Book Description
Who Is the Main Person on Your Medical Team Now?
It is you. Prior to leaving the hospital, you were at the center of a flurry of activity, surrounded by a busy health care team – physicians, surgeons, and nurses. The surgery is over now, and you’re home. It is quiet. Now, you become the most important member on your health care team.
Author Rosalind Benedet understands the concerns and questions you now have as you begin this phase of your recovery. An oncology nurse, she has worked with hundreds of women who have undergone mastectomies. In After Mastectomy, she gently guides you through recovery, both physically and emotionally. Among the many topics she covers:
• Adjusting emotionally and overcoming depression
• Choosing a breast form and undergarments
• Follow-up treatment – chemotherapy, hormonal therapy, and radiation
• Reconstruction options
• Resuming sexual relations
• Preventing lymphedema – swelling of the arm
• Exercises to regain arm mobility and increase energy
• Optimum nutrition for healing
Your Guide to What Happens After Your Surgery
Book Description
A fascinating narrative-and a bold new thesis in the study of the Civil War-that suggests Robert E. Lee had a heretofore undiscovered strategy at Gettysburg that, if successful, could have crushed the Union forces and changed the outcome of the war.
The Battle of Gettysburg is the pivotal moment when the Union forces repelled perhaps America's greatest commander-the brilliant Robert E. Lee, who had already thrashed a long line of Federal opponents-just as he was poised at the back door of Washington, D.C. It is the moment in which the fortunes of Lee, Lincoln, the Confederacy, and the Union hung precariously in the balance.
Conventional wisdom has held to date, almost without exception, that on the third day of the battle, Lee made one profoundly wrong decision. But how do we reconcile Lee the high-risk warrior with Lee the general who launched "Pickett's Charge," employing only a fifth of his total forces, across an open field, up a hill, against the heart of the Union defenses? Most history books have reported that Lee just had one very bad day. But there is much more to the story, which Tom Carhart addresses for the first time.
With meticulous detail and startling clarity, Carhart revisits the historic battles Lee taught at West Point and believed were the essential lessons in the art of war-the victories of Napoleon at Austerlitz, Frederick the Great at Leuthen, and Hannibal at Cannae-and reveals what they can tell us about Lee's real strategy. What Carhart finds will thrill all students of history: Lee's plan for an electrifying rear assault by Jeb Stuart that, combined with the frontal assault, could have broken the Union forces in half. Only in the final hours of the battle was the attack reversed through the daring of an unproven young general-George Armstrong Custer.
Lost Triumph will be one of the most captivating and controversial history books of the season.
Customer Reviews:
What's wrong with a little speculation?.......2007-07-19
First of all, I definitely recommend this book. I think a lot of the people giving it a bad review are being far too harsh.
I say that even though I also take issue with certain parts.
To begin with, I find it very hard to accept that Lee would not tell Longstreet that he intended to have Stuart attack the center of the Union line from the rear. I should think it would be rather vital that the commanders leading the charge be aware that once they got over the wall, they might see Stuart's cavalry approaching from the OPPOSITE direction. Otherwise, it would be a natural response in the dense smoke and confusion of battle for attacking Confederates to assume they were Union cavalry and fire upon them.
I should certainly think that Lee would be particularly sensitive to this, considering the fact that he recently lost his best subordinate, Jackson, in a similar "friendly fire" circumstance.
Since we know from his criticisms after the war that Longstreet did not know of any such plan of Lee's, the author argues that Lee did not inform Longstreet, due possibly to a combination of his irritation with Longstreet, his strong inclination for secrecy, and Lee's supposed principle that Longstreet did not need to know. Yet I simply can't believe this wouldn't fall into the category of "need to know."
I also have a problem with what I feel is the author's tendency to oversimplify when he speculates about people's motivations and thought processes.
There are other quibbles, of minor importance. Still, this book is a very worthy read. While people can (and will) argue the particulars endlessly, in the long view this theory makes a whole lot of sense. While the theory is far from proven, it is eminently worthy of serious consideration and further research by scholars and buffs.
