In fact the more you read The R. Crumb Handbook the more you start to understand Crumb is really a political cartoonist, challenging stereotypes, cultural norms, and the media. U.S. media in particular has had a powerful and profound impact on Crumb. Readers will learn what TV shows and books inspired Crumb, the state of comics in the 1960s versus today, the media's effect on day-to-day life, and what other comics served as models for Crumb in his own work. Artists like Jack Davis, John Stanley, Carl Barks, and the late Will Eisner made powerful impressions on Crumb about what comics could achieve. Crumb offers up some interesting insight into comics during the Great Depression (e.g., Dick Tracy and Superman) and explains how many of these comics mirrored the era and encouraged readers to "fight on" even during tough times. The R. Crumb Handbook is a solid piece of work, not only giving us a glimpse into the artist, but serving as a great read for old and new fans alike. --Pat Kearney
Read an interview with R. Crumb
Exclusive Images from the R.Crumb Handbook
Spoiler Alert: View at Your Own Risk!
Build Your R. Crumb Library
The Complete Crumb Comics Vol. 19 |
Complete Crumb Comics |
Your Vigor for Life Appalls Me: Robert Crumb Letters 1958-1977 |
The Life and Death of Fritz the Cat |
The R. Crumb Sketchbook Vol. 8: Early 1971 to Mid 1972 |
R. Crumb's Kafka |
Crumb in Other Universes
Crumb (DVD) |
The Confessions of Robert Crumb (DVD) |
The R. Crumb Coffee Table Art Book |
Customer Reviews:
The 1940 Campaign Explained.......2007-06-03
This is an excellent study of the 1940 blitzkrieg campaign in Western Europe and looks at the struggle of the German High Command to adopt the brilliant "sickle cut plan" when they themselves were expecting a long drawn out war and then looks how the campaign unfolded in depth. The book examines how the German victory came about even though the German forces were outnumbered and also contained in some instances inferior equipment e.g. the panzer divisions contained mainly inferior tanks of panzer pzkpfwIs & pzkpfwIIs.
The German advantages however lay in their ability to co-ordinate all arms in their arsenal e.g. airpower, armour, infantry and the German personnel on the battlefield were able to make quick decisions in the field and were always conscious of time and pushed onto their objectives. The author relates this ability to quickly react to the German training in that the German command gave out objectives and missions, but the way in how these were to be achieved was largely up to the individual officers in the front lines. It was also the unauthorised actions of commanders like Guderian and Rommel by relentlessly pushing forward with their panzers and outstripping the supporting infantry that caught both the German and Allied commands of guard. The French & Allied way was to wait for orders but once received they were generally hopelessly out of date, and time and again opportunities to launch effective counter attacks were wasted. The French Command was slow to react, unable to coordinate all arms and could not organise an effective counter attack at the operational level, they could only achieve this at a tactical level.
The author examines how the Germans came out victorious even though they contained large numbers of inferior tanks. The Germans achieved this by concentrating their armour in panzer divisions adhering to Guderians concept of "punching with the fist and not feeling with the fingers". The French tanks were superior in armour and firepower but lacked radio and had small fuel tanks. The French were constantly stopping to refuel from fuel trucks whereas the Germans tried to alleviate this by carrying fuel in jerry cans with them. The German tanks contained radio that enabled crews to better coordinate their attacks and gave them the edge. When the French did manage to mass their tanks it was in a linear fashion with no depth and the Germans were easily able to penetrate. Once the French lines were penetrated and the Germans raced on and reached the French rear areas, panic ensued and the French front virtually collapsed.
The author points out the French Command incorrectly assessed the Ardennes as impassable by armour, neglected the Sedan sector through lack of mines & incomplete bunkers and ignored reconnaissance reports of German movements and of course were far too slow to react. Also, the French airforce was not very effective because a long drawn out war was expected and therefore only a portion of available aircraft were committed.
This is indeed an interesting and well researched book and highly recommended.
Top-Notch History.......2006-06-19
This book is both an analysis of whether the campaign in France in 19040 was planned as a "blitzkrieg" and a rather good account of the campaign itself.
