How Democracies Lose Small Wars: State, Society, and the Failures of France in Algeria, Israel in Lebanon, and the United States in Vietnam

Book Description

Gil Merom argues that modern democracies fail in insurgency wars because they are unable to find a winning balance between expedient and moral tolerance for the costs of war. Small wars are lost at home when a critical minority shifts the balancing element from the battlefield to the marketplace of ideas. This minority, representing the educated middle class, abhors the brutality involved in effective counterinsurgency, but also refuses to sustain the level of casualties resulting from fighting in other ways.

Customer Reviews:

They're not "Small Wars" if you live there. . ........2005-06-04

Merom's book, and Lusavardi's review essay which endorses it, share a subscription to an unhappy intellectual current: "the stab in the back" -- the idea that a worthwhile military effort is undermined by "intellectuals" back home, and that if we'd only been able to "take the gloves off" and be just a bit more brutal -as demanded by circumstances, of course-- then everything would have turned out OK.

But this analysis is both wrong, and a pretext for the suppression of dissent. One of the characteristics of all three of the wars that Merom covers is that they were long, far longer than the American Civil War, and than American involvelment in WWII. The length of these involvements alone belies the argument that if only "a little more time, or more men" had been expended then the outcome would have been different.

What they also share in common --and share with Iraq-- is that they were at best marginally legitimate. None of these "wars" included a declaration of war, nor the political unity that such a declarations require-- Begin's invasion of Lebanon was regarded as illegal by the international community, and unwise by many Israelis. The "casus foederis" for America's Vietnam excursion, the "Gulf of Tonkin Incident" was as authentic as Saddam's Weapons of Mass Destruction. And France wished to maintain as French an Arab Muslim territory which didn't desire it at a time when the international community --prominently including the US-- regarded old Empires as politically illegitimate.

An alternate explanation for why democracies lose such wars is that military political elites, having papered together a thin pretext for intervention, are unable to maintain such rationales against the steady wave of casualties, the hatred for the intervener for their efforts, and the lack of any defined endpoint, but you won't hear that in Merom's book.

Finally, we might add that the brutality argument doesn't wash. Rather brutal nations have failed at counter-insurgency warfare --hard to argue that the Soviets in Afghanistan "kept the gloves on", nor that their successors in Chechnya have either. Conversely, the British did put down an insurgency in Malaya-- one of the classic success stories in counter-insurgency warfare.

Blaming whingeing home-front intellectuals for the strategic errors of those who commit a nation's soldiers to wars without end is tempting, but wrong.

Small Wars Lost At Home Not on Battlefield.......2004-05-15

How Democracy Loses Small Wars is perhaps one of the most-timely, but unrecognized books dealing with the so-called "quagmire" and war prisoner abuse situations the U.S. has encountered in Iraq in 2004. Gil Merom addresses how modern democracies lose small wars against weaker forces. Merom writes that small wars are lost mostly at home not on the battlefield when a highly media-visible minority of the educated upper middle class selectively views with moral revulsion the brutality and casualties necessary to win war. In response, government war leaders resort to repress the ugly realities of war by deceit, censure, and crackdowns, attracting even more media attention.

Merom offers three case studies of the outcomes of small wars: the French Algerian War, the Israeli Lebanon War, and the U.S. Vietnam War. It is not the Vietnam War but the French war against Algerian independence from 1954-60 that may offer the best history lesson for the U.S.-Iraq war. France sought to hold onto its empire and oil and gas resources in a mostly Muslim country. The French had overwhelming military power. There were low casualties. The public supported the war despite concerns about the economy. The conflict entailed mostly urban guerilla warfare where one third of the casualties were due to ambushes. And the war was portrayed as a struggle between "forces of light and those of darkness." Sound familiar? France won the battles but lost the war and had to eventually pull out. Its citizens would no longer tolerate the suppression of wartime abuses by criminalizing the press, the seizing of antiwar literature, and invoking the military draft.