And even if it isn't true, what's wrong with a little educated speculation? It's not as though he's suggesting that space aliens murdered JFK.
Very Speculative... and A Major Historical Error.......2007-04-30
Much material has already been presented concerning the speculative nature of much of the "evidence" presented here. Some of that speculated evidence seems simply beyond belief for Lee's normal reputation of dealing with his immediate subordinates in a normally open and his infamous non micromanager style of leadership (i.e., things like that Lee didn't tell Longstreet what the real plan was because Longstreet "didn't have a need to know" - that sounds more like Thomas Jackson's style by far - OR that Lee was miffed at Longstreet because Longstreet "had been surly" the last few days... give me a break!).
Even assuming that this was in fact "the" legitimate plan, performing it in this fashion still contained simply way too many fatal flaws.
The Northern forces were dug in and not threatening any offensive moves. And their central position - which had not been attacked at all on Day Two - was easily their strongest position. In addition it not only contained significant artillery resources but was very readily capable of being reinforced by yet even more artillery much more quickly than either flank could.
It would have made much more sense for Lee to have held his center with a relatively minor force (like he did at Chancellorsville) and overloaded his right flank and then on Day Three envelope the Northern left flank with an assault from their rear - which would have also threatened not only the Union's left rear (as would also be concurrently happening on the Union right rear flank), but would have threatened to cut off the Taneytown Pike LOC at the same time that Ewell's forces (on the other side) were slamming closed the LOC of the Baltimore Pike on the Union's right flank.
Each maneuver element would then have been able to deploy forces simultaneously into the Union rear while also "rolling up
both Union flanks towards the center. Stuarts cavalry force could then have had the option of "slamming closed the rear door" well to the east of the Federal cavalry (i.e., continuing to ride around the Federal army to the east and then to the south intercepting the Baltimore Pike ahead of the retreating / routed Union forces) OR could have been used in a "pursuit role" (once the Federal cavalry force was moved to the south in an attempt to stand-in-place and cover the withdrawing Federal army).
The plan - as given - presumes a breakthrough of the "penetration" type against the strongest point of the Union line - BEFORE the Confederate cavalry penetration into the rear of the Union forces at the breakthrough point. Much is made of the Confederate forces on the left flank rolling up the Union right towards that breakthrough point whilst the remnants of the breakthrough - not all as some have to stay in place to maintain the breakthrough opening, then turn south and start rolling up the Union line from the center towards the Union left flank anchor (Big Round Top). That plan of action presumes too many "ifs" and "maybes" and assumes no survival response by the Union forces. Even had this plan worked as orchestrated, the Union forces SOUTH of the breakthrough would have simply retreated southward along the still open Taneytown Pike Road. The Northern forces would have lost pretty much all of Howard's Corps and a major portion of Hancock's Corps... but a good part of Hancock's Corps as well as most of Sickle's Corps, Sykes' Corps, and Sedgwick's Corps would have been able to successfully extricate themselves with a withdrawal south and / or then southeast.
A double-flanking movement (as was used at the Battle of Cannae - not this type of plan)would have been more in line with the Battle of Cannae that seems to be what the the author is proposing was Lee's "real" (but "secret") plan. And I specifically refer - in my option - not to a movement that simply attacks head on the opponent's flank positions, but enveloping them with attacks simultaneously to their sides and rear areas as Jackson did at Chancellorsville.
But it was in the discussion - early in the book, Chapter four - where the author made a major error of serious significance concerning military history as regards that battle. An error that basically "blew it" for me. In fact, I was quite surprised that the reviewer who was a "historian by training" didn't immediately catch it - and catch it in horror!
First of all (but not the major point) was that the author has the figures completely wrong. I have checked a number of sources and find no major historical figures (i.e., Polybius, Livy, etc.) who reveal those particular numbers that the author uses.