The author very convincingly demonstrates that the Germans in general (and Hitler in particular) did not plan the French campaign as a blitzkrieg-style attack. While the high command's conservative plans resembled a revamp of WWI plans, a few new-style officers--principally Manstein and Guderian--came up with and convinced Hitler to authorize the daring plan to attack through Sedan. The campaign would have been an even greater success if Hitler and the senior generals had not lost their nerve and continually reined-in the panzers. In any event, all the German generals were a bit stunned by the quick victory. The author concludes by saying that France was an "unplanned but successful blitzkrieg, while Russia was a planned but unsuccessful blitzkrieg."
The book is also an excellent account of the campaign, and points out many interesting facts, such as:
--the French supreme headquarters was not equipped with a single radio at the outbreak of the war;
--another senior headquarters had a single telephone line, which became inoperable every day betwee 12:00 and 14:00 while the battle was raging because the swithboard girl insisted on her lunch break;
--at the outbreak of the war, the Germans had twelve times more trained radio operators than the French army;
--while the superiority of many French tank models over the German panzers is rather well known, the author recounts an incident in which a panzer commander grew so frustrated that his panzer could not damage a nearby French tank that he dismounted and attacked it (unsuccessfully and with fatal results) with a hammer.
Meticulously sourced, well written, great book. My only quibble is the rather excessive use of the word "astonishing"...
A Superb Operational-Level Assessment.......2006-05-22
Oberst Karl-Heinz Frieser, an officer in the Bundeswehr and military historian, delivers a detailed and thought-provoking analysis of the Wehrmacht's 1940 campaign in the west in The Blitzkrieg Legend. Frieser sets out to strip away the hype and wartime-era propaganda about Blitzkrieg in order to establish what the Wehrmacht intended to accomplish and how it achieved one of the greatest operational-level victories in military history. The book's main focus is on Panzer Group Kleist and Guderian's corps during the crossing of the Meuse; German operations in Belgium and Holland, as well as the follow-up "Case Red" offensive into the French heartland are addressed in passing. Overall, Colonel Frieser's analysis of the decisive elements of the German campaign is first-rate, as well as his discussion of the related military theory behind the German success.
The author's main thesis is strategic in nature, namely that the Wehrmacht did not plan Case Yellow as a Blitzkrieg, but expected a long, drawn-out attritional struggle against the Anglo-French powers. While the author cites Hitler's directives before May 1940 to suggest that the campaign merely sought to achieve "a favorable position" in northeast France and Belgium, this is less than convincing. Since the author makes little effort to examine German industrial mobilization other than eschewing the notion of a "Blitzkrieg economy", he does not really examine whether Germany was in fact, preparing for a long war. Based upon German production of tanks, artillery, aircraft and U-Boats, it does not appear that the Third Reich was preparing for an attritional war with the Allies. Although Hitler's deal with Stalin and his invasion of Norway do suggest that Hitler was protecting Germany's access to raw materials, the level of military mobilization in 1940 was far below what Germany was capable of achieving. The author also concludes that the campaign was decided by military factors, not social or ideological factors. He says that French generals later tried to use problems of the Third Republic to conceal their own ineptitude, but the poor morale of French troops in May 1940 was clearly widespread. Thus, the author's strategic-level hypothesis is rather weak.
The author is on much surer ground on his assessment of the operational-level factors behind the campaign. Colonel Freiser cites three developments in operational art that laid the foundations for Blitzkrieg: the overcoming of linear thinking of the First World War and the willingness to embrace risky, non-linear operations; the refinement of the stosstruppen tactics of 1917-18 and their adoption by mechanized forces; and the emphasis on schwerpunkt, breakthrough, encirclement and pursuit. The Blitzkrieg outcome in 1940 was a fortuitous result of the convergence of three factors in Germany's favor: better use of technology (communications and mechanization), air superiority and the superior German Auftragstsktik methods. Three specific factors added to the scale of the German victory: the abysmal state of French command and control deprived them of any chance of seizing the initiative; Gamelin's faulty Dyle-Breda plan wasted the French reserves on an useless effort to link up with the Dutch; and German commanders like Rommel committed unauthorized advances that were unpredictable and hence, led to a catastrophic French collapse.