So look for the Iraq war to be lost not in Fallujah or Kandahar, but in Berkeley, Paris, or more lately, in Madrid or Abu Ghraib prison. Look for the war to be lost if U.S. forces resort to war crimes, cover-ups, abuses of the Patriot Act, and succumbing to provocations of anti-war activists. Thus far, the Bush administration has court-martialed those who have committed abuses, has reluctantly admitted to no WMD's rather than attempting a cover up, and have avoided anything like the opinion galvanizing incident of the 1970 Kent State University National Guard killing of student Vietnam anti-war protesters in response to the provocation of burning down the campus ROTC building.

Merom offers good analysis of the interaction between the military and civilian battlefields. His book could have been enhanced by an analysis of how, what sociologists Alvin Gouldner and Peter Berger call the "new class" are able to socially construct the military as comprising the moral low ground. As to the quest for capturing the moral high ground in the Iraq War, perhaps the often self-indulgent anti-war activists could be reminded of the tragic moral consequences of the aftermath of abandoning Vietnam - the Killing Fields, the Boat People émigrés, and the atrocities of Pol Pot in Cambodia.

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Long on small wars, short on airpower

Half political history, half airpower history

How low and slow do you have to fly?

Airpower in Small Wars: Fighting Insurgents and Terrorists (Modern War Studies)
James S. Corum , and Wray R. Johnson
Manufacturer: University Press of Kansas
ProductGroup: Book
Binding: Paperback

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Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice (Third Edition)

Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam

The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century

The Transformation of American Air Power (Cornell Studies in Security Affairs)

Air Power Against Terror: America's Conduct of Operation Enduring Freedom

ASIN: 0700612408

Customer Reviews:

Long on small wars, short on airpower.......2006-01-19

This was well researched, but despite the title, it did not focus nearly enough on airpower. I also agree with Mr. Cappelli's assessment in his review. There is, however, some knowledge to be gained from the book, as the reader is able to examine some small wars side by side and see which aspects of airpower have consistently worked and which have not. The biggest drawback is the amount of material one has to wade through in order to find the bits where airpower is discussed.

To the authors' credit, the chapter summaries are good, and their conclusions covered in the final chapter are on the mark.

Half political history, half airpower history.......2004-04-29

I bought this book after reading some of the brilliant articles written by James Corum for the USAF official magazine. I rate this book with only two stars, because if one knows the history of various insurgencies of the past, can easily avoid reading half of the pages.
Corum and Johnson did not go deep in details, so the book remains just a general historical overview of the phenomenon of airpower against insurgents, even forgetting some minor wars (Sri Lanka against Tamils, Russia against Chechens, Morocco against Saharawis and so on).
Moreover, in the chapter dedicated to Colombia the two authors give an explicit negative political judgement on Clinton politics and overtly claim an American military intervention in the ongoing Colombian civil war: mixing politics with an academic work is not a good thing.

How low and slow do you have to fly?.......2004-03-04

The ideal aircraft in a counter insurgency war has to be able to fly low and slow enough to detect the insurgents and terrorists. But also have the ability to stay over the target long enough to direct firepower on them, if not fire upon them. While being able to carry the ordnance and have the speed to avoid being hit by ground fire. Does this require several types of aircraft, or is there one that can do it all?

Airpower in Small Wars presents over nine examples of small wars by giving the background of each particular conflict or the origins of each insurgency. The US Marine Corps is credited in the introduction and following chapter, with having greater interest and experience in employing aircraft against insurgencies. While the US Army Air Corps (later to become the USAF) focused on strategic use of airpower. The USMC still emphasizes aviation in its support of ground units with its close-air support doctrine. (Combined Arms Operations).

From the conflicts presented in the book, high performance jet aircraft are not particularly a benefit in the Counter Insurgency or Anti-Terrorist campaigns. And helicopters, though very useful are sussceptible to ground fire and Shoulder fired surface to air missles and Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPGs).

The book also shows the interaction between the US and assisted countries with regard to supplying aircraft, supplies and training in relation to US foreign affairs policies.

Though recent US operations in Afghanistan and Iraq are not covered. The examples presented provide you a frame work to understand the current and past air operations in both countries. The peacekeeping mission in Somalia was not also featured but this is well documented in other books and a smilar analysis frame work can be applied.