The general consensus is that the Romans (who maintained very excellent and accurate records) had a total of 80,000 + troops. Approximately 10,000 troops were left behind to guard the main camp when the main Roman army deployed on the plain to face Hannibal. The deployed Roman force consisted of 55,000 Heavy Infantry (Roman Hoplites), about 9,000 Light Infantry (auxiliary units of primarily sling-throwers but also some allied archers) and 6,000 cavalry. The Carthaginian forces (deployed) consisted of 32,000 Heavy Infantry, 8,000 Light Infantry (slingers and archers), and 10,000 cavalry. At least the author DOES show the correct placement of the opposing forces - and their subsequent movements during the battle (with the exception of not reflecting the Numidian cavalry's continued pursuit of the Roman cavalry thereby allowing Hasdrubal's Carthaginian cavalry to return to the main battlefield and seal off the rear of the Roman army thereby effectively completing the full envelopment of the main Roman force.
But the MAIN error in describing the battle and inferring it being a major reason in the defeat of th Romans was the author's commentary that the Roman army was "arrayed in a rigid phalanx" ... "their front covered by rows of shields from which loomed menacing lances... "!!!!! The author immediately revealed a complete lack of understanding of the Roman army and the tactics of Roam warfare. The author was clearly confusing the Roman army and tactics with that of the Greek and Macedonian armies from CENTURIES before the Roman army developed completely DIFFERENT battle tactics...
"A phalanx is a rectangular mass military formation, usually composed entirely of heavy infantry armed with spears (note: NOT lances... lances are cavalry spears), pikes (simply longer spears - but still not "lances"), or similar weapons. The troops were disciplined to hold a line which created a nearly impenetrable forest of points to the front. The phalanx is a hallmark of ancient Greek warfare. Most authorities date the formation of the hoplite phalanx of ancient Greece to the around the 7th century BC in Sparta (about 600-700 years BEFORE the Battle of Cannae). The (Greek / Macedonian hoplite) phalanx was a formation in which the hoplites would line up in ranks, usually no less than four deep, in very close order. In this formation, the hoplites would lock their shields together, and the first few ranks of soldiers would project their spears out over the first rank of shields, to try to gain the upper hand in the battle early on and as a result, allowing for the first three or so ranks of spearmen to engage their spears against the enemy. Therefore, one might say that the phalanx was essentially a formation in which the hoplites created a mass spear and shield wall... The Greek 'doru' was a type of spear in general use in the Hellenistic world. Although accounts of its length vary, it is usually now believed to have been seven to nine feet long. It was held one-handed, the other hand holding the hoplite's aspis (shield). The front spearhead was usually a curved leaf shape, while the rear had a spike which was used to stand the spear in the ground (hence the name), as a secondary weapon if the main shaft snapped, or for the rear ranks to finish off fallen opponents as the phalanx advanced over them... "
The Macedonians then perfected the tactical idea of the phalanx roughly around 300 BC (now "only" about 500 years before the Battle of Cannae). Their improvements consisted primarily of deepening the phalanx from 4 ranks to 8 ranks - and increasing the length of the spears (not more accurately "pikes" from 7 - 9 feet to 18 feet. Additionally the Heavy Infantry phalanx was designed by the Macedonians (Phillip II and Alexander the Great) to be used primarily as a holding force while allied Light Cavalry and Light Infantry protected the flanks and the Macedonian elite Heavy Cavalry effected either an envelopment or a penetration into the opponents rear.
The Romans meanwhile (jumping forward a couple hundred years) developed "manipular or cohort" tactics to use with their specifically designed Roman legion units...
