil War was on the 'cusp' of a military revolution - neither exactly the last of the old wars, not the first of the new. An engaging book, but one for the specialist, I'm afraid.

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The Art of Command in the Civil War

Manufacturer: University of Nebraska Press
ProductGroup: Book
Binding: Hardcover

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ASIN: 0803247850

Book Description

The military history of the Civil War has tended to focus on such issues as tactics, courage under fire, and which leader was capable of the bold stroke (Lee) and which one wasn’t (McClellan). Overlooked in these important issues is the matter of command itself: mastery of the resources required for successful military action. In this work seven experts examine particular instances of command problems—such as supply, military discipline, and effective relations with subordinate commanders—and show how a general’s handling of the problem illustrates an important feature of Civil War leadership.

Reflections of a Civil War Historian: Essays on Leadership, Society, and the Art of War

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Reflections of a Civil War Historian: Essays on Leadership, Society, and the Art of War
Herman Hattaway
Manufacturer: University of Missouri Press
ProductGroup: Book
Binding: Hardcover

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ASIN: 0826214878

Book Description

This collection of essays is a compendium of Herman Hattaway's writings from throughout his more-than-forty-year career. Hattaway is a captivating historian who always seeks to engage others in the study of history. He has made many important scholarly contributions to our understanding of the Civil War, including new information on the military use of balloons, the relevance of religion in warfare, and the nature of good (and bad) military leadership. This book will appeal to the many historians and others who have been influenced by Hattaway over the years. It demonstrates how he has evolved as a historian and brings to light many essays that were never before published or published only in obscure journals.

Book Description

This digital document is an article from Journal of Southern History, published by Southern Historical Association on August 1, 2000. The length of the article is 1015 words. The page length shown above is based on a typical 300-word page. The article is delivered in HTML format and is available in your Amazon.com Digital Locker immediately after purchase. You can view it with any web browser.

Citation Details
Title: The Art of Command in the Civil War.
Author: Edward J. Hagerty
Publication: Journal of Southern History (Refereed)
Date: August 1, 2000
Publisher: Southern Historical Association
Volume: 66 Issue: 3 Page: 640

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CIVIL WAR GENERALSHIP: The Art of Command

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CIVIL WAR GENERALSHIP: The Art of Command
W. J. (New copy) Wood
Manufacturer: Da Capo
ProductGroup: Book
Binding: Paperback
ASIN: B000OSNFXC

Student report / Air Command and Staff College, Air University

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Student report / Air Command and Staff College, Air University
Peter N Blaufarb
Manufacturer: Air Command and Staff College, Air University
ProductGroup: Book
Binding: Unknown Binding

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