Book Description

The threat of terrorism knows no borders, and, given the complexities of today's global system, no nation can afford to stand alone. This study considers the role that international cooperation plays in assisting elite military forces engaged in low-intensity and counter-terrorist operations, particularly hostage rescue efforts. Using historical examples from the experiences of Great Britain and the United States, the author concludes that cooperation (ranging from shared intelligence, to forward base access, to the provision of observers) can provide significant advantages in dealing with low-intensity operations. However, the most fruitful joint efforts involve shared activities by countries that possess a similar threat perception, usually in part a result of a common "sociology" in their view of historical developments. Before turning to modern counter-terrorism, Taillon addresses the respective military experiences of Britain and America within the wider realm of conventional and low-intensity operations. The main Anglo-American focus of the book gives primary importance to the developments and doctrine for the employment of special forces, as well as an analysis of more recent low-intensity and counter-terrorism operations, such as the 1980 Iranian embassy siege in London and the failure, that same year, of the American hostage rescue attempt in Teheran. Taillon hopes to identify and highlight those key aspects of cooperation at an international level which have, at least in part, been absolutely essential to successful counter-terrorist operations in the past and which seem destined to remain so in the future.

Customer Reviews:

A book for students of counter terrorism.......2001-09-17

This is an excellent study of the evolution of British and American counter terrorist CT teams. As well the author provides a well documented and detailed analysis of the problems that have been and continue to be faced by the political and military leaders/operators in hostage type situations. The detail for this study was drawn from interviews with experts and operators in the intelligence and spec ops communities,government and contemporary studies of these incidents, as well as an extensive list of books, historical papers and articles. In short this is not the book for those seeking a quick study of special forces and heroics, but rather a serious study for those professionals in the special operations /intelligence community, as well government leaders and academics who are focused upon the issues relating to terrorism and how to most effectively counter the manifestations of this phenomena.
This book is obviously a product of extensive research and provides the reader with little known insights into the British and American hostage rescue operations in London and Teheran in 1980. There are lots of interesting nuggets in the footnotes predicated obviously to Taillon's extensive research. The author also lays out to the reader an important set of criteria so as to maximize the opportunities for success in future CT operations. From the two hostage rescue case studies (NIMROD/EAGLE CLAW) Taillon draws a number of important lessons learnt, some of which can be tough medicine, particularly if you have any politcal or military biases. Reflecting upon the recent events in New York these lessons appear to require re-learning, particularly the criticality of timely and accurate intelligence.
Overall, this is a superb book authored for professional students of this type of warfare and stands alone as an excellent analysis of what critical issues demand to be taken into account, particularly when the negotiations with the terrorists ends, and the political/military operation, which hostage rescue is, begins. A must read for Delta/ SAS/GSG9 and those interested in special operations and counter terrorism.

extremely disappointing.......2001-04-28

This book comes nowhere near living up to its title. It is an extremely topical discussion of 1) the British and American experience in Counter Insurgency and LIC, and 2) the history of the 22 SAS and the US Army Special Forces. In both cases the author simply re-hashes old and tired arguments in a "cliff - notes" form, never spending enough time on any subject to develop his own thesis. From here he completely changes gears and discusses two hostage rescue operations that have absolutely no relevance to the previous discussion (he makes a big deal about the "fish in the sea" aspect of guerrilla warfare, and how one must win the "hearts and minds" of the locals, and yet chooses to discuss the hostage crisis at Princess Gate for Britain and the American Embassey takeover in Iran for America. In both cases none of the previous discussion about COIN applies. The respective countries could have cared less about the "hearts and minds" of the population surrounding the crisis site.) He then seems to decide he must live up to the description of his book, so in his conclusion he begins to throw out a bunch of thoughts about international cooperation during hostage rescue operations that bears no relevance to the previous discussion, and is so topical it almost appears that he wrote it as an afterthought. Finally, what really took the cake for me was the inaccuracies regarding operations and units in the book. Time and time again he makes the mistake of quoting a newspaper that was inaccurate to begin with, then uses that quote to buttress his argument. Bottom line: This book is not worth [...it]. The title is misleading and the book cannot decide what it wants to discuss. It frenetically skips around from topic to topic with little thread to pull the thoughts together.