"The nature of a manipular or cohort legion is that it's inherent flexibility, initiatives at the cohort/manipular level often resulted in infantry conduct the flanking movements, something a phalanx wasn't able to do with much finesse or if a phalanx line was broken anywhere to exploit it by utilizing their sword drills to slaughter hoplites at close-order fighting... "
The Roman legions were never armed with spears (much less pikes or especially "lances"), but each hoplite carried two javelins. A military historian would - of course - immediately understand the difference in that spears or pikes are meant to be HELD and to be FOUGHT WITH during the course of the battle (unless a spear shaft breaks or a spearhead becomes embedded in which case the Greek / Macedonian hoplite would either drop back to be replaced by the next hoplite in file or in dire cases draw and use his sword. The javelin on the other hand is meant to be THROWN. And that was the Roman legion primary tactic. Approach the enemy line at a rapid but controlled pace and throw - on command - first one javelin and then - on command - the second one... and then draw the sword and wade in to the enemies now disrupted and demoralized front lines, stabbing away with their special short sword specifically designed as a stabbing / thrusting weapon rather than a slashing sword.
AT the point of reading that (according to the author) the Roman army was "arrayed in a rigid phalanx" ... and that "their front (was) covered by rows of shields from which loomed menacing lances... ", well, I lost a great deal of credibility for the author from that point on. And wondered aloud that this is a West Point graduate who I assumed (like the trained historian reviewer) has supposedly studied Roman military history along with simply the Battle of Cannae??? From that point on, most things were taken with "a grain of salt"... a BIG grain of salt!
Intellectual History at its Best.......2006-11-01
I've read several reviews prior to writing mine and it appears that many reviewers (specifically the negative ones) are missing the thrust of this book. This is a work that blends standard history - which relies on factual primary and secondary sources to attempt to establish facts on the ground - and intellectual history - which is a discipline that attempts to divine the thoughts of actors through an examination of their cultural and educational milieu combined with their actual statements.
Both disciplines are legitimate and there are historical situations where they can not be reconciled, but in many cases the two disciplines can illuminate one another to provide a foundation for a theory which answers the salient questions about key historical events. This is one such case.
To begin, many reviewers claim an entire lack of evidence for Tom Carhart's theory among the facts of the battle (to be clear, the theory is that Lee planned a three-pronged attack on Meade's positions of which Picket's Charge was only one piece and the key to its success was an attack by Stuart's cavalry, and attached units, on the rear of Meade's position both at Culp's Hill and the clump of trees on Cemetary Ridge). I'm not certain which reviewers actually read the book versus which didn't, but it is simply not true to claim there is "no" actual historical evidence of such a theory. Mr. Carhart notes it in his work several times, for example: 1. he cites Stuart's after-action review which stated that he hoped to strike the Union rear; 2. he cites Lee's reported comments to Imboden the evening of July 3 (in my mind the best evidence) in which Lee states that Picket's Charge was not supported as it ought to have been and he didn't know why when the only battlefield commander left to debrief was Stuart - therefore, Stuart would be the only source to provide the answer to why Picket's Charge wasn't "supported;" and 3. he cites McClellan's comments about Stuart's multiple firing of one gun and McClellan's statement that no one knew what Stuart was doing, though McClellan though it may have been a signal to Lee (one reviewer said this was nonsense as it had to have taken place during the artillery barrage on Cemetary Ridge and therefore Lee couldn't have heard it - interesting that such an obvious problem wouldn't occurr to McClellan, who was actually there - in other words, if McClellan thought it a signal of some kind to Lee, then the artillery barrage on Cemetary Ridge could not have been happening yet since McClellan would, actually being there, have known it couldn't be heard - therefore, logically, it had to have occurred prior to the barrage) - another negative reviwer pointed out that he tracked down McClellan as the source of this idea - also interesting since Mr. Carhart cites McClellan as his source so he shouldn't have had to track down anything - it makes me wonder if he even read the book. These three items are cited from primary sources (and there are others in the book) which are generally considered the best form of historical evidence for facts on the ground. It is true that there is a huge mass of primary material dealing with Gettysburg and that these are very small pieces of that mass - and such a fact could lead one to accuse Mr. Carhart of "cherry-picking" his facts (though I think that claim would be innaccurate based on the intellectual history portion of the work), but it is simply untrue to claim there are "no" facts cited to support his theory.