The campaign narrative on the critical period of 10-25 May 1940 is superb and well supported by 48 color maps. This volume clearly surpasses works like Horne's To Lose a Battle in terms of detail and tactical insight. The description of the assault crossing of the Meuse, Guderian's decision to exploit westward and the subsequent destruction of the French armored reserves is superb. Although the author's viewpoint is German, there is still a great deal of new information presented about French operations. For example, the author notes how the French Air Force was underutilized, with one fighter wing sitting in reserve for virtually the entire campaign. In the final stages of the campaign, the author discusses the panzer halt order at great length, concluding that von Rundstedt and not Hitler, was primarily to blame. Throughout the book, the author notes the clash between the conservatives like Halder, Kluge and von Rundstedt who wanted to slow the panzers and the extremists like Guderian and Rommel, who ignored risks. I think the author's easy dismissal of the "flank psychosis" that caused the panzer halt is a bit retrospective, because it certainly must have been very hard to believe that one million Allied soldiers would simply sit there and allow themselves to be surrounded.
The author also discusses the various factors that led to the German failure to close the trap at Dunkirk, thereby allowing the BEF to escape. He then concludes that the escape of the BEF transformed the success of `sickle cut' into an "ordinary operational victory." He concludes that despite victory in France, Germany could not win against the superior economic resources of the Allies and that, "the panzer operations of the German blitzkrieg were very much like jousting against the windmills of superior industrial potentials." This is a bit much to swallow. I suppose that it is now politically incorrect for a German author to even suggest that the Third Reich might have achieved victory if Hitler had only been able to settle for something less than world domination, but the fact of the matter is that England alone could not possibly have defeated Germany. The quick German victory in the West cut the Allied powers down from 4 to only 1 and while Britain had significant air and sea potential, it had no ability on its own to contest Germany's continental power. Even with US involvement, all that industrial potential could only come ashore in France a few divisions at a time, and as long as Hitler kept the war confined to only England, Germany had hope for a win or draw. It was the invasion of the Soviet Union that changed the equation against Germany.
Brilliant and detailed.......2006-05-05
First, I have read the French edition so there may be some differences with the English language edition (which I don't yet have).
The Battle of France is one of my favourite battles of study, and one of the most pivotal battles in modern history. From every aspect of technology, doctrine, balance of power, etc. this battle decided what would come for the next half a century. As is well known, the German victory resulted in the defeat of one great power and the marginalization of another in just seven weeks with relatively few casualties on either side (compared to World War 1). The Germans accomplished an operational and strategic breakthrough in three days, when neither side did so over four years of combat in WW1.
A lot of the book is devoted to the tactical battle of the Sedan area, where the Germans concentrated their Panzer and mechanized infantry divisions to break out through the Ardennes. This book goes into detail of bunkers, strong point, bridges, and villages. It recounts the battle of Stonne, a small village that changed hands at least a dozen times in one day. There are also excellent accounts of other battles, such as the Hoth area, Arras, and in Belgium/Holland.
The book starts with a good strategic overview of strategy, organization, and planning without going into too much detail. It emphasizes that Blitzkrieg was first a name given by the British; and second, a concept understood by only a few mid-level Generals. Indeed, the Panzers greatest threat was not the French as much as their own infantry; at the first signs of slowing down, the Panzers were to be reorganized back into infantry armies, corps, and commanders.
In many ways, the German plan was flawed (but no military plan is perfect). The northern thrust in fact consumed considerable German resources and effort; from the Eben Emanuel raid to the sheer numbers of committed soldiers. Why? Because many German generals and Hitler did not understand the strategy and had limited faith in it. One might even say that success in the north would have doomed the overall plan as the Allies would not have been trapped at Dunkirk.
The literature on this battle is relatively poor, usually focusing on broad politics and strategy rather than the actual engagements. Most of the literature is from the British perspective, which entirely omits the battles of the Meuse. This book, as I said, provides excellent detailed narrative at the company level about the drive through the Ardennes and over the Meuse.
This is a brilliant, original study that sets a very high standard for the Battle of France and World War 2.