Learning from Conflict: The U.S. Military in Vietnam, El Salvador, and the Drug War

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Learning from Conflict: The U.S. Military in Vietnam, El Salvador, and the Drug War
Richard Duncan Downie
Manufacturer: Praeger Publishers
ProductGroup: Book
Binding: Hardcover

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ASIN: 0275960102

Book Description

Why have militaries so often failed to learn from conflict and war? Why, for example, despite years of unsuccessful counterinsurgency experiences in Vietnam and El Salvador and repeated recommendations from official Army studies, has the U.S. Army not changed its doctrine for counterinsurgency? Writing for scholars as well as military professionals and policymakers, Downie examines the sources of doctrinal change and innovation from a theoretical perspective and derives practical and relevant policy recommendations. Contrasting with other findings in this field, Downie provides case studies showing that neither external pressure on a military nor institutional recognition of the requirement for doctrinal change is sufficient to explain the process of doctrinal change. A military innovates when it "learns," by proceeding through a learning cycle that includes achieving an organizational consensus that permits adoption of new approaches that respond to factors that make existing doctrine deficient. When that process is blocked, militaries are left with outmoded doctrinal approaches that constrain military performance and lead to defeat. This is an important study for military leaders, civilian policymakers, and scholars and researchers dealing with contemporary U.S. military issues.

The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power

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a must read for these times
A seductive message, and yet it is wrong...
The perfect mix of analysis, narrative and good writing
War is the last stage of diplomacy but small wars come first
A good overview...

The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power
Max Boot
Manufacturer: Basic Books
ProductGroup: Book
Binding: Hardcover

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ASIN: 0465007201
Release Date: 2002-04-16

Amazon.com

Whether fought for commercial or strategic concessions or even moral reasons, whether little-known or well-publicized, America's "small wars"--against, say, the Barbary pirates and the rebellious Boxers--played a large part in the development of what historian Max Boot does not hesitate to call an American empire. All arguments to the contrary, Boot insists, America has never been an isolationist power; it has "been involved in other countries' internal affairs since at least 1805," when American marines landed on the shores of Tripoli, and it has "never confined the use of force to those situations that meet the narrow definition of American interests preferred by realpolitikers and isolationists." Closely examining the record of those small wars, which far outnumber major conflicts, Boot argues that Americans have a historic duty to deliver foreign nations from aggression, even to intervene in civil wars abroad, especially if the product is greater freedom--for, he writes, "a world of liberal democracies would be a world much more amenable to American interests than any conceivable alternative." Readers may take issue with some of Boot's conclusions, but they merit wide discussion, especially in a time when small--and perhaps large--wars are looming. Boot's book is thus timely, and most instructive. --Gregory McNamee

Book Description

A thrilling account of the forgotten wars of American history, and an eye-opening argument about the military's future role.

Max Boot's new book is a history of those smaller, undeclared wars that, he argues, have always played a key role in American international affairs. This story, he shows, has special relevance to the current "war on terrorism" and the future of American conflicts around the world. Written with a rare eye for both political nuance and real humor, this book introduces us to heroes and exploits from the forgotten side of America's military history. We meet Stephen Decatur, who destroyed a captured American warship under the Pasha of Tripoli's nose, Army Lieutenant George S. Patton, who shot it out, ivory-handled pistol in hand, with Mexican banditos at an isolated hacienda in 1916, and many other fascinating characters.

Boot locates America's failure to win the Vietnam War in the American military's failure to heed the lessons of "small wars" of the past, and warns against repeating this mistake in the future. Reminding us that the small wars of the Clinton presidency--Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo --fit squarely in an established military tradition, The Savage Wars of Peace is a compelling read that also delivers an important new argument about the future of American intervention abroad.

Among the Marines, it was said that Smedley [Butler] was dispatched to the National Palace to obtain [Haitian President] Dartiguenave's signature. The president tried to hide in his bathroom. The Marine waited outside the door for an hour....Growing impatient, Butler walked outside, grabbed a ladder, propped it against the palace wall, and climbed up to the window of the bathroom to discover Dartiguenave sitting on a porcelain commode, fully dressed in pinstriped trousers, morning coat and top hat, smoking a cigar and reading a copy of Petit Parisien. Wasting no time, Butler supposedly leaped through the window to present the treaty and a fountain pen to the startled president. 'Sign here,' he commanded, and the president did. There is no sense inquiring whether this 'gorgeous legend' is literally true;...it gives an accurate flavor of how the U.S.-Haiti Treaty of 1915 came into being.