The intellectual history portion is critical to this work. It examines the theoretical aspect of General Lee and his commanders to try and divine what they planned. It is true that Lee refused, almost entirely, to discuss battles post-action - it is also true that he was notoriously close-mouthed about his plans. To expect enlightenment from Lee directly for posterity's sake is to misunderstand the man, Lee. What Mr. Carhart does is examine the professional education of Lee and compare it with his actual actions in other battles he commanded to show how that education led him to maneuver his forces in a certain way to achieve the critical military principles of war known as mass, surprise, secrecy, objective and economy of force. After that examination (which I would have liked to have been fuller since I find it the most fascinating and convincing portion of the book), he then posits the question that has been asked for 150 years (and that I have asked myself repeatedly when studying Gettysburg): "What the hell was Lee thinking?" Picket's Charge simply could not succeed AS IT WAS CARRIED OUT AND EVERYONE WOULD KNOW THAT - MOST ESPECIALLY LEE. To claim hubris as the source of the decision (as one negative reviwer does) is simply to assert your own intellectual theory in place of Mr. Carhart's - with somewhat less justification I might add. In other words, to claim that you know what Lee was thinking without the benefit of a developed theory of Lee's psyche based on his education, culture and other actions. Mr. Carhart does posit a theory of Lee's intentions based on just such an examination - and it rings true. IF Lee's plan was such as Mr. Carhart posits (and while I am unable to be dogmatic about it, I am convinced that he is correct), then the question about what was Lee thinking when he ordered Picket's Charge is answered, and answered in a way that fits with what we know of Lee's psyche based on his education, culture, training and other actions during the war. In other words, Mr. Carhart has developed an intellectual history justification that makes sense and when that is added to the primary historical sources he cites, then the theory breathes. It is neither counterfactual, evidence-poor nor badly-argued. Like all theories, it does not demand assent, but it appears to me, from the evidence, that it is strongly supported. So, in contravention of one of the other reviwers, Mr. McPherson should have no shame in providing a forward - rather he simply acknowledged the quality work of a fellow historian done well.
In conclusion, Mr. Carhart has written a fine piece of intellectual and traditional history that sheds new and convincing light on one of the most inexplicable decisions made by any commander in history. I strongly urge readers to read it themselves and think it through.
Final note: I'm an historian by training and a lawyer by profession so examining historical evidence is not out of my area of expertise.
Kelly Whiting
A controversial account of why Robert E. Lee lost the battle of Gettysburg.......2006-09-23
Was it Lee's fault? Tom Carhart a West Point graduate ponders this question as he looks at Gettysburg. Along the way we read brief accounts of famous battles Lee studied at West Point. Especially important are Cannae in 216 BC won by Hannibal against Rome; Leuthen in 1756 which was Frederick the Great's best battle and several Napoleonic battles. Napoleon was the beau ideal of the great soldier in nineteenth century military study.
The book has a short introduction by noted scholar James McPherson which gives it respectable cache with this reader. Carhart's thesis is
that Lee wanted Longstreet and Ewell to attack both wings of the Union Army on Cemetery Ridge on July 3rd. The key to victory was to be JEB
Stuart's cavalry assault from the rear on Culp's Hill. However, these
plans were stopped cold by the Union victory on the East Cavalry Field
battleground where the intrepid George Armstrong Custer led his Wolverines to victory. Picket's Charge was also a disaster.
Along the way we are given a brief sketch of RE Lee's career and several Civl War battles.
Carhart has a vivid writing style but I would want to read more before accepting his theory. It does sound plausible.
The Da Vinci Code of Gettysburg?.......2006-08-12
The Da Vinci Code was a work of fiction based on theories that had been kicked around long before, and it displayed little depth or knowledge of theology or history -- especially of the history of the Holy Grail, which made its first bow in literature in the late twelfth century (despite copious vain attempts to link it, however tenuously, with more ancient myths). Yet the Da Vinci Code was apparently a good read and a runaway success that has changed the way people think, even if what they think is provably inaccurate.