Interesting view of Blitzkrieg.......2006-04-21
As already pointed out by other reviews this book goes far to show that Blitzkrieg wasn't used in France, on the contrary, it was put together and finally created during the campaign Germany unleashed against France. Most of the general officers of the German High Command (both OKH and OKW) didn't believe that the Germans would be successful, and their hopes plummeted even further when presented with Manstein's plans. The planning for the campaign encompassed the idea that it was going to be a slogging match and a long one at that, reserves of men and materials were planned well in advance. In the end everyone from Hitler to Guderian were surprised by the enormous success that the Wehrmacht began to enjoy from day one. The French were as surprised during the German invasion as the Soviets would later be when the Germans attacked them. That is actually one aspect that I found very interesting when comparing this campaign to Barbarossa. First off both the French and Soviets had few radios amongst their tanks which led to horrible losses when communication problems arose. Contradictory orders offset some of the offensive attacks that the French wanted to throw against the Germans, the same could be seen in 1941 with the Red Army. General communication problems developed between army groups, armies, and their subordinates, again reminiscent of the Eastern Front in 1941. The list goes on and on, it was remarkable to see that the French who in fact declared war on Germany were caught by surprise and reacted practically the same way as the Soviets did in 1941. The author also makes a great assessment in the fact that after Hitler beat France which had support from the British and others he thought that the Soviets would be no problem, if in WWI the Russians were the ones that were defeated and the French the ones who held out, who knew that WWII would be the exact opposite? Another interesting discussion is who was responsible for the 'halt' order before Dunkirk. In the end reading this book will give the reader an understanding of how Blitzkrieg was created and 'perfected', as best it could be, with the campaign in France. What mistakes the French made that led to continued German success, and in reality the Germans had tremendous luck with their actions and the French were horribly unlucky in many of their plans, counter-attacks, maneuvers, etc. In the end an excellent read and a great addition to any library on WWII.
Book Description
"So long as the English tongue survives, the word Dunkerque will be spoken with reverence. For in that harbor, in such a hell as never blazed on earth before, at the end of a lost battle, the rags and blemishes that have hidden the soul of democracy fell away. . . . This shining thing in the souls of free men Hitler cannot command, or stain, or conquer. . . . It is the great tradition of democracy. It is the future. It is victory."
-- The New York Times, June 1, 1940
In Lightning War, historian Ronald Powaski tells the dramatic story of the German defeat of the Allies in northern France and the Low Countries in 1940. This is the first book to cover the campaign as a whole, examining the issues from all sides-- those of the French, British, German, and other involved nations. From the Battle of the Meuse to the German drive to the English Channel, from the Weygand Plan to Operation Dynamo, Powaski relates the events through the eyes of the generals, politicians, and servicemen who witnessed and forever shaped history.
Customer Reviews:
An amazing read.......2007-03-12
I'm only just getting into WWII History so don't have too many other books to compare this one by, but from the moment I picked up this book I couldn't put it down. It kept me hooked all the way through.
The Author makes it very clear as to the reasons why France's defense failed - for example the reserve forces being sent to Belgium and the French High Command refusing to believe the attack would come through the Ardennes.
The first part of the battle where the 70 or so German gliders took a Fortress of over 700 soldiers was unbelievable as was the story of when during the Meuse crossing, after several boats were shot up, one team managed to get across and silence the opposing French guns all on their own.
I've given it five stars, but have one small complaint. You follow the story of the Panzer divisions all the way through the book until you get to the (excellently written) chapter on the Dunkirk evacuation and then Hitler gives the halt demand. After the Dunkirk section you get a very small section on the Germans breaking through the Somme forces and taking Paris.
A further chapter after Dunkirk describing the Luftwaffe and Panzer assault on the Somme forces and then onto Paris in more detail would have been the icing on the cake. Furthermore a quick section on how life changed after the occupation for Parisians would have been nice.
[...]
A Very Good Read Indeed!.......2006-10-04
"Lightning War" is a well written and compelling history of the German invasion of the Low Countries and France in 1940.
Author and Professor Ronald E. Powaski writes well and explains clearly and methodically why France and Britain were so quickly defeated by a numerically and qualitatively inferior German Army. He takes the reader, step by step, through the key decisions and actions by both sides, which resulted in an unprecedented Wehrmacht victory. Those not familiar with the campaign will finish this book much better educated on Germany's "Blitzkrieg" campaign in the West.
If all historians wrote history as well as Powaski it would be a much more popular subject and we would have a much better educated population.
The book is well illustrated with photographs, many of them new. Like all books, however, "Lightning War" suffers from weaknesses. The first is the lack of maps, which would have allowed the reader to follow the action being described. "Lightning War" could have benefited from more maps, but here one must blame the editors rather than the author.
Another, more important, weakness is that vast bulk of references cited are secondary, despite the fact that Powaski stresses his use of primary sources early in the book. Thus, there is little new in this book. Still, sometimes an important story needs to be retold.