Customer Reviews:

a must read for these times.......2007-09-28

One of the best books I have read about our (USA) involvement in a surprising amount of insurections and affairs that required more than the State Departments attention.

A seductive message, and yet it is wrong..........2007-07-29

I first read this book several years back, as a young Sergeant. When I first read it, the book seemed to make a lot of good points, and its logic seemed almost ironclad. After having gotten a bit older and a bit wiser, and having been taught at least a few formal critical thinking techniques, I now believe that Mr. Boot's book is pretty much wrong from cover to cover. He basically tells us how great and wonderful our military interventions have been to the world (and to our security), but when you start to look more deeply at his examples (Philipines, Haiti, etcetera) you start to believe that the truth is a lot more complex than he makes it seem.

I am no pacifist, and in many cases our intervention may truely have been unavoidable or have improved things, but the case he makes is almost entirely one sided. Look no further than his analysis of Smedley Butler's change of heart. *sarcasm* Obviously the man simply didn't see "the big picture". After all, a General with decades of experience in the very campaigns Boot cheerleads couldn't possibly be at least somewhat right in his criticisms. */end sarcasm*

I give it two stars because Mr. Boot is a good writer, and he knows how to make his argument seem irrefutable, even when they are very debatable. Just my 2 cents.

The perfect mix of analysis, narrative and good writing.......2007-06-18

The more history I read, the more I admire historians. Writing good history is not easy. You can be overly academic and the book becomes dry and boring, or if one just strings together interesting stories the book lacks intellectual weight.

The Savage Wars of Peace hits the mark. It finds new ways to tell old stories in a new light. Most military history focuses on the big wars and big battles (think D-day and Gettysburg). Many prominent historians have made careers stating the American way of war is based on mass and attrition.

Max Boot takes a different angle. Those "small wars" that pop up in-between the big wars are just as vital to U.S. military history as the big wars. As America looks toward the future of warfare it is looking less like Battle of the Bulge and more like numerous occupations of Haiti. The book carefully moves though American's small wars and demonstrates how similar they are and how regular, irregular warfare really is. The book is very pro-Marine Corps, but they are the ones who fought most of America's small wars and published the now famous "Small Wars Manual" in the late 1930s.

The book was written before the U.S. intervention into Iraq, but it does predict many of its problems. The first half of the book is stronger than the last half, and the last chapter sort of rambles, but it is by far the best military history book I have read this year. Well worth your time.

War is the last stage of diplomacy but small wars come first.......2007-04-23

When I first grabbed Boot's book, I was dreading yet another look at conflicts and was stopped at the first page. Boot's knowledge and depth in the small intensity conflicts of the US from Tripoli to the Banana wars of the 80's, is quite astonishing. Having been an avid reader of military history literature, I was caught surprised to learn something new at nearly every page.

I would offer that most readers need to have a good understanding of the main (or popular) opinion of the times the various events Boot refers to occur. This will help to expand the understanding gained by the reader. However, anyone with an interest in the lesser known acts of "diplomacy" engaged by the US government is well advised to add this book to thier collection.

I did find a certain sense of bias toward the Marine Corps (given that the USMC's focus has been predominantly centered on low-intensity conflicts, this is almost unavoidable). Still, being a former Marine, the read was quite motivational as well.

Given the topics of todays counterinsurgency (COIN) activites, this book will add depth and clarity to small unit leaders as well as policy-makers into the challenges the US faces in the near future. Like it has been said time and again, a firm understanding in the past will shed enlightenment of the future.

A must read.

While not supporting or defending the tactics of guerrilla forces of the past, to gain a first-hand dimension of COIN, consider reading Moshe Dayan: Story of my life. Its a bit older and obviously bias toward what may be considered unpopular (or even deploarable) actions of a nation in engaging in diplommatic conflict, but worth the read nontheless.