LOST TRIUMPH doesn't sink to those depths, but it does present an interesting alternative to the battle of Gettysburg via speculation. Like the Da Vinci Code, the author's idea has been batted around before (I read another book with the same theory before I read LT). Unlike the Da Vinci Code, it has some basis in history.
The great question was always, "What was Lee thinking?" While I have read defenders of Pickett's charge (if only Longstreet had gone when he was told!) But when Longstreet didn't go, and didn't go, and didn't go, why didn't Lee scrub the mission -- or sack a subordinate who refused to follow orders? And did Longstreet finally charge those men to their deaths out of spite, just to rub Lee's face in it? LOST TRIUMPH is an attempt, albeit speculative, to address these more than 150-year-old questions and provide answers.
The book's largest failure is structural. It might have been better if the author had taken the pedantic fact-cum-fiction approach of THE EDUCATION OF JULIUS CAESAR. "The Education of Robert E. Lee: and How it Lost Gettysburg." He does a good job of describing Lee's education at West Point, and his cultural milieu, for beginners. He even points to some of Lee's favorite reads. He takes us through Mexico with Lee, and shows the young Lee's courage and resource (which would come into play when he was given command of an army that was always smaller than his opponent's, and with less materiel).
The author takes his time getting to Gettysburg. His ideas are speculative, but so is much of accepted history. What he lacks in primary documentation, he makes up for in imagination. Other reviewers have compared "facts" presented here with "facts" presented by the likes of Shelby Foote -- but Foote cannot be relied upon, either. Foote apparently made up the story that the Confederates went to Gettysburg to look for shoes, which is often presented as known fact, although that story could be the poster child for undocumented speculation.
The premise of the book (and the author gets around to it about like I have in this review, after a lot of other stuff) is that Lee sent Stuart -- who had circled the Union army twice -- around the Union army for rear action simultaneous with Longstreet's frontal advance. Stuart's rear action and the frontal assault were meant to divide the Yanks. Wow. This is a sweeping idea (and, as I said before, hardly new). Is it true? I don't know. Is it plausible? Lee was an audacious commander, and though his generalship has been under fire by revisionists, that tide will subside. It's certainly a plausible idea, and if Lee didn't have it, he should have. Unfortunately, Gens. Stuart and Lee are both deceased, so we can't ask them. Any attempt to read their intentions will contain some degree of projection.
So, why did the dual assault fail? The frontal assault failed because of Longstreet's intransigence, and Union movement during day three of the battle. The rear assault failed because Stuart was stopped dead by -- George Armstrong Custer, who was later felled in another famous battle, that of the Little Bighorn. Custer has been much maligned (not always unfairly) but the premise that Custer saved the union at Gettysburg is tough meat for some readers to chew, because of the baggage of their own cultural milieu.
That explains why Lee didn't scrub the mission when Longstreet failed him: Stuart's ball was already in play and without the frontal assault, the rear action was rendered pointless.
But readers don't have to worry about Custer saving the Union. That point, which was actually implied by the previous book I read on the subject, is not debatable. Gettysburg made a lot of noise, but Vicksburg, where the Yanks actually did divide the Confederacy, was where the Confederacy was lost. The Confederacy would have survived Gettysburg (especially with Meade in command). Vicksburg started the gray sand of the Confederacy leaking out of the hourglass. It was only a matter of time, unless public war-weariness up north could be exploited the way it is by America's enemies today.
LT should be read with some background to the battle. It's not a starter's kit. A solid, general (for Da Vinci Code readers, I mean "not specific") history of the battle should be read beforehand, and the accepted facts absorbed. It probably should not be read by experts, either, since, judging by the reviews, this sort of book gets their nose out of joint.