However, by repeating previous history Powaski propagates several old myths, dismissed long ago. Certainly the most glaring, which arises early in the book, is that the German panzer Generals took their ideas from British historian and strategist Basil Liddell Hart. This myth was dispelled some time ago by another historian, John J. Mearsheimer, in his ground-breaking "Liddell Hart and the Weight of History".
Another is that Hitler danced a jig after the defeat of France. This was based on a clip of Adolph Hitler stomping his foot several times and appearing as though he is dancing. Historians disproved this myth long ago and the short film clip is actually a loop of Hitler stamping his foot once in glee over the French defeat.
Nonetheless, this is very good history and Powaski shows that we can still learn a great deal from previously published material. He puts the blame for the defeat of France squarely on French shoulders and attributes it primary to its military leaders. "The French military was led by too many old men," he writes, "men like Gamelin, who, more than anyone else, was responsible for the decision to send France's best armies into Belgium."
Powaski also gives credit to the Wehrmacht, who, of course, had a great deal to do with the French and British defeat. Its leadership, doctrine, organization, and mode of operations ensured that the Germany army and air force were much better prepared to exploit new opportunities and retain the initiative for much of the campaign. As a result the French were simply unable to get inside the German High Command's decision cycle.
Overall, "Lightning War" is a very good read indeed!
Very Detailed Study .......2006-03-30
"Lightning War" by Ronald E. Powaski. Sub-titled:" Blitzkrieg In The West, 1940"
John Wiley & Sons, 2003.
The author, Ronald E. Powaski, has produced a 388 paged book, rich in details about the May 1940 invasion of western countries by the Third Reich. He covers the usual facts: e.g. the adoption of the Schlieffen Plan, the delay of the actual invasion until May 10 1940, and the rapid disintegration of the allied forces. France surrendered in June 1940. All of these historical facts are well enough known, but Powaski provides more details than most books about this period. For example, he describes in detail the two German officers who crashed their aircraft in Belgium (at the time, 1939, neutral) while they were carrying the German plans for the invasion through Belgium. This, of course, resulted in the need to change the invasion plans which, in turn, evolved into the genesis of the Schlieffen plan. Besides describing and naming the German officers (details missed in most history books), the author also tells us that the two men spent the entire war in a POW camp in Canada. Interesting. But, more ironically, as punishment for the incident, their wives were also imprisoned inside the Third Reich.
Duplicity of Churchill: I found, in my humble opinion, that the author tends to emphasize the duplicity of the British Prime Minister, Winston S. Churchill, during the time when the allied forces were engaging the German enemy and just prior to the actual surrender of France. Powaski pictures Churchill as waving his right hand and promising RAF squadrons to aid the French , while with his left hand (behind his back), he is motioning the BEF Commanding General, Lord John Gort, to get the British troops down to the sea and across the channel back home. Of course, after the German break through, evacuation at Dunkirk was all that was left to save the bulk of the British army. The chapter on the evacuation of the troops (Chapter Nine, "Operation Dynamo"), is one of the more interesting chapters in the book. Powaski records that many French soldiers were evacuated along with the British. When the French soldiers landed in England, they were immediately loaded on trains and sent to other ports (e.g. Plymouth) to be shipped back to France. These French troops arrived back in France in time for the defeat and in time to surrender to the Germans. This is an interesting detail you will not find in general history books. All in all, I found this to be a well written book.
OK, but..........2004-07-18
This is a recounting of the campaign of 1940 which culminated in the evacuation of the British Expeditionary Force from the beaches of Dunkirk. The author spends about a third of the book setting the stage for the battle, beginning with the crash-landing of the Me108 in Belgium that leaked to the Allies the original German plan to invade that country and Holland. He then goes on to tell the story of the battle itself, both at the level of the common soldier and that of the national and military leadership.
My criticism of the book is two-fold. One half of it is that there are some minor errors (the most notable being the Hitler jig, which was debunked by John Toland 25 years ago) and other interpretations with which I differed somewhat, anyway. As an aside, the business of the British killing POWs is interesting. The author doesn't actually say the British did kill any POWs, but he tells you that they captured about 400 soldiers from SS Totenkopf, then tells you that their fate has never been determined, then recounts to you one account in which a British officer admitted to stopping his men from killing some of the SS prisoners. Lastly he tells you that the SS *believed* that the British had killed those POWs, and says this at least partly explains why the same division killed British POWs later in the campaign.