A good overview..........2007-02-07

Max Boot's book does a service in covering some lesser known aspects of US military history. The general history of small scale landings/naval activity to protect American citizens and trade is well known to many but some of the more obscure events like unofficial American attempts to control some western Pacific islands make interesting reading. This book covers events from the time of national birth to post Gulf War I.

Mr. Boot's writing style does not bore a reader but gives sufficent detail to elevate the book above a popular history. Especially enlightening are the chapters on the history of US military presense in China, the successful(during the actual occupations)efforts in the Caribbean and Central America and the Philipines.

The ending chapter on the lasting effects of these efforts and the likelihood of future efforts is maybe even more interesting. Agree or not with him, Mr Boot lays out some good arguments for most of these efforts to have been beneficial to both the Americans and the localities concerned. His points on Vietnam while not new, are concise and quite valid. The chapter dealing with the myths concerning US military incursions such as "need for exit strategies", "need for declarations of war", etc are excellent. His points on the current emphasis on force protection/casuality minimization are thought provoking also.

My problems with the book were actually minor. This book is unabashedly pro USMC, given the fact that a majority of the small actions were Marine not Army, this makes sense but to a retired Army infantryman...well its annoying (sorry)

One excellent and overriding point he makes however is this. The Armed Forces have overwhelmingly succeeded in their missions if allowed to do so, generally only homefront political interference, not their erstwhile enemies caused failure. With Iraq raging and an almost as hot a war being waged on the home front on the issue, history might be worth looking at.

Beneath the Visiting Moon: Images of Combat in Southern Africa (Issues in Low-Intensity Conflict Series)

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Well worth the hunt!

Beneath the Visiting Moon: Images of Combat in Southern Africa (Issues in Low-Intensity Conflict Series)
Jim Hooper
Manufacturer: Lexington Books
ProductGroup: Book
Binding: Hardcover

General | Africa | History | Subjects | Books

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ASIN: 0669246379

Customer Reviews:

Well worth the hunt!.......2000-06-02

I found this book many moons ago in a used book rack. Having recently re-read the volume I am again impressed by seeing a view of South Africa's efforts to halt communism in SW Africa/Namibia. Now that apartheid has ended officially, we the rest of the world can see the other side of life in the southern tip of Africa. Mr. Hooper's description of his time with Koevoet is both exciting and in-depth in his examination of the people conducting counter-insurgency against the communist supported SWAPO. A good, fast read that can allow the reader a chance to expand their knowledge of what attrocities were committed by forces in the name of "global marxism." Balance this work with recently released histories on American work against communism. You the reader can now decide with a more balanced view. Not just a war history but a look at why men fight for seemingly unjust causes.

Average customer rating:

Good, but shortsighted

The Future of Warfare
Bevin Alexander
Manufacturer: W W Norton & Co Inc
ProductGroup: Book
Binding: Hardcover

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ASIN: 0393037800

Customer Reviews:

Good, but shortsighted.......2004-03-27

This book opens with and excellent explanation of the vital interests of the United States that would result in war. It goes on to discuss the probable near term trends and development in warfare, with historical examples to explain these trends. If your interest is military history and probable near term military developments, this is an excellent book. I have read several of Bevin Alexander's books and consider him to be a fine and insightful author and historian. As with all of his books, this one could use more maps, as this would greatly facilitate following his explanation of battles and campaigns.
My main criticism is that this book fails to look over the horizon where the future of warfare lies. There is no mention of the military future of space. One of the first commercial applications of space colonization will be to build large solar collectors that could supply the power requirements of our nation. These would have auxiliary uses in warfare. They could be used in varying intensity to raise the temperature of a battlefield or small country from a few dozen, to hundreds of degrees, in order to discourage or kill an adversary. They could also be used indirectly to influence the weather and rainfall on the planet. Another aspect of a space presence is that it results in complete command of the seas. It is extremely expensive to operate our carrier battle groups and they are more vulnerable than purported. This would be unnecessary if we had a military presence in space. From space one can "shoot" asteroids accurately that would strike at approximately 20 times the muzzle velocity of a rifle. These dumb iron asteroids could be sized from a few ounces (with and ablative coating) to millions of tons. They would provide the ability to sink any ship, destroy any bunker, or country on earth. In the airburst mode they would be effective against soft, or small fast targets i.e. tanks, missiles in the boost phase, or troops. Asteroids are cheep and impossible to defend against. These systems would be operated by a small number of people who would be invulnerable to retaliation. In a nutshell, military control of space can result in low cost, uncontestable, absolute, military dominance of the planet. This is the future of warfare and it does not even receive comment in this book.
Another benefit of industrializing space is that it would eliminate another of the causes cited for future wars, namely a monopoly of vital commodities, chromium, cobalt, oil etc. Oil would be less critical if there was limitless cheep electricity from solar power satellites. We could also create synthetic oil or hydrogen using this electric power. All other critical elements should exist in the easily mined moon.
In short a means of obtaining low operational cost, long term military dominance of the planet while at the same time eliminating most of reasons he cites for going to war deserves at least a chapter. But, even given the above, the first chapter alone is worth the price of the book and the time to read it.