Customer Reviews:
Harmans real plan ar Gettysburg.......2005-11-18
Harman's major point is that Lee could not be so dumb as to order Pickett's Charge at Gettysburg--but that a masterful plan of the Southern Genius General went awry. The book is short of documentation in the historic record of this and pads the book with discussions of Napoleans' strategy, Gettysburg Day 1 and Day 2, etc. Essentially it is a "plausible" idea bereft of evidence. The book imho is but a southern apologist's unbelief that Lee could lose at Gettysburg and that Meade on that day outgeneraled Lee.
Troy Harman's Gettysburg.......2004-07-07
From the moment of its conclusion, the Battle of Gettysburg has provoked endless controversy regarding its significance, the plans and strategies employed by the armies, the tactics, and the reasons for the result. It has been said that if a reader doesn't like a particular account of the battle, it is only necessary to read on to find a more appealing version.
Troy Harman is a historian and a ranger with the National Park Service at Gettysburg. He has intimate familiarity with the Battlefield and a thorough grasp of the literature on the Battle. In his book, "Lee's Real Plan at Gettysburg" (2003), Mr. Harman takes issue with what he terms the "affirmed version" of the Battle and offers what he believes to be a new and competing account. His account is well and lucidly presented and will provoke thought among students.
Mr. Harman argues that most students of the Battle have tended to focus on the details of the three days of fighting and have failed to understand the plan that the Confederate commander, Robert E. Lee, developed for the Battle and pursued during its entirety. According to Mr. Harman, Lee's focus throughout was on the heights of Cemetery Hill on the Union right. At the conclusion of the first day's fighting, the Confederates did not attempt to capture Cemetery Hill. But in the second day of fighting on the Union left, (Little Round Top, primarily) and in Pickett's Charge on the third day, the objective of Lee's plans, Mr. Harman maintains, was Cemetery Hill, due to its height, its control of the town and roads, and its vulnerability as a salient exposed to potential attack on three sides.
This is a challenging claim, particularly as it involves the second day of the Battle. Mr. Harmon argues that Longstreet's troops were to advance along the Emmitsburg Road, which essentially parallels the Union line and take Cemetery Hill, giving only slight attention to Little Round Top. Mr. Harmon argues that the objective of Pickett's famous charge on day 3 was Zeigler's grove on the right of the Union line rather than the more famous Angle and Copse of Trees.
There is a great deal to be learned from this, and from any attempt to revisit a received and too comfortably accepted account. But I think Mr. Harman tends to overemphasize the originality of his approach and to type-cast the account with which he takes issue. The basic points in Mr. Harman's approach, involving the alleged importance of Little Round Top, the advance of the Third Corps of the Union Army to the Peach Orchard, and the focus of Pickett's Charge have been addressed by many writers. These points are and will remain highly controversial, and Mr. Harman's understanding of each of them is shared with (and also disputed by) many other scholars. Mr. Harman's primary claim -- the importance of Cemetery Hill -- has also been addressed in a slightly different way in a book called "Last Chance for Victory" by Bowden and Ward which likewise challenges the received account of Gettysburg.
Mr. Harman also is too quick, I think, in forulating his understanding of the "affirmed version" of Gettysburg. Most of the accounts of the battle I have read take a more nuanced view than that indicated in Mr Harman's summations. They recognize, I think, the changing nature of the Battle and the choices these changes forced on commanders North and South. Lee does seem to me to have ordered a charge up the Emmitsburg Road, based on the faulty information he had about the size and position of the Union troops, but this plan had to change on the spot when Longstreet discovered the location of Sickles and his third Corps. Pickett's charge on the third day may well have had Zeigler's grove as its objective, but the fact remains that the Southern attack crested at the Copse of Trees, thus entitling it to its reputation as the "High Water Mark".
Mr Harman has taken a fresh, lively approach to the Battle which taught me a great deal and which will inspire the interested reader to learn more. It will instill in the reader a sense of fluidity and a reluctance to dogmatize over significant historical events.