The other difficulty is more one of the overall concept of the book. It's hard to see what the author thought he was adding to the accounts of the battle that have already been written. This is a campaign and battle about which tons of ink have already been spilled,and another concise reasonably well-written account isn't really neccessary, in my view. It's not a bad book, but there are others out there which cover pretty much the same ground, are more accessible, more scholarly, or more revolutionary.
Some inaccuracies.......2004-06-12
Just to add to one of the other reviews. The accusation of massacre at the Battle of Arras is based upon very flimsy evidence and should not be repeated in print. Powaski says that the French 1st Army marched by night as well as by day to reach Gembloux by 14th May. He should of course have said that it marched by day as well as by night ( day marches were not common due to the threat of air attack). Basic mistakes for a professional historian.
Book Description
The German victory of 1940 stunned the world. France, thought to be a major European power with one of the world's largest armies, collapsed in less than seven weeks. The secret of the Wehrmacht's success lay in its revolutionary new tactics of blitzkrieg: lightning war. Fast-moving tank divisions supported by armored, mobile infantry swept over opposition, helped by both conventional bombers and deadly Stuka dive-bombers. Alan Shepperd's highly detailed text examines the tactics, organization, and equipment of the Allied and German forces, and provides a daily account of the most crucial period of the battle. "The tank marks as great a revolution in land warfare as an armored steamship would have marked had it appeared amongst the toilsome triremes of Actium." So said General Heinz Guderian, architect of the stunning German victory over France in 1940. Alan Shepperd examines tactics and the German's application of them to their 1940 French campaign, as he looks at the differing organization and equipment of both Allied and German forces. He gives a daily account of the most crucial period of the battle, that of May 10-17, and also examines the evacuation of Dunkirk, in which 337,000 troops, mostly British, were taken out of the Germans' clutches at the last moment by the Royal Navy supported by a vast armada of privately owned vessels. Not only are German strengths looked at but Allied weaknesses are also examined: their ineffective use of tanks, the obsolete French defensive strategy, and, possibly most importantly, the political splits within France that demoralized her army and combined with the German's speedy advance to bring collapse about so quickly.
Customer Reviews:
Biased and riddled with errors.......2004-08-04
Shepperd's book is yet another in Osprey's large collection of moderately useful publications. It shares the same characteristics of the others, as I have written elsewhere: it is a bland, uneven overview that contains several important mistakes and suffers from some strange interpretations and errors of omission.
The first problem is with the assessments of German and French commanders. Rommell gets the bulk of the attention (some 20 lines out of 73) despite the fact that he was only a divisional commander at the time. Kleist and Guderian get comparative short shrift, even though they were much more influential. Shepperd dispenses with the French command very quickly, mentioning only army, army group, and political leaders. Shepperd's obvious disdain for the French is revealed in his assessment of the French prime minister, Reynaud, which points out the fact that he had an influential mistress (who cares?). In short, Shepperd's presentation of the German and French commanders is inept and trivial.
When Shepperd discusses the opposing armies, he starts to make outright mistakes. He claims, on page 13, that the French 37mm gun mounted in many of their tanks was "useless against contemporary armor". Obviously, Shepperd did not bother to look up any (easily available) data on weaponry and armor of German and French tanks. Contrary to his claim, the French 37mm was more than adequate to deal with the vast bulk of German tanks in 1940 (which were Panzer I and II models). Instead, it was actually the German tanks that lacked the punch to deal with their foes: their 37mm gun could barely deal with the common H35 and R35 tanks, and were of only marginal use (against the sides) of the S35 and B1 tanks. Shepperd simply parrots most of the long-standing myths about the state of the French forces in 1940.
This is revealed by his comment about the employment of French tanks. He implies that the French threw most of their tanks away by employing only four armored divisions (each with 160 tanks). He overlooks the fact that there were also three light mechanized divisions (each with 260 tanks) as well as five light cavalry divisions (each with 44 tanks). The French did distribute many tanks to independent tank battalions, but about a third of these tanks were FT17s, left over from World War I. Although over a thousand useful R35 and H35 models were distributed to these battalions as well, the French army was more mobile and concentrated its tanks far more than Shepperd admits. Effectively, the count is 7 French armored divisions against 10 German. And yes, the German divisions had more tanks in each one, but 58% of their tanks in the field were Pz I and Pz II models, which can hardly be termed "tanks".