Civil Wars, Insecurity, and Intervention

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Civil Wars, Insecurity, and Intervention

Manufacturer: Columbia University Press
ProductGroup: Book
Binding: Paperback

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ASIN: 0231116276

Book Description

Since the end of the cold war, a series of costly civil wars, many of them ethnic conflicts, have dominated the international security agenda. The international community, often acting through the United Nations or regional organizations like NATO, has felt compelled to intervene with military forces in many of these conflicts -- four of which comprise the heart of this book: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Somalia, Cambodia, and Rwanda. Civil Wars, Insecurity, and Intervention is a detailed examination by a host of distinguished scholars of these recent interventions in order to draw lessons for today's policy debates.

The contributors view ethnic conflict and internal war through the prism of the concept of the security dilemma -- a situation in which parties with strong incentives to cooperate wind up nonetheless in bloody competition out of distrust of the opponent. Civil Wars, Insecurity, and Intervention assesses how international intervention can help solve the security dilemma in civil wars by designing political and military arrangements that make security commitments credible to the warring parties. The mixed record of partial successes, failures, and in some cases counterproductive interventions suggests an urgent need to extract lessons with a view toward developing a framework for making future policy choices.

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Where are the congressional reviews and oversights for LIC?

Low Intensity Warfare
Michael Klare
Manufacturer: Pantheon
ProductGroup: Book
Binding: Paperback

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Low-Intensity Conflict: A Guide for Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures

ASIN: 0394746538
Release Date: 1987-12-12

Customer Reviews:

Where are the congressional reviews and oversights for LIC?.......2004-11-22

Low Intensity Warfare covers the historical conflicts of El Salvador, Nicarguia, Afghanistan, Iran, and Iraq. Ronald Reagan was the primary supporter of LIC giving him capablity and power to fight communism. Reagan directive was to contain communism and disprove Breshnev's claim that once communism was establish that it could not be uprooted. The threat of communism in third world countries could not be ignored. The failure of Vietnam could not go unchallenged. LIC provided a way to fight communism. Furthermore, all third world conflicts involving the U.S centered on containment or the eradication of communism from the territory. Media exposure of direct LIC involvement in the country was the first cardinal rule not to break. Secondly, military training and advisement demonstrated support for nations sharing national interest to winning against our enemies. Third, LIC present helped form the political, social, and economic infrastructure of unstable nations.

LIC was marketed as military aid and training for nations that were of national interest. Friendly nations were not suppose to be effected by LIC engagments, however, the global connected nature of nation economies left very few friendly nations uneffected by lethal engagment.

The LIC design was to wage warefare without Congressional approval. Secrecy was the goal and it was not secret to the targeted nations but it was secret for the political advocates who provided funding for LIC operations. Hundreds of millions of dollars were funneled into LIC. The method employeed were designed too effect the political, economic, and social structure by "winning the hearts and minds" of the people. Statements like "that is war" blanked the issues and attrocities of LIC engagements. LIC engagements were design to strike fast, be invisible to the world censorship, and shift power balances and alignment.

So the government trained men on how to win the hearts and minds of the people giving them a edge to secular influence third world governments. The effect of this objective secularism did not work correctly. Instead these men gained power over these small countries and ruled repressively. These men used unethical means to gain power and ruled as dictators and replacing a repressive government with and more repressive government dictator. The U.S. government realized the program did not work, so they retracted the training and changed the plan to insurgence.