The forest for the trees.......2004-06-08
Sometimes you can't see the forest for the trees. As an airline pilot, civil war buff, and trained historian I found Mr. Harman's thesis right on the mark. For years I've wondered why
no one else saw the obvious. As one reviewer stated, "it was the high ground." General Lee was a brilliant tactician and strategist whoes training in the Mexican War would have demanded the obvious-Take the high ground! Unfortunately, the fog of war trumped his plan. Read the entire book during a long layover in Chicago. Mr Harman walked, worked, and lived the grounds of Gettysburg-he knows his history well. Thank you.
Old Wine-New Bottle.......2004-05-01
Harmon's book is a repackaging of his thesis in his original book entitled Cemetary Hill-The General Plan was Unchanged. So if you have that book, you essentially know what he is talking about. This new book is a bit more polished. He presents an interesting theory, although unconvincing for me.
Finally, a book that uses realism to evaluate!.......2004-04-10
As an old Army Field Artillery Officer, I had always wondered why the obvious nature of the Cemetery Hill was never presented. It was the high ground for crying out loud! Anyone worth their salt would see the case presented by Harmon is long overdue. He did an exceptional job of presenting factual evidence, and did not present a tired rehashing of the same old "accepted story." It was an eminently readable effort. The next time that I travel to the battlefield I will have to meet this man for an autograph in my copy of the book. (Maybe they should read this one in the service schools too.)
Average customer rating:
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Lost triumph: Lee's real plan at Gettysburg - and why it failed.: An article from: Army Lawyer
Jason M. Bell
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ASIN: B000NIVBQ6
Release Date: 2007-02-14 |
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This digital document is an article from Army Lawyer, published by Thomson Gale on August 1, 2006. The length of the article is 3621 words. The page length shown above is based on a typical 300-word page. The article is delivered in HTML format and is available in your Amazon.com Digital Locker immediately after purchase. You can view it with any web browser.
Citation Details
Title: Lost triumph: Lee's real plan at Gettysburg - and why it failed.
Author: Jason M. Bell
Publication:
Army Lawyer (Magazine/Journal)
Date: August 1, 2006
Publisher: Thomson Gale
Page: 35(5)
Distributed by Thomson Gale
Books:
- After This... An Inspirational Journey for All the Wrong Reasons
- Ain't Misbehavin: The 10 Discipline Issues Every Parent Faces and How to Resolve Them
- Algebra Out Loud: Learning Mathematics Through Reading and Writing Activities
- Animals Alive!: An Ecologoical Guide to Animal Activities
- Basic Guide To Pesticides: Their Characteristics And Hazards: Their Characteristics & Hazards
- Beginning Hydroponics: Soilless Gardening : A Beginner's Guide to Growing Vegetables, House Plants, Flowers, and Herbs Without Soil
- Boiler Operations Questions and Answers, 2nd Edition
- Bringing Baby Home: A New Owners Manual for First Time Parents
- Bringing Out the Winner in Your Child: The Building Blocks of Successful Parenting
- Building America - Hoover Dam (Building America)
Books Index
Books Home
Recommended Books
- Charles Dickens Four Complete Novels
- The Ultimate Rice Cooker Cookbook : 250 No-Fail Recipes for Pilafs, Risottos, Polenta, Chilis, Soups
- The Bar Sinister, Pride and Prejudice Continues
- Shrapnel in the Heart: Letters and Remembrance from the Vietnam Veteran's Memorial
- The Dog Is Not a Toy: House Rule #4
- String Theory and M-Theory: A Modern Introduction
- The New Gas Grill Gourmet, Updated and expanded : Great Grilled Food for Everyday Meals and Fantasti
- The Wealth of Nations
- Recreating Asia: Visions for a New Century
- Start Where You Are: Retirement Planning in a Changing World
Mama Said There'd Be Days Like This: A Twelve Step Guide to Surviving a Mastectomy
The Breast Reconstruction Guidebook, Second Edition
Understanding Lumpectomy: A Treatment Guide for Breast Cancer
Dr. Susan Love's Breast Book:4th Edition 2005
Why I Wore Lipstick : To My Mastectomy