Shepperd further disparages the French army by sniping at its perceived immobility; this is not done overtly, but the implication is there: he shows pictures of French troops by their horses, and notes that guns were horse-drawn and "moving slowly" (page 39), while ignoring the fact the vast bulk of the German army was in the exact same situation (in fact, this is what caused so much worry at higher levels of command during the campaign: the panzers were dramatically outrunning the entire horse-drawn and foot-marching German army). Shepperd is also way off on French morale: recent scholarship on the campaign reveals that the French were confident that they would win, given they had the superior army. Shepperd's German-centric book is also revealed in errors of omission: he does not present the structure of a French division despite providing one for a panzer division, and he ignores successful battles fought by the French (as in front of Gembloux, where Prioux's two light mechanized divisions beat the 3rd and 4th panzer divisions). Finally, the campaign itself is told in the fashion of a broad overview: not much detail and presented in a straightforward textbook-like fashion. Clearly, there is better, more detailed writing on the portion of the campaign Shepperd covers.
In the end, these books are for modelers and wargamers, not those interested in getting an accurate history of a campaign. So, how useful is it in this regard? Again, one star. There are quite a few pictures, most of which are commonly seen. The color plates of men and vehicles are mostly badly drawn, with washed out coloring. The 3-D maps that form the central attraction for wargamers are interesting, as always. They will provide some inspiration for putting miniatures on the table top, but the maps are "zoomed out" so there is not much detail.
For modelers, rather than for historians.......2000-06-30
In the usual Campaign series format, highlights from the book are the topological maps in 3D and the uniforms and equipment sketches. (These drawings actually come from other Osprey series, such as WARRIORS, MEN AT ARMS, or ELITE.)
The historical treatment is not too deep (the book isn't that long!) but gives a nice overview of the whole lightning campaign.
There is some extra material for wargamers at the end, but, as said, the main users of this book will be modelers (as I am!).
Books:
- The Sexual Life of Catherine M.
- The Soccer War
- The Stone Cold Truth (WWE)
- The Treasury of Quotes
- The Tricky Part: One Boy's Fall from Trespass into Grace
- Too Many Songs by Tom Lehrer
- Truth and Duty: The Press, the President, and the Privilege of Power
- Until the Final Hour: Hitler's Last Secretary
- Vanilla Beans & Brodo: Real Life in the Hills of Tuscany
- Walk This Way: The Autobiography of Aerosmith
Books Index
Books Home
Recommended Books
- WINGS AROUND THE WORLD: The Exhilarating Story of One Woman's Voyage From the North Pole to Antarcti
- The Heart of Burgundy: A Portrait of French Wine Country
- Old Main Burning: A tale of love and murder in Mississippi
- Mother Angelica: The Remarkable Story of a Nun, Her Nerve, and a Network of Miracles
- Pimps, Hos, Playa Hatas, and All the Rest of My Hollywood Friends: My Life
- Physics for Scientists and Engineers with Modern Physics, Third Edition
- Structural Bioinformatics
- Taxation, shipping and aircraft : agreement between the United States of America and Venezuela, sign
- Practical Intelligence: Working Smarter in Business and Everyday Life
- Saving Open Space: The Politics of Local Preservation in California
General
| Reference
| Arts & Photography
| Subjects
| Books
The R. Crumb Coffee Table Art Book (Kitchen Sink Press Book for Back Bay Books)
Book of Mr. Natural
R. Crumb's America
Crumb (Special Edition)
R. Crumb's Heroes of Blues, Jazz, & Country
From the mountains of Southern France where he currently lives and works, pop artist R. Crumb makes a grand entrance back to the publishing world with The R. Crumb Handbook. Part biography, part comic book, and part media critique, the latest Crumb book is a feast indeed. In addition to numerous reprints of Crumb comic hits like Fritz the Cat and Mr. Natural, the book also features new works by Crumb, including a hilarious dialogue between the artist and his wife. (Both Crumb's wife and daughter are comic book artists.) Fans already familiar with Crumb's comic book work will rejoice at the glossy reprints of Crumb oil paintings and sculptures, complete with gallery-owner narratives about working with the artist. There are also record covers reprints that Crumb has drawn over the years, as well as a CD of songs by the artist's traditional band, R. Crumb and the Cheap Suit Serenaders. But more important, the Handbook helps provide a window into the man himself.