One is left to wonder how Congress did not hear about each LIC mission and result. Congress did not have oversight committees to monitor LIC activities. Should Congress be increased in size to manage all the insurgency operations through out the world? Accountablity should not go unmonitored by congress. Congressmen should be debating the ethical and national interest served by LIC operations and cancel any operation not meeting these guidelines. Any constitutional or civil liberty violated by LIC operations should be prosecuted by the government.

LIC operations are governed by the constitution or civil liberties laws. Instead, the follow a secular logical designed to help them achieve their objectives and the only secular objective and directive is to win at any cost. So the means are justified because the ends destroy communism.

For example, in Nicarguia, SOF attacked fuel supplies and leak information to the media that the contras had done it. This one act displaced 25,000 people. The moral decisions to oppress the people was not considered. Instead, the plan was to challenge the leadership of the Sandintas and cause popular support to diminish threating their political domination. More often, LIC repress the innocent people causing damage to infrastructure: electrical, water, sewer, education, and jobs.

Afghstan was a message that two super powers could content over control the territories and the U.S could push back the Soviets. Counter Insurgency provided to the U.S they could win against the super power Russia. The danger behind such conflicts was that LIC can immediately elevate to a full conflict without Congressional involvement. Imperial warfare has increased significantly and LIC though not constitutional has become the means for fighting targeted enemies of the U.S

Congress must take back the delegated right to declare war away from the Presidential Directives and not share war fighting power. I doubt such a retract will occur as LIC has become such a part of foreign policy. Today LIC budgetary approval is built into the law.

The Iran - Contra scandal in 1984 demonstrated how the Congressional system could be manipulated. Congress pull funding for the contras in 1984. Accusations and reviews were directed at Oliver North for his role in providing the contras funding in a two way traffic deal: One involving drugs trafficed between South America and North America with moneys being diverted too numerous Swiss banks and the other the selling Arms to Iran, who at the time had U.S import sanctions and made the transactions illegal. Supposely, the money stored in Swiss banks went to the contras, as freedom fighters. Was there and proof of accountablity between the ledger transactions between the bank and the contras? No. Did Congress have a financial statement deliverable to the American people showing where the monies were being spent? It was a national disaster.

Public criticism surfaced around the credibility of the Freedom fighters with charge of corruption and oppression being made.

The Iran-Contra scandal demonstrated "plausible deniablity". Pondexter, North, and Reagan claimed no recollection. Reagan was probably innocent being shielded from the daily LIC operations and plans. LIC operating independant of congressional or presidental approval in daily operations. Once the American public learned of the illegal arms sells fierce criticism of Reagan's foreign policy were debated and he never recovered from the American lost of confidence in his foreign policy. Reagan managed to crush communism economically and politically eventually leading to the fall of communism.

Unconventional Conflicts in a New Security Era: Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam (Contributions in Military Studies)

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Unconventional Conflicts in a New Security Era: Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam (Contributions in Military Studies)
Sam C. Sarkesian
Manufacturer: Greenwood Press
ProductGroup: Book
Binding: Hardcover

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ASIN: 031327763X

Book Description

The United States must devise entirely new military and political strategies because threats to the nation's security have shifted so markedly. This work provides the first comparative analysis of unconventional conflicts, using Malaya and Vietnam as lessons for developing effective policies and operations to counter strife, "drug wars," and new types of Third World conflict today. This text for students, experts, and policymakers in military studies, history, and international relations combines insights from primary and secondary sources, participant-observer experiences, and scholarly and professional thinking in order to formulate practical recommendations for future policy. Sarkesian provides a comparative framework for analyzing unconventional conflicts, describing past strategies used by Great Britain, France, and the United States. He defines the military posture and nature of conflict, leadership, and indigenous situations in Malaya and Vietnam. He analyzes the nature of revolutionary and counter-revolutionary systems. Sarkesian describes a new U.S. national security agenda to deal with a transformed geostrategic world landscape. A lengthy bibliography adds to the usefulness of this provocative text for classes in contemporary military studies, world history, war and peace, U.S. foreign policy, and conflict management.

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